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PREFACE 
The Commission of the EC, strongly supported by the European Parliament, has 
initiated a project on 'The costs of non-Europe', and the benefits of 
"completing" the Community's Internal Market by the end of 1992. The 
steering committee, chaired by Mr Paolo Cecchini, decided that the work 
could benefit from an exploratory study of the Internal Markets of the US 
and Canada, in particular, their remaining 'incompleteness' as well as the 
costs and benefits. 
The present paper aims to analyze the nature of the Internal Market of the 
USA, with special attention for its remaining fragmentation, and that of 
Canada, with its fragmentation too, as well as the nature and scope of 
non-tariff barriers and other distortions discussed in the Canada-US free 
trade area talks. A second objective is to come to an assessment of costs 
and benefits of the barriers inside the two Internal Markets of the USA and 
Canada, respectively, as well as the costs and benefits of the ~..anada-US 
free trade area for the Canadian economy. 
The assignment is to provide an exploratory study, not a fully-fledged 
research product nor a very detailed and minute comparison. A major 
limitation of the paper is that no original research was conducted. The 
basis of the following is literature, interviews and discussion. 
The author is endebted to numerous Canadian and US civil servants, academic 
experts and specialists, who generously helped to gather material and to 
improve the understanding of the many intricate aspects of market 
integration in their countries. Special thanks are due to Mark Vanheukelen 
(DG II, EC Commission). His painstaking efforts to clarify lots of detailed 
pieces of economic regulation have been indispensable. His insightful 
analytical survey of the empirical economic studies on the impact of the 
US-Canada free trade area on the Canadian economy has greatly increased the 
quality of this report. Needless to emphasize, however, that only the author 
is responsible for any errors or omissions. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. In the framework of the research project 'The costs of non-Europe' it 
was considered useful to dispose of a study of the Internal Market 
arrangements in the US and in Canada as well as the recent endeavour 
of the two countries to establish one North American market. A second 
objective is to provide, whenever possible, a cost/benefit assessment 
of still existing 'barriers' in the two countries and of the removal 
of 'barriers' between the two neighbours. Since the free trade area 
agreement implies an enormous market enlargement for Canada, the 
latter cost/benefit analysis will concentrate on the Canadian case. 
2. The assignment is to provide an exploratory study. The report 
summarized below is not a fully-fledged research product, as no 
original research was conducted and sourcing, interviews and the 
processing of literature and material were limited by time 
constraints. 
3. The main features of the report are four: 
o the context of market integration in the US and in Canada 
o a comparative description of seven 'barriers' within the two 
Internal Markets 
o an assessment of the market fragmentation caused by each 
'barrier', and its costs, where possible 
o an assessment of the (net) economic benefits of North American 
market integration, especially for Canada. 
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4. The context of market integration in the two countries studied 
differs considerably from that of the European Community today, or 
even from the EC in 1993. It is also important to appreciate 
essential contextual differences between the US and Lanada. The 
report highlights a number of non-economic factors, such as 
demographic and geographic determinants of market size, some 
essential historical, constitutional and legal characteristics, and 
key political values. Although the factors are not elaborated, it is 
crucial to take them into account before any possible lesson is 
drawn from the assessments. 
5. The Internal Markets must also be placed in a wider economic context 
before a proper evaluation of the nature and degree of market 
integration and fragmentation can be made. The allocative function 
of government - exercized by the choice between the market mechanism 
on the one hand and the options of regulation and intervention in 
markets on the other hand - is not fully centralized in the two 
federations. However, the degree of delegation of allocative 
functions to the market and the degree of decentralization of 
regulation/intervention interact with two other economic functions 
of government: redistribution and macro-economic stabilization. The 
nature and degree of market integration depend on this interaction, 
and not solely on allocative decisions. 
6. Both Canada and the US have centralized their macro-economic 
stabilization policies. They each have one money and the federal 
government's budget carries a large weight in the national economy. 
There are no internal exchange controls and the money and capital 
markets are fairly well-integrated. Nevertheless, fiscal policy is 
not fully centralized and this gives rise to both macro-economic and 
allocative issues. The federal governments also assume certain 
general redistributive functions both directly and via 
(co-)financing welfare programmes at subcentral level. In both 
countries this central function is closely linked to labour mobility 
as citizens anywhere in the nation are always entitled to equal and 
free access to social security and related benefits. 
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The seven categories of 'barriers' were selected in prior 
consultation with the Commission in view of their prominence in the 
White Paper and their expected importance in the two countries. 
'Barriers' are defined as impediments to or artificial 
encouragements of economic mobility between States or Provinces. For 
a discussion of the concept used, the reader is referred to section 
4 .1. The seven categories of barriers selected are: (in) taxation, 
public aid, discriminatory public procurement, (in) financial 
services, technical barriers, (in) labour mobility and (in) 
transport. 
8. An elaboration of these barriers for both countries is not possible 
in the executive summary. Nonetheless, without some basic 
description, the assessment cannot be explained at all. A compromise 
is presented in Table EX-1, providing a highly condensed 
presentation of the comparative analysis in the chapters 5 and 6 of 
the report. The reader is warned that this material does not lend 
itself very well to such compression; for a proper understanding it 
remains indispensable to consult the main text. 
9. Very little research on the quantitative economic costs (and 
benefits, if any) has been conducted on the intra-US 'barriers'. For 
Canada some simple static estimates exist. Therefore, the report 
discusses internal 'barriers' in the two countries almost entirely 
in qualitative terms. Hence a 'ranking' of barriers in terms of 
costs is not possible and the following impressions are inevitably 
partly subjective. 
10. In Canada, the most costly 'barriers' are likely to be excises on 
alcoholic beverages (including the restrictions of provincial liquor 
boards); the administrative burden on road haulage flowing from the 
enforcement of the destination principle in fuel taxes; provincial 
subsidy competition; and the administrative burden on road haulage 
flowing from provincial entry regulation and registration fees. It 
is uncertain whether discriminatory public procurement is so costly 
to the economy. Interprovincial tax competition in Canada is 
unimportant in the retail sales tax and personal income tax and more 
- 12 -
'barriers' or 
sector 
1. taxation 
- sales 
- excises 
5 
TABLE EX-1 
THE INTERNAL BARRIERS IN CANADA AND THE US : 
a summary of facts and costs 
CANADA 
provinces levy retail 
sales tax; rates vary from 
0% to 12%; Ontario 7%; 
Quebec 9%, distances 
prevent major distortions; 
fiscal cross-border 
shopping is exceptional. 
excises differ among pro-
vinces but the main issues 
are with alcoholic 
beverages and motor fuel; 
local preferences through 
liquor boards' rules are 
combined with restrictions 
to minimize cross-border 
shopping; wine and spirits 
excises can be much higher 
than in the US; fuel 
excises differ also but 
the major concern of 
provinces is that miles 
travelled by trucks in a 
province are roughly 
proportional to fuel 
bought locally (via extra 
administrative controls). 
USA 
states and local 
authorities levy retail 
sales tax; rates (incl. 
local) vary from 0% to 9%; 
many states exempt various 
basic needs, but often in 
different ways; certain 
states tax services, 
others don't; geographical 
distribution and distances 
prevent major distortions; 
only few identifiable 
cases of fiscal 
cross-border shopping. 
states levy excises espe-
cially on cigarettes, 
alcoholic beverages and 
motor fuel; state 
cigarettes excises vary 
from 2 cents a pack up to 
29 cents; large scale 
cigarette bootlegging is a 
federal crime; individual 
cross-border shopping is 
accepted and can be sub-
stantial; spirits excises 
differ enormously from 
$1.50 to $6.50 (often 
combined with state mono-
poly systems); random 
checks on cross-border 
shopping of all alcoholic 
beverages; state motor 
fuel excises vary from 8 
cents to 19 cents a 
gallon, with cumbersome 
fuel use administration 
for trucks (per state). 
- 13 -
- corporate 
- personal 
income 
2. public aid 
- subsidies 
- tax breaks 
6 
provincial rates vary from 
10% to 16%; federal tax 
collection agreement for 7 
smaller provinces (i.e. 
identical base); there is 
uniformity for multi-
provincial firms in 
apportioning tax revenue 
among provinces. 
rates vary somewhat among 
provinces; base is 
harmonized through federal 
tax collection agreement 
(exc. Quebec); 
progressivity structure is 
similar; provincial tax 
credits may differ but not 
much. 
vigorous subsidy competi-
tion among provinces; no 
federal supervision via 
Ottawa or the Supreme 
Court; great variety of 
instruments, frequently 
'off-budget' (via 'crown' 
corporations or special 
funds); subsidy compe-
tition is reduced via 
federal regional 
programmes. 
numerous; limits (for 
corporate tax breaks) are 
set by the federal 
state (marginal) rates 
vary from 0% to 11,5%, 
ignoring all kinds of 
special cases; however, 
states compete via 
exemptions, too; 5 states 
have no corporate tax; 
unitary taxation is not 
forbidden, though strong 
pressures discourage it 
somewhat; altogether, 
interstate corporate tax 
competition has reduced 
average state corporate 
tax revenue below 5% of 
all state revenues. 
rates vary considerably 
among states, the highest 
marginal rates ranging 
from 10% to 13,5% in nine 
states and lower in other 
(before the recent tax 
reforms; to be reduced to 
four) states; seven states 
have no personal income 
tax and three levy only a 
tax on interest & 
dividends; state/local 
income tax is deductible 
for federal income tax 
purposes (reducing the 
impact of interstate tax 
competi- tion); federal 
and states' tax base not 
harmonized. 
all states have inward-
investment promotion 
activities, but direct 
state aids are very 
modest, major instruments 
are infrastructural, 
easier access to capital 
and various tax exemp-
tions; many states' laws 
forbid production sub-
sidies; commerce 
enforcement is 
major constraint. 
clause 
another 
numerous; especially on 
construction, initial 
outlays for plant and 
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3. procurement 
- formal 
- informal 
4. financial 
services 
- banking 
7 
collection agreement for 
the 7 smaller provinces, 
but not for the three 
bigger ones (as they opted 
out) 
complete constitutional 
freedom for provinces to 
purchase preferentially; 
provincial laws usuallyset 
maximum price diffe-
rences for tendering 
procedures. 
the formal leeway is 
materially reduced by 
interprovincial sensi-
tivities and tax payers' 
consciousness; neverthe-
less, numerous informal 
local content requirements 
or 'understandings' are 
reported. (Note: the 
provincial purchases are 
small compared to EC 
Member States, as major 
purchase categories are 
private in Canada or 
federal). 
nation-wide operations 
with, however, quite some 
provincial regulation; no 
nation-wide freedom to 
supply cross-border 
banking services; 
efficient national 
clearing; different 
banking functions were 
regulated at federal level 
(banks) and provincial 
(near-banks and 
securities); recent 
deregulation upset this 
system somewhat; the 
capital market is truly 
nation-wide and open to 
the world; there are 4 
stock exchanges in the 
country; the banks are few 
physical 
excise and 
immigrating 
executives) 
used. 
capital; also 
income tax (for 
business 
exemptions are 
around 20 states have 
preference laws (up to 5% 
price differential in 
bids); states as pur-
chasers are normally not 
constrained by the 
commerce clause. 
there are many anecdotes 
about informal pressures; 
tax payers' consciousness 
in the US is very nigh, 
however, and blatant 
discrimination (if costly) 
can be politically 
damaging (Note: state 
purchases are small 
compared to EC Member 
States as major purchase 
categories are private in 
the US or federal). 
banks can be chartered at 
federal or at state level; 
most supervision is 
federal, but assigned to a 
handful of institutions in 
a complex setting (savings 
and loans as well); frag-
mentation arises out of 
crippling branching 
restrictions: there are 
many thousands of 'unit' 
banks with no branches at 
all; interstate branching 
is forbidden, with groups 
of states sometimes 
allowing exceptions; 
intra-state brancning 
prohibitions still exist 
in a number of states. For 
the many complexities this 
- 15 -
- insurance 
5. technical 
barriers 
8 
in number (5 big ones gives rise to, see section 
attract most business) but 6.2.2. Pressures to reduce 
competition is fierce. this fragmentation are 
most regulation at 
provincial level; some at 
federal level; 
far-reaching harmonization 
between provinces has been 
achieved via uniform laws 
proposed by the Asso-
ciation of (provincial) 
Super-intendents of Insu-
rance, close collaboration 
between industry and 
regulators at federal 
level, and delegation of 
the control of the finan-
cial integrity of insurers 
to the federal Dept. of 
Insurance; in this way, 
formal provincial powers 
have nevertheless enabled 
effective market 
integration 
with 
in insurance, 
considerable 
standardization and mutual 
recognition and 'home 
province control' where 
necessary. 
formally, provinces have 
substantive regulatory 
powers; yet, apart from 
road haulage and a few 
instances in agriculture, 
there appear to be few 
problems in technical 
regulations. Standards are 
mostly nation-wide; so is 
certification. 
strong: they originate from 
financial stability 
concerns, technology, 
business strategies and 
consumer sources. The costs 
of fragmentation have 
probably decreased for 
consumers 
technology, 
instability 
high. 
due to 
but financial 
costs are still 
regulated at state level 
since Congress has 
explicitly allowed for 
this. Licensing of 
insurers and brokers per 
state and divergent state 
regulations lead to 
serious £ragmen- tation, 
although formally the 
freedom of services is 
nation-wide. States refuse 
'home state control', so 
super-vision is expensive 
and duplicative. 
Regulation extends to 
rates (at times very 
strict), solvency, 
insurance products, taxes 
and fees, and licensing -
there is reciprocity for 
licensing agents and 
brokers. Costs are further 
increased by almost 
permanent 
drift in 
legislative 
many states 
(recently again in 
response to the problems 
in product liability 
insurance). 
although standard writing 
is (privately) organized 
in an extremely 
complicated way, the 
issues arizing are in the 
antitrust area, not so 
much in differences among 
states regulations 
themselves, or the 
standards they refer to. 
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6. labour 
mobility 
- general constitutional rights to 
access travel and to migrate; 
to labour recourse to provincial 
markets social security/services; 
- professions 
nation-wide public 
pension; incomplete 
portability of private 
pensions; some cases of 
preferential provincial 
hiring of labour. 
extensive regulation of 
professional licensing at 
provincial level; 
sometimes the local 
professional organizations 
decide on admission; 
minimum residence 
requirements are rarely 
costly (but some are); 
barriers are serious for 
lawyers, pharmacists and 
surveyors, as well as for 
certain skilled craftsmen; 
university education is to 
federal standards in many 
cases (although 
restrictions exist in the 
medical field). 
Standards are nation-wide. 
The major exception is in 
the building codes. 
Nevertheless, the commerce 
clause should not be 
considered as preventing 
differences in technical 
regulations from arising at 
all, and this can be costly 
in individual cases. 
constitutional rights to 
travel and to migrate; 
recourse to state social 
security/services; fairly 
strict case law to prevent 
preferential hiring. 
extensive regulation of 
professional licensing at 
state level; dependent on 
state and professions, 
restrictions can vary from 
trivial to very serious; 
however, higher education 
in many cases is federally 
oriented or to federal 
(university) standards 
(yet, some states require 
local exams in some 
professions); 
mutual recognition exists 
in some cases, not in 
other there is no 
general rule. 
(Note: mobility is (Note: mobility is 
7. transport 
- registra-
tion 
actually substantial). 
At provincial level; until 
'82 license plates for 
every province; now there 
is 'home-province control' 
with mutual provincial 
recognition of the home 
plate, with an inter-
actually substantial). 
At state level; 
registration reciprocity 
is widespread; 
registration 'fees' 
competition is reduced in 
'compacts' (more than 30 
states), with fees shared 
-· 17 -
- fuel 
- other 
10 
provincial clearing based 
on miles travelled per 
province (i.e. an 
administrative burden). 
fuel taxes differ among 
provinces; the real 
problem is the destination 
principle; fuel tax 
revenues are shared out 
among provinces according 
to miles travelled in the 
province(s), which imposes 
cumbersome administrative 
requirements for road 
haulage. 
licensing before entering 
the road haulage sector 
takes place at provincial 
level (stricter 
regulations for out-of-
province truckers are 
sometimes validated by the 
Supreme Court, which 
reduces the cabotage 
right). 
ace. to miles travelled 
(i.e. an administrative 
burden). 
as in Canada, the 
destination of the fuel 
tax revenue is the key 
issue; truckers are held 
to fill tanks proportional 
to miles travelled in the 
various states (or pay the 
excise anyway), and file 
forms and accounts proving 
this; random checks are 
regularly held. 
43 states have not 
deregulated on intra-state 
transport incl. entry 
barriers and 'fair 
competition' rules which 
can be peculiar; they can 
create some costs for 
firms operating 
nationwide; property taxes 
and sales taxes on trucks 
differ; on axle/distance 
taxes, there is even tax 
retaliation among certain 
states. 
NOTE: For a proper evaluation, this list of barriers should be read 
together with the assessment in the text. The economic context, the 
benefits and minor costs are not indicated in this summary. Details are 
ignored. 
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pronounced for corporate taxes. Financial services present some 
complications but in reality, fragmentation has been largely 
prevented. The costs of having formal provincial powers in insurance 
are negligeable as harmonization is almost complete. There are hardly 
any problems with securities, but near-banks cause regulatory and 
supervisory costs. Technical barriers are exceptional in Canada. 
Migration for the professions can be onerous in some cases; 
uncertainty exists because of local admission procedures. 
11. In the US, the most costly 'barriers' include interstate tax 
competition in general, interstate branching prohibitions in banking, 
state regulation in direct insurance and administrative burdens 
connected to interstate road transport arrangements. 
Interstate tax competition is so fierce in the US that it covers 
almost any conceivable tax, including death taxes and gambling taxes. 
In sales taxes there is only a moderate spread of rates, but this is 
likely to be related to transaction costs for non-marginal cross 
border shopping, given the absence of fiscal frontiers (so, one could 
argue that sales tax competition is also fierce but restrained by 
open borders). In excises, competition is stronger, and complemented 
by non-fiscal (f. i. administrative) measures to secure tax revenues 
for the state of consumption. These measures even lead to cooperation 
among the States and, in cigarettes, to federal law enforcement for 
the States' purposes! In corporate and personal income matters, tax 
competition is strong; in corporate taxes, exemption policy and other 
tax breaks play a role as near-subsidies. State subsidies are of 
trivial importance and public procurement discrimination seems only 
marginally more costly. Technical barriers in interstate commerce are 
effectively minimized (if not removed) by commerce clause case-law 
but, to some extent, state technical regulation and their differences 
may still lead to higher costs for multi-state business; standards 
and certification present few problems, however. Interstate mobility 
of the professions sometimes seems to be hampered by overly strict 
regulation, including licensing and supervision. Since national 
standards for professions and university education are well-accepted, 
mobility costs are generally not increased more than marginally. 
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12. Finally, in both countries incidental 'barriers' can be identified 
outside the selected group of seven categories. They remain outside 
the scope of this report (for an impression of this problem, see 
sections 5.1 and 6.1). 
13. A cost/benefit perspective of the fragmentation and integration of 
the internal markets of the US and of Canada requires, nowever, a 
broader set of criteria. Looking strictly to 'barriers' as 
impediments to access to state/provincial markets or as artificial 
encouragement of inward economic mobilities might provide a singular 
emphasis on 'costs'. From this angle, 'benefits' would be identified 
only for sectoral or regional interests, with the national economy 
presumably suffering an overall welfare loss. Given the nature of the 
Commission's research project 'The costs of Non-Europe', this report 
does not address the benefits of sectoral groups. 
14. The problem is quite different with regional interests. Of course, at 
regional level sectoral lobbies will attempt to present their case in 
terms of 'regional' benefits. If and only if this is all there is to 
the political economy of 'barriers', the mere concentration on costs 
to the national economy would be proper. But in federal countries, 
this cannot always be correct. It is conceivable to design a model 
federal country where market integration is complete, and where 
subcentral governments are only involved in purely regional 
expenditure and regulation (with no spill-over effects to other 
subcentral economies). Neither the US nor Canada fully respond to 
this model. Since they do not, 'barriers' must be presumed to 
generate certain 'benefits', as elements of political support to the 
federalist structure of government. 
15. If there are 'benefits' of plurality, variety or diversity, two 
questions emerge in the context of this report: 
(a) given the constitutionally assigned powers and politically agreed 
division of labour between the central and the subcentral 
governments - i.e. the 'benefits' - are these powers utilized in 
such a way as to achieve the highest degree of market integration? 
In other words, given the 'benefits' of a federal structure, are 
the 'costs' of fragmentation minimized? 
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(b) The 'benefits' of diversity may include more than the 
satisfaction of having one's own regional government with some 
powers to satisfy local preferences. To what extent, then, do 
regional regulation and intervention (in the US and Canada) yield 
benefits to the national economy, that are not captured by the 
focus on their distortive nature as 'barriers'? 
16. If the immaterial, but genuine, 'benefits' of a federal structure are 
expressed in regional competences with a market-fragmenting 
potential, the issue is one of cost minimization. A variety of 
approaches are used in the two countries. 
o federal judicial review on the kind of measures, allowed to 
affect market integration; in the US the commerce clause case-law 
goes very far in protecting interstate commerce from state 
measures; in Canada, the interprovincial economic mobilities are 
also protected but there is more attention to preserve the 
effective economic powers of the provinces (the 'benefits'). 
o a complementary factor in both countries is the threat of federal 
preemption, possible under the constitution but not utilized so 
as to increase the 'benefits' of decentralization. The threat 
tends to become more credible as the costs of fragmenting 
subcentral measures increases, thereby having the effect of 
curbing local protectionist pressures. In the insurance market in 
the US, states can only retain current powers if they find 
mechanisms keeping the costs of fragmentation acceptable, so that 
federal pressure to preempt does not build up. In the US banking 
market, interstate branching prohibitions in federal laws have 
been threatened a number of times; in the distant past, new 
measures bordering on the problem have been used as palliatives 
(federal deposit insurance being one); during the last few 
decades more and more routes of evasion have been agreed or 
condoned at federal level, leading at state level to a measured 
relaxation of the prohibition as a response since 1985. In 
Canada, the federal government delegated road transport 
regulation to the provinces in the early 1950's and the mounting 
irritation about the costs of fragmentation (against the backdrop 
- 21 -
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of a constitutional debate on an 'economic bill of rights' 
guaranteeing market integration) forced the provinces to reduce 
these costs in the early 1980's. 
o cooperation among the States or Provinces. For subcentral 
governments this has the advantage of retaining powers (and, 
whenever relevant, tax revenues), while reducing fragmentation, 
duplication or harmful competition. Both countries have developed 
legal techniques that greatly reduce costly differences in 
regional laws and procedures: the major instrument is Uniform Law 
Codes, but sometimes uniform insurance policies exist or 
identical procedures. Cooperation may extend to 'mutual 
recognition' (e.g. licensing insurance brokers in US States) but 
not frequently (e.g. rarely in licensing insurers). Mutual 
recognition is approximated, however, in cases where national 
standards (technical; diploma's) are used as references in 
regional laws; some costs remain in such cases, as licensing 
procedures may still be required. Cooperation is also developing 
in joint institutions (cf. solvency investigation of non-US 
insurers by the NAIC, seeking licenses in a State), in interstate 
compacts (sharing truck registration fees, for instance, or, 
allowing limited reciprocal interstate bankbranching) and in 
joint lobbying organisations (promoting federal-subcentral 
cooperation so as to reduce fragmentation or enhance 
'harmonization'). Cooperation can go as far as delegating 
administrative execution (tax collection agreements in Canada; 
some insurance controls in Canada) or enforcement power (checks 
on cigarette bootlegging in the US) to the federal government. In 
the case of administrative execution this increases uniformity as 
a condition to the federal task (e.g. a uniform tax base). In the 
case of cigarette bootlegging, however, it has reduced the 
constraint of (illegal) cross-border trade, thereby increasing 
the freedom of the States to raise excises. 
17. Are there other benefits of regional powers to the national economy, 
that are not captured by the focus on their distortive nature as 
'barriers'? If so, they would have to be weighed against the 'costs' 
of barriers. The report does not discuss this question in any detail. 
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For a good understanding of how Canadians and Americans perceive the 
cost/benefit issue, it is nevertheless valuable to identify briefly 
these other benefits. This may well have some relevance to the 
Community's own assessment of costs and benefits of the 'remaining' 
fragmentation of its Internal Market. 
o under appropriate conditions, the combination of a high degree of 
market integration with 
generates the benefits of 
some remaining subcentral powers 
'competitive federalism'. The idea is 
that citizens and firms can signal dissatisfaction with taxes, 
public goods and services and regulation by interstate/provincial 
migration. Subcentral governments may also compete with respect 
to the nature and intensity of interventions in the goods and 
services markets, setting different objectives or imposing 
different costs for given targets. More generally, subcentral 
government performance is subject to competitive challenges from 
other subcentral governments, and this may prompt policies to be 
more responsive. In the Padoa- Schiappa report this idea is 
echoed as 'competition-among-rules'. The benefits flowing from 
such competition cannot be available when central powers are the 
alternative. On the other hand, for the benefits to materialize, 
a fairly high degree of market integration must be achieved 
(especially for factors of production) for migation to serve as a 
disciplining factor. This applies, mutatis mutandis, to product 
and services market integration. In other words, in the EC 
context, the completion of the White Paper is essential before 
this benefit could be enjoyed. Note that neither in the US nor in 
Canada competition among rules, among tax regimes and public 
goods has led to a removal of diversity, or to overall 'low 
standards' of whatever activity. For instance, tax competftion 
accentuates diversity while at the same time finding a minimum 
standard in the desired ability everywhere to provide good 
infrastructure, certain merit goods and certain public goods. 
o decentralization fosters innovation, which may or may not spread 
according to its attractiveness. This is a longstanding argument 
against coordination or centralization. The argument is used to 
rationalize powers which currently carry some costs in terms of 
fragmentation. However, it cuts two ways. The mobility of the 
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professions in the US regulated is stricter than necessary, due 
to rapid interstate imitation of 'innovations', thereby having 
made interstate mobility more costly. On the other hand, where 
deregulation is proving successful, a possibly benef1cial 
side-product of spreading regional deregulation is improved 
market integration (cf. banking in Canada, led by Quebec; road 
transport deregulation in the US). 
o finally, and not surprising for federalist countries, in a number 
of policy areas, the mere avoidance of central policies or 
regulation is perceived as a benefit, worth some costs of 
fragmentation. In Canada this point is related to the peculiar 
economic geography of the country (chapter 2 and section .).1), 
which causes federal sectoral policies to benefit certain clearly 
identifiable provinces at the expense of other equally clearly 
identifiable ones. However, in both countries, there are also 
political objections which fall outside the scope of this report. 
18. The recently signed but still not ratified US-Canadian free trade 
agreement is discussed in the last two chapters. 
Three questions are addressed. First, was the expectation borne out 
that the negotiating parties would move beyond mere free trade to a 
kind of common market, possibly the only case comparable to the White 
Paper? The answer is clearly no. Although from a GATT perspective, 
the agreement is ambitious and may be a helpful exercise for the 
Uruguay Round, it falls far short of virtually all the major dossiers 
of the White Paper. Trade in services is not tackled, merely the 
'right of establishment' combined with 'national treatment'. The 
direct investment regime, especially on the Canadian part, is 
conditional and has significant exceptions. What exactly will happen 
to the mobility of the profession is unclear. Even in product trade 
certain restrictions have been 'grandfathered' (i.e. accepted), 
notably for beer, and others have been relaxed only conditionally and 
incompletely. On subsidies, no agreement was reached but new rules 
are nevertheless announced as a basis for 'binding' dispute 
settlement; however, all this has to be agreed in the next five to 
seven years. In other words, there are reasons to be sceptical about 
Congress's willingness to give up its power of countervailing duties 
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before March 3, 1988 (the deadline of the 'fast track' procedure) 
without having the slightest idea about the principles and the rules 
on subsidies. 
19. Second, the North American free trade area (NAFTA) negotiations 
called forth the question whether states and provinces would give up 
regulatory and subsidy powers for the sake of bilateral economic 
intercourse, although these powers are on the whole seen as essential 
to federalism. The short answer is that subcentral governments, 
especially in Canada, have informally influenced the negotiations in 
such a way that competences have hardly or not been undermined. 
Possibly, NAFTA may force provinces and states to exercise their 
economic powers in a less costly fashion. Thus, it is conceivable 
that the cost minimization, discussed in para. 16 tinfra), is 
facilitated by bilateral or multilateral liberalization, if only it 
is stringent enough. However, it does not imply that the assignment 
of economic competences to the two levels ot government in both 
federations is called into question. 
20. The third reason to study NAFTA is the rich Canadian economic debate 
on the impact of the enormous market enlargement it implies for 
Canada. The economic methodology as well as the orders of magnitude 
found are of obvious interest to the 'cost of non-Europe' project. 
Methodological issues are especially important as Canadian economists 
have published path-breaking work on NAFTA, using general equilibrium 
models with economies of scale and imperfect competition (here: price 
collusion behind protection). This also enables to break out of the 
narrow confines of traditional partial-equilibrium estimates (based 
on 'welfare triangles'), which are known to yield too low estimates 
of welfare effects of trade liberalization, given their assumptions. 
21. Chapter 8 discusses in some detail (adapted) partial equilibrium 
estimates, general equilibrium model estimates and those from large 
macro-econometric models, including some methodological issues. For 
the purpose of this study it is important that these different 
approaches produce empirical estimates much larger than the simple 
traditional approaches. Nevertheless, the empirical problems are 
- 25 -
18 
considerable: general equilibrium model estimates vary but go up to a 
high of 9% GDP increase, whereas the macro-econometric estimates 
(after 10 years) move between 1.9% and 3.3% GNP increase (as well as 
different employment increases). Amongst a number of empirical 
puzzles one has to solve when using these models, the proper 
calculation of the 'height' of 'non-tariff barriers' in the product 
market - not to spreak of services or factors - and the assumed 
reactions on their removal stand out as particularly difficult. All 
in all, the work on the economic impact of NAFTA on Canada supports 
the methodological direction of the 'Costs of Non-Europe' project 
with respect to the goods markets and the empirical results for 
Canada lend plausibility to the range of estimates on the EG of 1992. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. In the framework of the research project 'The costs of non-Europe' 
it was considered useful to dispose of a study of the Internal 
Market arrangements in the US and 1n Canada as well as the recent 
endeavour of the two countries to establish one North American 
market. A second objective is to provide, whenever possible, a 
cost/benefit assessment of still existing 'barriers' in the two 
countries and of the removal of 'barriers' between the two 
neighbours. Since the free trade area agreement implies an enormous 
market enlargement for Canada, the latter cost/benefit analysis will 
concentrate on the Canadian case. 
2. The assignment is to provide an exploratory study. The report 
sunnnarized below is not a fully-fledged research product, as no 
original research was conducted and sourcing, interviews and the 
processing of literature and material were limited by time 
constraints. 
3. The main features of the report are four: 
o the context of market integration in the US and in Canada 
o a comparative description of seven 'barriers' within the two 
Internal Markets 
o an assessment of the market fragmentation caused by each 
'barrier', and its costs, where possible 
o an assessment of the (net) economic benefits of North American 
market integration, especially for Canada. 
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4. The context of market integration in the two countries studied 
differs considerably from that of the European Conununity today, or 
even from the EC 1n 1993. It 1s also important to appreciate 
essential contextual differences between the US and Canada. The 
report highlights a number of non-economic factors, such as 
demographic and geographic determinants of market size, some 
essential historical, constitutional and legal characteristics, and 
key political values. Although the factors are not elaborated, it is 
crucial to take them into account before any possible lesson is 
drawn from the assessments. 
5. The Internal Markets must also be placed in a wider economic context 
before a proper evaluation of the nature and degree of market 
integration and fragmentation can be made. The allocative function 
of government - exercized by the choice between the market mechanism 
on the one hand and the options of regulation and intervention in 
markets on the other hand - is not fully centralized in the two 
federations. However, the degree of delegation of allocative 
functions to the market and the degree of decentralization of 
regulation/intervention interact with two other economic functions 
of government: redistribution and macro-economic stabilization. The 
nature and degree of market integration depend on this interaction, 
and not solely on allocative decisions. 
6. Both Canada and the US have centralized their macro-econom1c 
stabilization policies. They each have one money and the federal 
government's budget carries a large weight in the national economy. 
There are no internal exchange controls and the money and capital 
markets are fairly well-integrated. Nevertheless, fiscal policy is 
not fully centralized and this gives rise to both macro-economic and 
allocative issues. The federal governments also assume certain 
general redistributive functions both directly and v1a 
(co-)financing welfare progranunes at subcentral level. In both 
countries this central function is closely linked to labour mobility 
as citizens anywhere in the nation are always entitled to equal and 
free access to social security and related benefits. 
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VII 
The seven categories of 'barriers' were selected 1n prior 
consultation with the Commission in view of their prominence in the 
White Paper and their expected importance in the two countries. 
'Barriers' are defined as impediments to or artificial 
encouragements of economic mobility between States or Provinces. For 
a discussion of the concept used, the reader is referred to section 
4.1. The seven categories of barriers selected are: (in) taxation, 
public aid, discriminatory public procurement, (in) financial 
services, technical barriers, (in) labour mobility and (in) 
transport. 
8. An elaboration of these barriers for both countries is not possible 
1n the executive summary. Nonetheless, without some basic 
description, the assessment cannot be explained at all. A compromise 
is presented 1n Table EX-1, providing a highly condensed 
presentation of the comparative analysis in the chapters 5 and 6 of 
the report. The reader is warned that this material does not lend 
itself very well to such compression; for a proper understanding it 
remains indispensable to consult the main text. 
9. Very little research on the quantitative economic costs (and 
benefits, if any) has been conducted on the intra-US 'barriers'. For 
Canada some simple static estimates exist. Therefore, the report 
discusses internal 'barriers' in the two countries almost entirely 
in qualitative terms. Hence a 'ranki'ng' of barriers 1n terms of 
costs is not possible and the following impressions are inevitably 
partly subjective. 
10. In Canada, the most costly 'barriers' are likely to be excises on 
alcoholic beverages (including the restrictions of provincial liquor 
boards); the administrative burden on road haulage flowing from the 
enforcement of the destination principle in fuel taxes; provincial 
subsidy competition; and the administrative burden on road haulage 
flowing from provincial entry regulation and registration fees. It 
is uncertain whether discriminatory public procurement is so costly 
to the economy. Interprovincial tax competition in Canada 1s 
unimportant in the retail sales tax and personal income tax and more 
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'barriers' or 
sector 
1. taxation 
- sales 
- excises 
VIII 
TABLE EX-1 
THE INTERNAL BARRIERS IN CANADA AND THE US : 
a summary of facts and costs 
CANADA 
provinces levy retail 
sales tax; rates vary from 
0% to 12%; Ontario 7%; 
Quebec 9%, distances 
prevent major distortions; 
fiscal cross-border 
shopping is exceptional. 
excises differ among pro-
vinces but the main issues 
are with alcoholic 
beverages and motor fuel; 
local preferences through 
liquor boards' rules are 
combined with restrictions 
to minimize cross-border 
shopping; wine and spirits 
excises can be much higher 
than in the US; fuel 
excises differ also but 
the major concern of 
provinces is that miles 
travelled by trucks in a 
province are roughly 
proportional to fuel 
bought locally (via extra 
administrative controls). 
USA 
states and local 
authorities levy retail 
sales tax; rates (inc 1. 
local) vary from 0% to 9%; 
many states exempt various 
basic needs, but often in 
different ways; certain 
states tax services, 
others don't; geographical 
distribution and distances 
prevent major distortions; 
only few identifiable 
cases of fiscal 
cross-border shopping. 
states levy excises espe-
cially on cigarettes, 
alcoholic beverages and 
motor fuel; state 
cigarettes excises vary 
from 2 cents a pack up to 
29 cents; large scale 
cigarette bootlegging is a 
federal crime; individual 
cross-border shopping is 
accepted and can be sub-
stantial; spirits excises 
differ enormously from 
$1.50 to $6.50 (often 
combined with state mono-
poly systems); random 
checks on cross-border 
shopping of all alcoholic 
beverages; state motor 
fuel excises vary from 8 
cents to 19 cents a 
gallon, with cumbersome 
fuel use administration 
for trucks (per state). 
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- corporate 
- personal 
income 
2. public aid 
- subsidies 
- tax breaks 
IX 
provincial rates vary from 
10% to 16%; federal tax 
collection agreement for 7 
smaller provinces (i.e. 
identical base); there is 
uniformity for multi-
provincial firms in 
apportioning tax 
among provinces. 
revenue 
rates vary somewhat among 
provinces; base is 
harmonized through federal 
tax collection agreement 
(exc. Quebec); 
progressivity structure is 
similar; provincial tax 
credits may differ but not 
much. 
vigorous subsidy competi-
tion among provinces; no 
federal supervision via 
Ottawa or the Supreme 
Court; great variety of 
instruments, frequently 
'off-budget' (via 'crown' 
corporations or special 
funds); subsidy compe-
tition is reduced via 
federal regional 
programmes. 
numerous; 
corporate 
set by 
limits (for 
tax breaks) are 
the federal 
state (marginal) rates 
vary from 0% to ll, 5%, 
ignoring all kinds of 
special cases; however, 
states compete via 
exemptions, too; 5 states 
have no corporate tax; 
unitary taxation is not 
forbidden, though strong 
pressures discourage it 
somewhat; altogether, 
interstate corporate tax 
competition has reduced 
average state corporate 
tax revenue below 5% of 
all state revenues. 
rates vary considerably 
among states, the highest 
marginal rates ranging 
from 10% to 13, 5% in nine 
states and lower in other 
(before the recent tax 
reforms; to be reduced to 
four) states; seven states 
have no personal income 
tax and three levy only a 
tax on interest & 
dividends; state/local 
income tax is deductible 
for federal income tax 
purposes (reducing the 
impact of interstate tax 
competi- tion); federal 
and states' tax base not 
harmonized. 
all states have inward-
investment promotion 
activities, but direct 
s~ate aids are very 
modest, major instruments 
are infrastructural, 
easier access to capital 
and various tax exemp-
tions; many states' laws 
forbid production sub-
sidies; commerce clause 
enforcement is another 
major constraint. 
numerous; especially on 
construction, initial 
outlays for plant and 
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3. procurement 
- formal 
- informal 
4. financial 
services 
- banking 
X 
collection agreement for physical 
the 7 smaller prov1nces, excise and 
but not for the three immigrating 
bigger ones (as they opted executives) 
capital; also 
income tax (for 
business 
exemptions are 
out) used. 
complete constitutional 
freedom for provinces to 
purchase preferentially; 
provincial laws usuallyset 
maximum price diffe-
rences for tendering 
procedures. 
the formal leeway is 
materially reduced by 
interprovincial sens1-
tivities and tax payers' 
consciousness; neverthe-
less, numerous informal 
local content requirements 
or 'understandings' are 
reported. (Note: the 
provincial purchases are 
small compared to EC 
Member States, as major 
purchase categories are 
private in Canada or 
federal). 
nation-wide operations 
with, however, quite some 
provincial regulation; no 
nation-wide freedom to 
supply cross-border 
banking services; 
efficient national 
clearing; different 
banking functions were 
regulated at federal level 
(banks) and provincial 
(near-banks and 
securities); recent 
deregulation upset this 
system somewhat; the 
capital market is truly 
nation-wide and open to 
the world; there are 4 
stock exchanges _in the 
country; the banks are few 
around 20 states have 
preference laws (up to 5% 
price differential in 
bids); states as pur-
chasers are normally not 
constrained by the 
commerce clause. 
there are many anecdotes 
about informal pressures; 
tax payers' consciousness 
in the US is very high, 
however, and blatant 
discrimination (if costly) 
can be politically 
damaging (Note: state 
purchases are small 
compared to EC Member 
States as major purchase 
categories are private 1n 
the US or federal). 
banks can be chartered at 
federal or at state level; 
most supervision is 
federal, but assigned to a 
handful of institutions 1n 
a complex setting (savings 
and loans as well); frag-
mentation arises out of 
crippling branching 
restrictions: there are 
many thousands of 'unit' 
banks with no branches at 
all; interstate branching 
is forbidden, with groups 
of states sometimes 
allowing exceptions; 
intra-state branching 
prohibitions still exist 
in a number of states. For 
the many complexities this 
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- insurance 
5. technical 
barriers 
XI 
in number (5 big ones gives rise to, see section 
attract most business) but 6.2.2. Pressures to reduce 
competition is fierce. this fragmentation are 
most regulation at 
provincial level; some at 
federal level; 
far-reaching harmonization 
between provinces has been 
achieved v1a uniform laws 
proposed by the Asso-
ciation of (provincial) 
Super-intendents of Insu-
rance, close collaboration 
between industry and 
regulators at federal 
level, and delegation of 
the control of the finan-
cial integrity of insurers 
to the federal Dept. of 
Insurance; in this way, 
formal provincial powers 
have nevertheless enabled 
effective market 
integration 
with 
in insurance, 
considerable 
standardization and mutual 
recognition and 'home 
province control' where 
necessary. 
formally, provinces have 
substantive regulatory 
powers; yet, apart from 
road haulage and a few 
instances in agriculture, 
there appear to be few 
problems in technical 
regulations. Standards are 
mostly nation-wide; so 1s 
certification. 
strong: they originate from 
financial stability 
concerns, technology, 
business strategies and 
consumer sources. The costs 
of fragmentation have 
probably decreased for 
consumers due to 
technology, but financial 
instability costs are still 
high. 
regulated at state level 
since Congress has 
explicitly allowed for 
this. Licensing of 
insurers and brokers per 
state and divergent state 
regulations lead to 
serious £ragmen- tation, 
although formally the 
freedom of services is 
nation-wide. States refuse 
'home state control', so 
super-v1s1on 1s expensive 
and duplicative. 
Regulation extends to 
rates (at times very 
strict), solvency, 
insurance products, taxes 
and fees, and licensing -
there 1s reciprocity for 
licensing agents and 
brokers. Costs are further 
increased by almost 
permanent legislative 
drift in many states 
(recently again in 
response to the problems 
in product liability 
insurance). 
although standard writing 
is (privately) organized 
in an extremely 
complicated way, the 
issues arizing are in the 
antitrust area, not so 
much 1n differences among 
states regulations 
themselves, or the 
standards they refer to. 
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6. labour 
mobility 
- general constitutional rights to 
access travel and to migrate; 
to labour recourse to provincial 
markets social security/services; 
- professions 
nation-wide public 
pension; incomplete 
portability of private 
pens ions; some cases of 
preferential provincial 
hiring of labour. 
extensive regulation of 
professional licensing at 
provincial level; 
sometimes the local 
professional organizations 
decide on admission; 
minimum residence 
requirements are rarely 
costly (but some are); 
barriers are serious for 
lawyers, pharmacists and 
surveyors, as well as for 
certain skilled craftsmen; 
university education is to 
federal standards in many 
cases (although 
restrictions exist ~n the 
medical field). 
Standards are nation-wide. 
The major exception is in 
the building codes. 
Nevertheless, the commerce 
clause should not be 
considered as preventing 
differences 1n technical 
regulations from ar1s1ng at 
all, and this can be costly 
in individual cases. 
constitutional rights to 
travel and to migrate; 
recourse to state social 
security/services; fairly 
strict case law to prevent 
preferential hiring. 
extensive regulation of 
professional licensing at 
state level; dependent on 
state and professions, 
restrictions can vary from 
trivial to very serious; 
however, higher education 
in many cases is federally 
oriented or to federal 
(university) standards 
(yet, some states require 
local exams in some 
professions); 
mutual recognition exists 
1n some cases, not ~n 
other there is no 
general rule. 
(Note: mobility is (Note: mobility is 
7. transport 
- registra-
tion 
actually substantial). 
At provincial level; until 
'82 license plates for 
every province; now there 
is 'home-province control' 
with mutual provincial 
recognition of the home 
actually substantial). 
At state level; 
reciprocity 
widespread; 
'fees' 
is reduced 1n 
(more than 30 
registration 
is 
registration 
competition 
'compacts' 
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- other 
XIII 
plate, with an inter-
provincial clearing based 
on miles travelled per 
province (i.e. an 
administrative burden). 
fuel taxes differ among 
provinces; the real 
problem is the destination 
principle; fuel tax 
revenues are shared out 
among provinces according 
to miles travelled 1n the 
province( s), which imposes 
cumbersome administrative 
requirements for road 
haulage. 
licensing before entering 
the road haulage sec tor 
takes place at provincial 
level (stricter 
regulations for out-of-
province 
sometimes 
Supreme 
reduces 
right). 
truckers are 
validated by the 
Court, which 
the cabotage 
states), with fees shared 
ace. to miles travelled 
(i.e. an administrative 
burden). 
as in Canada, the 
destination of the fuel 
tax revenue 1s the key 
issue; truckers are held 
to fill tanks proportional 
to miles travelled 1n the 
various states (or pay the 
excise anyway), and file 
forms and accounts proving 
this; random checks are 
regularly held. 
43 states have not 
deregulated on intra-state 
transport incl. entry 
barriers and 'fair 
competition' rules which 
can be peculiar; they can 
create some costs for 
firms operating 
nationwide; property taxes 
and sales taxes on trucks 
differ; on axle/distance 
taxes, there 1s even tax 
retaliation among certain 
states. 
NOTE: For a proper evaluation, this list of barriers should be read 
together with the assessment in the text. The economic context, the 
benefits and minor costs are not indicated in this summary. Details are 
ignored. 
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pronounced for corporate taxes. 
complications but in reality, 
Financial services present some 
fragmentation has been largely 
prevented. The costs of having formal provincial powers in insurance 
are negligeable as harmonization is almost complete. There are hardly 
any problems with securities, but near-banks cause regulatory and 
supervisory costs. Technical barriers are exceptional 1n Canada. 
Migration for the professions can be onerous 1n some cases; 
uncertainty exists because of local admission procedures. 
11. In the US, the most costly 'barriers' include interstate tax 
competition in general, interstate branching prohibitions in banking, 
state regulation in direct insurance and administrative burdens 
connected to interstate road transport arrangements. 
Interstate tax competition is so fierce 1n the US that it covers 
almost any conceivable tax, including death taxes and gambling taxes. 
In sales taxes there is only a moderate spread of rates, but this is 
likely to be related to transaction costs for non-marginal cross 
border shopping, given the absence of fiscal frontiers (so, one could 
argue that sales tax competition is also fierce but restrained by 
open borders). In excises, competition is stronger, and complemented 
by non-fiscal (f.i. administrative) measures to secure tax revenues 
for the state of consumption. These measures even lead to cooperation 
among the States and, in cigarettes, to federal law enforcement for 
the States' purposes! In corporate and personal income matters, tax 
competition is strong; 1n corporate taxes, exemption policy and other 
tax breaks play a role as near-subsidies. State subsidies are of 
trivial importance and public procurement discrimination seems only 
marginally more costly. Technical barriers in interstate commerce are 
effectively minimized (if not removed) by commerce clause case-law 
but, to some extent, state technical regulation and their differences 
may still lead to higher costs for multi-state business; standards 
and certification present few problems, however. Interstate mobility 
of the professions sometimes seems to be hampered by overly strict 
regulation, including licensing and supervision. Since national 
standards for professions and university education are well-accepted, 
mobility costs are generally not increased more than marginally. 
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12. Finally, 1n both countries incidental 'barriers' can be identified 
outside the selected group of seven categories. They remain outside 
the scope of this report (for an impression of this problem, see 
sections 5.1 and 6.1). 
13. A cost/benefit perspective of the fragmentation and integration of 
the internal markets of the US and of Canada requires, however, a 
broader set of criteria. Looking strictly to 'barriers' as 
impediments to access to state/provincial markets or as artificial 
encouragement of inward economic ~abilities might provide a singular 
emphasis on 'costs'. From this angle, 'benefits' would be identified 
only for sectoral or regional interests, with the national economy 
presumably suffering an overall welfare loss. Given the nature of the 
Commission's research project 'The costs of Non-Europe', this report 
does not address the benefits of sectoral groups. 
14. The problem is quite different with regional interests. Of course, at 
regional level sectoral lobbies will attempt to present their case 1n 
terms of 'regional' benefits. If and only if this is all there 1s to 
the political economy of 'barriers', the mere concentration on costs 
to the national economy would be proper. But in federal countries, 
this cannot always be correct. It is conceivable to design a model 
federal country where market integration is complete, and where 
subcentral governments are only involved 1n purely regional 
expenditure and regulation (with no spill-over effects to other 
subcentral economies). Neither the US nor Canada fully respond to 
this model. Since they do not, 'barriers' must be presumed to 
generate certain 'benefits', as elements of political support to the 
federalist structure of government. 
15. If there are 'benefits' of plurality, variety or diversity, two 
questions emerge in the context of this report: 
(a) given the constitutionally assigned powers and politically agreed 
division of labour between the central and the subcentral 
governments - i.e. the 'benefits' - are these powers utilized in 
such a way as to achieve the highest degree of market integration? 
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In other words, given the 'benefits' of a federal structure, are 
the 'costs' of fragmentation minimized? 
(b) The 'benefits' of diversity may include more than the 
satisfaction of having one's own regional government with some 
powers to satisfy local preferences. To what extent, then,· do 
regional regulation and intervention (in the US and Canada) yield 
benefits to the national economy, that are not captured by the 
focus on their distortive nature as 'barriers'? 
16. If the immaterial, but genu1ne, 'benefits' of a federal structure are 
expressed 1n regional competences with a market-fragmenting 
potential, the 1ssue is one of cost minimization. A variety of 
approaches are used in the two countries. 
o federal judicial review on the kind of measures, allowed to 
affect market integration; in the US the commerce clause case-law 
goes very far 1n protecting interstate commerce from state 
measures; in Canada, the interprovincial economic mobilities are 
also protected but there is more attention to preserve the 
effective economic powers of the provinces (the 'benefits'). 
o a complementary factor in both countries is the threat of federal 
preemption, possible under the constitution but not utilized so 
as to increase the 'benefits' of decentralization. The threat 
tends to become more credible as the costs of fragmenting 
subcentral measures increases, thereby having the effect of 
curbing local protectionist pressures. In the insurance market 1n 
the US, states can only retain current powers if they find 
mechanisms keeping the costs of fragmentation acceptable, so that 
federal pressure to preempt does not build up. In the US banking 
market, interstate branching prohibitions in federal laws have 
been threatened a number of times; in the distant past, new 
measures bordering on the problem have been used as palliatives 
(federal deposit insurance being one); during the last few 
decades more and more routes of evasion have been agreed or 
condoned at federal level, leading at state level to a measured 
relaxation of the prohibition as a response since 1985. In 
Canada, the federal government delegated road transport 
regulation to the provinces in the early 1950's and the mounting 
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irritation about the costs of fragmentation (against the backdrop 
of a constitutional debate on an 'economic bill of rights' 
guaranteeing market integration) forced the provinces to reduce 
these costs in the early 1980's. 
o cooperation among the States or Provinces. For subcentral 
governments this has the advantage of retaining powers (and, 
whenever relevant, tax revenues), while reducing fragmentation, 
duplication or harmful competition. Both countries have developed 
legal techniques that greatly reduce costly differences in 
regional laws and procedures: the major instrument is Uniform Law 
Codes, but sometimes uniform insurance policies exist or 
identical procedures. Cooperation may extend to 'mutual 
recognition' (e.g. licensing insurance brokers in US States) but 
not frequently (e.g. rarely 1n licensing insurers). Mutual 
recognition 1s approximated, however, 1n cases where national 
standards (technical; diploma's) are used as references 1n 
regional laws; some costs remain in such cases, as licensing 
procedures may still be required. Cooperation is also developing 
in joint institutions (cf. solvency investigation of non-US 
insurers by the NAIC, seeking licenses in a State), in interstate 
compacts (sharing truck registration fees, for instance, or, 
allowing limited reciprocal interstate bankbranching) and 1n 
joint lobbying organisations (promoting federal-subcentral 
cooperation so as to reduce fragmentation or enhance 
'harmonization'). Cooperation can go as far as delegating 
administrative execution (tax collect ion agreements in Canada; 
some insurance controls in Canada) or enforcement power (checks 
on cigarette bootlegging in the US) to the federal government. In 
the case of administrative execution this increases uniformity as 
a condition to the federal task (e.g. a uniform tax base). In the 
case of cigarette bootlegging, however, it has reduced the 
constraint of (illegal) cross-border trade, thereby increasing 
the freedom of the States to raise excises. 
17. Are there other benefits of regional powers to the national economy, 
that are not captured by the focus on their distortive nature as 
'barriers'? If so, they would have to be weighed against the 'costs' 
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of barriers. The report does not discuss this question 1n any detail. 
For a good understanding of how Canadians and Americans perceive the 
cost/benefit issue, it is nevertheless valuable to identify briefly 
these other benefits. This may well have some relevance to the 
Community's own assessment of costs and benefits of the 'remaining' 
fragmentation of its Internal Market. 
o under appropriate conditions, the combination of a high degree of 
market integration with some remaining subcentral powers 
generates the benefits of 'competitive federalism'. The idea is 
that citizens and firms can signal dissatisfaction with taxes, 
public goods and services and regulation by interstate/provincial 
migration. Subcentral governments may also compete with respect 
to the nature and intensity of interventions in the goods and 
services markets, setting different objectives or imposing 
different costs for given targets. More generally, subcentral 
government performance is subject to competitive challenges from 
other subcentral governments, and this may prompt policies to be 
more responsive. In the Padoa- Schiappa report this idea 1s 
echoed as 'competition-among-rules'. The benefits flowing from 
such competition cannot be available when central powers are the 
alternative. On the other hand, for the benefits to materialize, 
a fairly high degree of market integration must be achieved 
(especially for factors of production) for migation to serve as a 
disciplining factor. This applies, mutatis mutandis, to product 
and services market integration. In other words, in the EC 
context, the completion of the White Paper is essential before 
this benefit could be enjoyed. Note that neither in the US nor in 
Canada competition among rules, among tax regimes and public 
goods has led to a removal of diversity, or to overall 'low 
standards' of whatever activity. For instance, tax competition 
accentuates diversity while at the same time finding a minimum 
standard in the desired ability everywhere to provide good 
infrastructure, certain merit goods and certain public goods. 
o decentralization fosters innovation, which may or may not spread 
according to its attractiveness. This is a longstanding argument 
against coordination or centralization. The argument is used to 
rationalize powers which currently carry some costs in terms of 
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fragmentation. However, it cuts two ways. The mobility of the 
professions in the US regulated stricter than necessary, due to 
rapid interstate imitation of 'innovations', thereby having made 
interstate mobility more costly. On the other hand, where 
deregulation ~s proving successful, a possibly beneficial 
side-product of spreading regional deregulation ~s improved 
market integration ( cf. banking in Canada, led by Quebec; road 
transport deregulation in the US). 
o finally, and not surprising for federalist countries, in a number 
of policy areas, the mere avoidance of central policies or 
regulation is perceived as a benefit, worth some costs of 
fragmentation. In Canada this point is related to the peculiar 
economic geography of the country (chapter 2 and section 5.1), 
which causes federal sectoral policies to benefit certain clearly 
identifiable provinces at the expense of other equally clearly 
identifiable ones. However, in both countries, there are also 
political objections which fall outside the scope of this report. 
18. The recently signed but still not ratified US-Canadian free trade 
agreement is discussed in the last two chapters. 
Three questions are addressed. First, was the expectation borne out 
that the negotiating parties would move beyond mere free trade to a 
kind of common market, possibly the only case comparable to the White 
Paper? The answer is clearly no. Although from a GATT perspective, 
the agreement ~s ambitious and may be a helpful exercise for the 
Uruguay Round, it falls far short of virtually all the major dossiers 
of the White Paper. Trade in services is not tackled, merely the 
'right of establishment' combined with 'national treatment'. The 
direct investment regime, especially on the Canadian part, ~s 
conditional and has significant exceptions. What exactly will happen 
to the mobility of the profession is unclear. Even in product trade 
certain restrictions have been 'grand fathered' (i.e. accepted), 
notably for beer, and others have been relaxed only conditionally and 
incompletely. On subsidies, no agreement was reached but new rules 
are nevertheless announced as a basis for 'binding' dispute 
settlement; however, all this has to be agreed in the next five to 
seven years. In other words, there are reasons to be sceptical about 
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Congress's willingness to give up its power of countervailing duties 
before March 3, 1988 (the deadline of .the 'fast track' procedure) 
without having the slightest idea about the principles and the rules 
on subsidies. 
19. Second, the North American free trade area (NAFTA) negotiations 
called forth the question whether states and provinces would give up 
regulatory and subsidy powers for the sake of bilateral economic 
intercourse, although these powers are on the whole seen as essential 
to federalism. The short answer is that subcentral governments, 
especially in Canada, have informally influenced the negotiations in 
such a way that competences have hardly or not been undermined. 
Possibly, NAFTA may force provinces and states to exercise their 
econom1.c powers 1.n a less costly fashion. Thus, it is conceivable 
that the cost minimization, discussed 1.n para. 16 (infra), 1.s 
facilitated by bilateral or multilateral liberalization, if only it 
1.s stringent enough. However, it does not imply that the assignment 
of econom1.c competences to the two levels of government in both 
federations is called into question. 
20. The third reason to study NAFTA is the rich Canadian economic debate 
on the impact of the enormous market enlargement it implies for 
Canada. The economic methodology as well as the orders of magnitude 
found are of obvious interest to the 'cost of non-Europe' project. 
Methodological issues are especially important as Canadian economists 
have published path-breaking work on NAFTA, using general equilibrium 
models with economies of scale and imperfect competition (here: price 
collusion behind protection). This also enables to break out of the 
narrow confines of traditional partial-equilibrium estimates (based 
on 'welfare triangles'), which are known to yield too low estimates 
of welfare effects of trade liberalization, given their assumptions. 
21. Chapter 8 discusses 1.n some detail (adapted) partial equilibrium 
estimates, general equilibrium model estimates and those from large 
macro-econometric models, including some methodological issues. For 
the purpose of this study it is important that these different 
approaches produce empirical estimates much larger than the simple 
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traditional approaches. Nevertheless, the empirical problems are 
considerable: general equilibrium model estimates vary but go up to a 
high of 9% GDP increase, whereas the macro-econometric estimates 
(after 10 years) move between 1.9% and 3.3% GNP increase (as well as 
different employment increases). Amongst a number of empirical 
puzzles one has to solve when using these models, the proper 
calculation of the 'height' of 'non-tariff barriers' in the product 
market - not to spreak of services or factors - and the assumed 
reactions on their removal stand out as particularly difficult. All 
in all, the work on the economic impact of NAFTA on Canada supports 
the methodological direction of the 'Costs of Non-Europe' project 
with respect to the goods markets and the empirical results for 
Canada lend plausibility to the range of estimates on the EC of 1992. 
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1. WHY CANADA AND THE US? 
The paper attempts to broaden the Community's perspective on the problem 
of completing the Internal Market. In particular, the focus will be on 
the Canadian Internal Market, the US Internal Market and, whenever 
relevant, on the issues in the negotiations on the US/Canada free trade 
area, linking the two Internal Markets. Of course, among developed market 
economies more examples can be found of (con-)federal states where issues 
of market integration play a role, e.g. Switzerland and Australia. Even 
inside the European Community, Germany is a federation and Member States 
such as Spain, Belgium and Italy and, again in a different way, the 
United Kingdom may be characterized as 'non-unitary' polities. 
The arguments to select the US and Canada relate to constraints and 
focus. The constraints of time and human resources effectively preclude a 
large scale research project, comparing many Internal Markets. The 
problems already encountered in a merely exploratory paper about only two 
Internal Markets constitute a warning not to overreach and to be 
extremely prudent in enlarging the geographic scope of such comparisons. 
A naive or careless juxtaposition of seemingly similar 'barriers' or 
'distortions' would only create or reconfirm the kind of 
misunderstandings, inadequate assessments or prejudices, this project 1s 
precisely supposed to avoid. The constraints assume even more 
significance in the absence of a well-accepted framework of comparative 
analysis. Inevitably, the economic assessments must be firmly integrated 
into a wider, interdisciplinary appreciation of how these federations 
work. 
There are distinct reasons for the focus on Canada and the US. From the 
literature on comparative federalism it can be inferred that Canada 
appears to have a 'less completed' Internal market than Australia, the 
US, Switzerland and Germany, not to speak of the other 'non-unitary' 
Member States of the EC. Not surprisingly, the Internal Market debate in 
Canada is lively and may be more instructive for our discussion on the 
White Paper and its effects than internal queries in the other countries. 
This 1s not to say that market integration 1s 'complete' 1n other 
federations. Rather, the point is that questions of the 'degree of market 
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integration' matter to the Community, because the EC moves from a lower 
to a distinctly higher degree of market integration and hence might reach 
a stage where lessons from Canada would be most instructive. 
The selection of the United States is based on more pragmatic 
considerations. Ever s1nce the early 1950s, or perhaps earlier, the 
United States has been utilized in Europe as an example to look at, not 
so much to copy it in European integration but to increase awareness of 
how a big common market can be organized and what benefits it brings. The 
Spaak report of 1956 even contains explicit references to it. There 1s a 
considerable stock of legal, institutional, political, economic and 
administrative literature on the US-EC comparison. However, most (not 
all) of this literature compares the US with EC countries, rather than 
with the EC. Comparisons with the EC proper tend to be highly 
specialized. In less specialized debates, as well as in political 
discussions, however, the inclination to look to the US has created two 
tendencies that unconsciously play a role in the 1992 debate: 
o when advocating the benefits of a given approach to a particular 
issue in the EC Internal Market, the US solution 1n its Internal 
Market is loosely referred to as instructive but often completely out 
of context or in an ill-informed way; 1ssues in road haulage and 
taxes are examples but other 'barriers' treated in this report have 
occasionally be referred to as well; 
o when resisting specific solutions to achieve one EC econom1c 'area 
without frontiers' (Single Act, Art. 8), loose references to the US 
or totally unrepresentative examples of some remaining barriers to 
interstate trade or exchange are given without putting them 1n 
context and without indicating the cost/benefit aspects of it; 
examples include the highly exceptional physical barriers for citrus 
fruit imported 
differing among 
into California, 
States and the 
certain odd 
restrictions 
technical regulations 
on the mobility of 
professionals (without indicating the strictness of the regulation 
and the context of overall labour mobility). 
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2. COMPARING FEDERATIONS:SOME KEY NON-ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The USA and Canada are both federations, yet they are remarkably 
different countries. A crucial question for the purpose of the present 
paper is therefore the following: is their being both federations 
sufficient for a stylized comparison of their Internal Market regimes? 
The answer is no. There is a compelling case to grasp first the key 
non-economic factors and some basic facts, that might be ignored by 
Europeans focussing purely on unifying economic regulation and the scope 
of fragmentation. A good understanding of the barriers remaining and 
their actual economic significance requires the knowledge of behaviourial 
and contextual elements, explaining political and institutional 
preferences and (in-)tolerances of various practices. 
This paper does not pretend to offer appropriate contextual analysis. A 
number of highlights may nevertheless heighten the understanding of 
European readers sufficiently to prevent major mistakes in interpretation. 
These highlights are presented comparatively in Table 1. 
ASPECTS 
historically 
constitutionally 
TABLE 1 
A summary comparison of the US and Canada 
CANADA 
- never war of independence 
- some features of colonial 
status far into 20th 
century 
- nationhood and unity 
feelings distinctly weaker 
- enumerating the exclusive 
powers of the Provinces 
(i.e. constitutional 
protection of economic 
powers of provinces is 
strong) 
- residual (and some speci-
fic) powers assigned to 
federal level 
USA 
- war of independence 
- strongly nationalist 
attitude early on 
- no right of secession 
(e.g. civil war) 
- reserves residual powers 
to the States 
- 'delegates' powers to 
federal level (while 
prohibiting some powers 
to the States) 
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key federal powers 
(selection) 
Court 
market size 
internal trade 
(political) values 
4 
- no 'upper house' with link 
to provincial elections 
- parliamentary system 
- defense 
- legal system (with some 
specifics for Quebec) 
- currency 
- taxing and (deficit) 
spending 
- stresses the preservation 
of both federal and pro-
vincial powers (sometimes 
at the cost of market 
integration) 
25 million inhabitants 
geographic size like US 
- strong concentration of 
population near US border, 
and in two provinces 
- economic market size of 
Benelux 
- East-West trade among Pro-
vinces (excluding neigh-
bourhood trade) small 
-trade with US ('North-
South' trade) important 
- quite some European 
influence and affinity 
- considerable attention for 
redistribution and welfare 
- considerable tolerance (if 
not, inclination) to 
intervene in the economy 
- Senate (and House) repre-
sents regional interests 
- presidential system 
- defense 
- legal system (with some 
specifics for Louisiana) 
- currency 
- taxing and (deficit) 
spending 
- built up functional and 
impressive case-law on 
the basis of 'interstate 
commerce clause' (and 
'due process'), yielding 
almost unhampered access 
and mobility throughout 
the USA 
- 240 million inhabitants 
geographic s1ze like 
Canada 
- population spread 
the country and 
concentrated 1n a 
States 
biggest market 1n 
world (with the 
roughly on par) 
- intra-US trade 
preponderant 
over 
less 
few 
the 
EC 
lS 
- trade with Canada ranks 
first in foreign trade, 
but has a small weight in 
GNP 
- melting pot 
- less attention for redis-
tribution; low levels of 
social security & welfare 
- a weakening tolerance to 
regulate and little 
tolerance to intervene 
financially in the economy 
NOTE: The elements mentioned are merely highlights for European readers. 
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3. COMPARING THE FEDERATIONS: 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS 
The comparative study of the Canadian and the US Internal Markets, 1n 
particular the remaining internal barriers to economic mobility, cannot 
be restricted to allocative issues of public intervention and regulation. 
In reality the three public economic functions - allocation (through 
market integration, or the lack of it), redistribution and macro-economic 
stabilization interact in complex ways. This interaction differs 
somewhat when comparing the US and Canada,. but, in both cases, contrasts 
sharply with the separation in the EC of major allocative functions at EC 
level (namely, the Internal Market, competition policy, trade policy, 
etc.) from redistributive and macro-economic stabilization functions at 
Member State level. To the extent that market integration is facilitated 
by the central exercise of the other two functions, North America's 
market integration is not fully comparable to EC market integration. 
But one should not overplay the incomparability of the EC and North 
America, since comparative studies of federations have shown that there 
are many ways to design a viable federation. Beyond a few basic 
prescriptions on how to assign economic powers to the two levels of 
government, careful studies are required before establishing the 
necessary conditions for the EC in terms of stabilization arrangements 
and 1n terms of (what kind of) redistribution, so as to achieve and 
maintain a 'completed' Internal Market after 1992. It is conceivable that 
forms of econom1c confederation may be stable without having to be 
congruent with existing federations such as the US or Canada. 
3.1 Macro-economic stabilization 
Both the US and Canada have central powers for macro-economic 
stabilization. Before a closer look will bring out some refinement of 
that statement, it is crucial to realize the fundamental difference with 
the EC, even in 1993. In the 'completed' Euromarket of 1993, economic 
agents are not certain that cross-frontier economic transactions are 
subject to perfect exchange rate fixity. There are good arguments to 
design policies for stability of exchange rates in a common trading area. 
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But the more the perspective shifts to the longer run, the less 
satisfactory mere 'stability' will be. For long run investment 
commitments, cross-frontier mergers, financial services implying long run 
commitments (pensions, mortgages, etc.), the certainty of one currency is 
bound to increase incentives to take an interregional perspective for all 
major economic decisions. Moreover, commitments of mere 'stability', i.e. 
minimizing exchange rate realignments without outlawing them are hard to 
combine with both a 'completed' Internal (capital and money) Market and 
the retention of Member States' assignment of macro-econom1c 
stabilization. As long as no firm legal commitment on joint stabilization 
1s assumed, the danger of reversibility 1n the form of intra-EC 
restrictions (e.g. on capital flows) hangs like a sword of Damocle above 
the 'completed' Internal Market. Since this danger is absent in the US 
and Canada, the economic case to centralize macro-policies in these 
countries is too overwhelming to be questioned. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy is executed at federal level both in 
the US and in Canada. Neither country has a direct credit line for 
regional governments with the central bank (and the US not even for the 
federal government). But the actual implementation of federal monetary 
instruments may be constrained by the assignment to states/provinces of 
powers to regulate financial institutions or certain social statutes (see 
Courchene, 1986, for Canada). In Canada, four constraints to federal 
monetary & exchange rate policy can be distinguished. First, near-banks 
are regulated by the provinces and were traditionally not obliged to hold 
cash reserves with the Bank of Canada. Since the chartered banks loom 
large in the financial system this potential constraint on the leverage 
of monetary policy was not considered a serious one as late as the mid-
1970's. In 1980 the Canadian Payments Association was enacted in the 
revised Bank Act, with the requirements for all banks and near-banks to 
maintain minimum cash-reserve deposits with the Bank of Canada. Typically 
the provinces (and the near-banks themselves) objected to this 
requirement as unconstitutional s1nce it would make provincially 
regulated institutions subject to federal legislation. Ottawa then 
dropped its subtle distinction between the cash-reserve requirement being 
a federal question and regulation of near-banks remaining a provincial 
one, and accepted a compromise. Membership of the CPA is now optional: if 
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a member, clearing 1.s direct but the cash-reserve requirement has to be 
accepted; if not a member, clearing has to take place via a CPA member, 
thereby exerting an indirect influence on the minimum reserve 
requirements of that bank. 
Second, problems can be foreseen, were monetary policy to be pursued by 
means of credit controls, i.e. rationing the volume of credit. In Canada 
(and the US) this is not currently a relevant issue as the approach is 
oriented towards the costs of credit, hence is more 'market oriented'. 
Nevertheless, attempts to pursue credit controls beyond moral persuasion 
- for example, via the federal parliament in Ottawa - would probably be 
contested by the provinces as a violation of the constitutional 
assignment to them to regulate near-banks. 
Third, exchange controls would of course hamper the provinces 1.n 
borrowing abroad but, since this is not a matter of interprovincial 
economic intercourse, they would be constitutional (and, obviously, there 
is no such issue as provincial exchange controls, like one or the other 
EC Member State might still temporarily revert to after 1992). It is 
significant that such exchange controls must be nation-wide. Fourth, the 
competence of wage and price controls as an anti-inflationary device is 
controversial in Canada (not in the US, where it is clearly federal). 
After a Supreme Court ruling the federal competence is unquestioned in 
case of an emergency. If emergency is not clearly referred to, federal 
powers are unlikely to reach further than the (federally contra lled) 
public and quasi-public agencies. 
If in a federal country market-oriented views prevail few political 
obstacles towards functional centralism will be met, hence such a country 
can 'afford' to be centralist 1.n macro-economic policy where 
functionalist arguments are compelling. The latter thesis clearly applies 
-, 
to the USA. The pursuit of monetary policy is not hindered by questions 
of assignment to the States in any appreciable degree. The Federal 
Reserve and the Treasury have all necessary powers. The only problem in 
US monetary affairs is that the almost complete prohibition of 
'branching' of banks (interstate, sometimes even intra-state!) has led to 
financial instability issues. To the extent these issues can be solved by 
supervision and deposit-insurance, the problem shrinks to that of unequal 
competitivity of banks inside the US and affects but marginally overall 
monetary policy (see section 6.6.2). 
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Fiscal policy is less completely centralized 1n Canada and the US than 
monetary policy. In comparison, Canada is more decentralized 1n this 
respect than the US. Whereas in Canada the federal share in 'own-source' 
revenues of all government has declined from 64% in 1950 to around 44% in 
1985 (and from 60% in 1950 to around 32% in 1985 in terms of revenues 
after transfers), the US federal share in 'own source' revenues of all 
government was 70% in 1949, declining only to 65% in 1974, but returning 
to 70% for all years of the period 1981-1986; in terms of revenues after 
transfers, the dominance of federal revenues does not disappear and the 
decline over time is small, to wit, from 66% in 1949 via a low of 56% in 
1974 to a share of 61%-63% in the 1980s. The development in Canada is not 
due to decreased federal spending but rather to a more rapid increase in 
provincial/local tax and spending activity. Note however, that, if the 
need would be politically credible (as in the case of war or 
emergencies), the Canadian federal government would have almost 'plenary' 
powers to pursue fiscal policy. 
On the expenditure side, the Canadian federal government can and does 
extend its leverage via conditional grants and via large-scale projects, 
frequently co-financed by provinces. Therefore, a significant measure of 
fiscal coordination supplements the direct federal expenditure available. 
It follows that provincial budgetary policy cannot really cross the 
cyclical policy pursued by Ottawa. Moreover, a large share of non-federal 
spending is not suitable for anti-cyclical variation, e.g. health and 
primary education. Unemployment insurance is federal in Canada, whereas 
the 'welfare' programme is provincial but with a SO% contribution from 
Ottawa, and (like in the US) subject to an entitlement of every Canadian 
to such benefits without discriminatory (residence) requirement. This 
complexity has allocative (migrationD and interregional redistributive 
consequences but does not seem to affect the stabilization function at 
federal level very much. 
In contrast to Canada, the US, ever since 1980, has no revenue sharing 
via unconditional ('equalization') grants. All federal grants are grouped 
in specific 'block grants', sometimes with discretion for the States, 
sometimes with conditions, 
non-federal spending 1s 
or matching requirements. Similar to Canada, 
largely a-cyclical, as it concentrates on 
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'welfare', education and health, the only major exception being highways. 
Therefore, anti-cyclical variations of public expenditure can be pursued 
at federal level without great problems. Indeed, before the Reagan 
administration, the federal grants-in-aid tended to be varied 
anti-cyclically so as to compensate for the States' incapacity to conduct 
anti-cyclical policy. 
Of course, spending variations also depend on tax income and the 
resulting balance. Both Canada and the US have no federal constitutional 
prohibitions or constraints on budget balances. In fact, however, the 
States themselves (except one) have imposed 'balanced budget' rules on 
their legislatures, with different degrees of stringency with respect to 
short-term borrowing or borrowing for long run investment. Canadian 
provinces are under no legal constraints and may even revert to the world 
capital market. 
On the tax side, complications are greater. Both the US and Canada have 
fairly decentralized tax systems. The difference between the two 
countries LS the degree of harmonization of the decentralized tax 
policies: in Canada, there LS far-reaching harmonization compared to the 
USA in the taxes relevant for stabilization, to wit personal income and 
corporate taxes, although the actual impact of this difference LS 
probably mitigated by the generally lower rates of taxation in the US, 
and the lower share of subcentral taxation in overall US public revenue. 
In Canada the income and corporate taxes are 'joint' taxes under the 1962 
Tax Collection Agreements. The exception is Quebec, which has 
"competitive" taxes on personal income and on corporate income. All other 
provinces let the federal government collect both the federal and 
provincial personal income tax, with significant gains in administrative 
simplicity for all tax authorities (and at no financial costs to the 
provinces) and tax payers. In return, the provinces must accept the 
federal structure of income taxation down to considerable detail; the 
provinces are free to fix their own rate and can introduce tax credits 
under conditions of administrative simplicity, compatibility with the 
federal tax system and with the 'efficient functioning of the Canadian 
economic union'. Nevertheless, these tax credits are a cause of some 
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concern in Canada because they tend to distort (if not impede) the free 
flow of products and factors in the common market. There are important 
allocative differences between the Quebec and the federal income tax, but 
whether they are of more than trivial importance for stabilization 
purposes is unclear. Apart from Quebec the federal government has 
considerable scope for tax manipulation for anti-cyclical purposes, since 
it can define income and some deductions. Yet, in the crucial case of a 
cut or hike of the rate, the cooperation of the provinces is not a priori 
guaranteed. There are currents at provincial level arguing for a more 
active fiscal stance of the provinces as a 'supplementary stabilization 
thrust'. Thus province A could choose to neutralize at least the direct 
impact of a cut in the federal rate by a matching increase in its own 
rate, or the other way around. In this context it ought to be noted that 
provinces can run deficits but cannot monetize them via open market 
operations or otherwise, so that their borrowing capacity is determined 
essentially by credit ratings. 
Corporate taxation is less harmonious in Canada because three provinces 
(Ontario, Quebec and Alberta) have opted out of the tax collection 
agreements. Unlike the US, all Canadian provinces adhere to a uniform 
procedure for allocating the profits of multi-provincial corporations 
across the provinces this typical common-market 1ssue reduces tax 
competition and may so help overall stabilization policy. The leverage of 
the federal government in corporate taxation is primary determined by its 
own rate since the seven provinces adhering to joint collection generate 
only one-quarter of the corporate taxable income in Canada. The 
assessment of the arrangement hinges on the extent to which federal 
stabilization is undermined by the diversity. The even greater diversity 
in, for instance,the US - although at lower rates and yielding relatively 
little revenue (see section 6.4) - serves as a reminder that uniformity 
or centralism is not imperative. Indeed, there is nothing in the Canadian 
constitution that forbids the provinces to alter course and massively opt 
out of the joint collection of (direct) taxes at federal conditions. 
Surely, this would reduce the efficacity of Canadian fiscal policy, still 
apart from likely deleterious effect in this common market. In any event, 
the interesting lesson from the Canadian arrangements is that, within 
limits, these questions can be discussed in terms of (economic) costs and 
(political) benefits. 
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In the US the predominance of federal taxation is such that the leverage 
of federal fiscal policy is very considerable. Various forms of 
interstate tax competition (see sections 6.3 and 6.4) may result ~n 
effective taxation constraints on the States and so prevent a possible 
future reduction of federal leverage. However, there is some controversy 
with respect to 'unitary taxation' of multi-state corporations' profits 
and this could perhaps create difficulties for stabilization policy at 
the margin. Therefore, state taxation typically generates issues of 
horizontal equity and of allocation in the US common market, much less 
does it raise problems for stabilization. 
3.2 Redistribution 
The functioning of the North American Internal Markets ~s generally 
facilitated by interpersonal and 
redistribution. Of course the two are 
because interregional redistribution will 
interstate/interprovincial 
economically related if only 
enhance the capacity of the 
poorer regions to provide income security programmes. There is a tax side 
to interpersonal redistribution, too: to the extent that federal 
progressive taxes tend to burden rich regions more than poor, an 
interregional mitigation of income differentials will result. This brief 
section is on expenditure, however. 
Redistribution is more ambitious ~n Canada than in the USA. 
Notwithstanding the complexity and frequent shifts in the actual division 
of powers with respect to the social programmes, the latter and the 
equalization payments have the effects of converging across Canada 
income, welfare and social (health and education) levels as well as the 
provincial capacities to provide other public services. The virtually 
unhampered and unconditional potential access of all Canadians to the 
social and other public services and to income maintenance creates a 
situation very different from the one underlying the completed Internal 
Market in the EC in 1993. The EC will have no free and equal access to 
national social security and income maintenance programmes for mobile 
citizens. It is true, as some economists argue, that the Canadian social 
programmes reduce the incentives for labour mobility across Canada, ~n 
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other words, that the functioning of the Internal Market would not 
singularly improve but on some accounts suffer from rigidities. It might 
mean that the programmes encourage people to remain in low-employment 
areas. Such an objection implies a judgement on optimal support levels, 
which this paper will not address. 
With respect to interpersonal redistribution, (see Courchene, 1986) the 
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over, inter alia, 
unemployment insurance and old-age security; the provinces have exclusive 
jurisdiction over workmen's compensation and the pension plans if they do 
not join the Canadian Pension Plan (only Quebec), whereas joint 
jurisdiction exists for the Canada pension plan, regulation of private 
pensions and the Canada Assistance Plan (for 'welfare'). 
It should be realized, however, that the assignment of jurisdiction ~s 
only one of several criteria for assessing the degree of 
(de)centralization. Whether federal grants are conditional or not, and 
what percentage of the programme Ottawa pays may well be decisive. 
Conditional grants of 50% are provided by the federal government for 
hospital insurance, for medicare (one condition being the 'portability' 
of benefits across Canada), for post-secondary education and for 
'welfare' (one of the conditions being that provinces can not ~mpose 
lengthy waiting periods for eligibility). 
Interprovincial redistribution is enshrined in the 1982 Constitution Act 
as follows: "Parliament and the Government of Canada are committed to the 
principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial 
governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable 
levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation". 
However, the equalisation programme actually started in 1957 already. 
Courchene (1986) takes the view that the initiation of equalization 
payments was mainly motivated by the broad desire after the war to return 
to the provinces a greater autonomy in taxation. Both the equity and 
efficiency grounds have probably played a role as well. In the political 
discussion they were mixed (as shown ~n the quotation from the 
Constitution) with a federalist rational (match provincial responsibility 
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with sufficient access to funds) and a 'nation-hood' rationale (a 
nationally desired level of public services should be available for every 
Canadian, and if the provinces have to deliver them, they ought to have 
the funds). The efficiency argument relates directly to the proper 
functioning of the Internal Market. Recent discussion (Boadway & 
Flatters, 1982; Oates, 1983; Courchene, 1986) turns around the notion of 
'net fiscal benefits': the utility derived from the level of public 
services in combination with taxes. Net fiscal benefits may differ among 
richer and poor provinces, with resource-rich provinces as an especially 
attractive case. Efficiency 1n the common market would be reduced if 
migration would occur in response to net fiscal benefits, rather than 
market income. By making net fiscal benefits more or less equivalent, 
efficiency would thus be increased. A possible objection to this argument 
1s that net fiscal benefits may become capitalized in land prices or 
otherwise. The objection might be important because, in contrast to 
Canada, the US does no longer have an equalization programme since 1980, 
and had a very modest one before. The Canadian equalization 1s not 
comparable to the 'Finanzausgleich' 1n the Federal Republic of Germany, 
where rich Lander directly 1 equalize' with relatively poor Lander. In 
Germany there u virtually no discretion and certainly not at federal 
level, which guarantees the economic effectiveness of the equalisation. 
The contrast with the US is sharp because its programme in the 1970's was 
fully discretionary at federal level and, in 1980, scrapped overnight. 
The Canadian Constitution makes this impossible, but some federal 
discretion exists. Ottawa provides 
vertical and horizontal fiscal 
unconditional 
balance 1n 
transfers to improve 
the federation. The 
Atlantic-Eastern provinces raise their own-source revenue (per capita), 
ranging around 59%-66% of the national average, to 
revenue-plus-equalization, ranging around 83%-84% of the national 
average. Except for resource-rich Alberta, all provinces cluster between 
90% and 106% of the national average if all transfers are taken into 
account. 
The redistribution functions exercised 1n the US federal system have 
always been more modest than those in Canada. Interstate redistribution, 
say via equalization payments from the center (Canada) or v1a interstate 
sharing-out arrangements (Finanzausgleich 1n Germany), does not take 
place. A modest revenue sharing programme existed between 1972 and 1980. 
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There is no constitutional obligation for interregional equalization like 
the one in Canada. Therefore, the redistribution system employs only 
specific purpose grants. Under the 'new federalism' of president Reagan 
one idea was to consolidate the more than 400 grant programmes (most of 
which were highly specific categorical grants and projects with 
case-by-case control, with a lot of federal involvement) into very few 
block grants ('broad purpose grants'). The objectives pursued were three: 
a) to reduce the federal spending together with certain tax rate 
decreases, and hence provide room for the states to fill the gap 
according to their own preferences (actually, this objective may well 
result in less redistribution, but not necessarily so); b) reduce federal 
tutelage and pervasive conditionality, hence restoring the 'regulatory 
balance' between the states and the federal governments; c) reduce the 
heavy administrative costs of these programmes (regulatory relief). There 
are essentially two types of grants in the US: one group (mostly 
'welfare') finances entitlements of individuals and the administration 1s 
done by states and local governments; the other group of grants goes to 
states (and ultimately to local governments in a lot of cases) and relate 
to education, health and highways. 
Since the federal deficit became so preponderant a problem after 1983 and 
since the early block grants consolidations had led to severe cuts in 
federal aid to states (for fiscal 1982, a 23,5% reduction for the funds 
administered by states, and a 38% reduction for the funds directed to 
states~), the new federalism proposals eventually got stuck in Congress 
(see Williamson, 1986). In particular, the 'swap and turnback' proposals 
would radically shift interpersonal redistribution back to the states 
(namely, by half), except for health care for the needy, while leaving 
some transfers in block grants as before. This was never accepted 
politically and the radical decentralization of interpersonal 
redistribution did not occur. 
The facts are that federal grants-in-aid fell continuously as a share of 
state/local general revenue from own resources: from 34,4% in 1976 and 
30,4% in 1980 to 21,8% in 1985. The shares of education, public highways 
and 'welfare' in this federal grants programme have not changed much 
since 1979 and have actually increased a little for 'welfare' (as well as 
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for urban renewal). Thus, the cuts 1n real terms have been spread over 
these categories and have otherwise fallen much more heavily on health 
and 'other' federal grants. It is unclear whether this has significantly 
influenced redistribution (ACIR, 1987, p. 58). 
Finally, the 1986 federal tax reform does not seem to have more than 
marginal effects for redistribution. In general, de facto progressivity 
is increased and this may have some additional redistributive effect. 
4. IDENTIFYING INTERNAL BARRIERS 
After explaining briefly what 1s meant by 1 barriers 1 for the purpose of 
this report, this section will identify the 'barriers' in seven 
categories. These 
consultation with 
seven categories have been selected 1n prior 
the Commission, given their prominence in the White 
Paper and the expected importance in (one of) the two countries. The 
identified 1 barriers' are compared 1n an extremely condensed form in 
Table 2. This presentation should serve the reader as a quick reference. 
It cannot and does not serve as a summary because the sections 5 and 6 
have already been compressed to virtually irreducable size. With a 
further shortening too much information would be lost, the danger of 
misunderstanding would augment and enriching insights might be foregone. 
4.1 On 'barriers' and 'distortions' 
For the purposes of the report, a 'barrier' is defined as an impediment 
to or an artificial encouragement of economic mobility among the US 
States or the Canadian provinces. The impediments may completely block 
access of goods, services, or factors of production to a state's or 
provincial market, or they may only raise the costs of access. The latter 
will lead to a discriminatory effect on prices of goods, services or 
factors coming from out-of-province/state. In describing the 'remaining 
fragmentation' of the US and the Canadian Internal Market (and between 
the two, in the North American market), the majority of measures dealt 
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with are 1 barriers-to-access 1 • In some cases, however, States /provinces 
artificially encourage economic mobility, which also hampers the proper 
functioning of internal markets. 
An economic assessment of costs and benefits, 1s normally based on the 
concept of 1 distortions 1 • A distortion can only be meaningfully defined 
if one agrees about what is being 1 distorted 1 • In the present context, 
economic analysis would look at the allocation of resources resulting 
from the functioning of the (internal) market. The allocation of 
resources can be 'distorted' by government action in many ways, and not 
only through barriers-to-access. In other words, distortions refer to a 
much broader category of regulatory or financial interventions, including 
barriers-to-access. A simple way of classifying different distortions for 
present purposes would be to distinguish domestic (i.e. state or 
provincial) ones, federally-induced ones, barriers-to-access and 
artificial stimuli to economic mobility among states/provinces. Since the 
report concentrates on the latter two distortions, 'barriers' is utilized 
as shorthand. 
In the normative terms of 1 welfare economics 1 , a distortion causes the 
allocation of resources to be such that the resulting income remains 
below potential. The potential income 1s normatively defined as the 
income resulting from the 'undistorted' allocation of resources, with the 
proviso that after the removal of the distortion compensation can, 1n 
principle, be given to losers so as to keep their income steady. Removing 
a distortion would lead to a potential income that, after allowing for 
compensation, is still higher than 1n the 1 distorted 1 situation. 
Maintaining fragmentation through 1 barriers 1 therefore has a 1 cost 1 for 
the economy as a whole. 
Whether there are benefits to such state/provincial intervention 1s 
harder to answer. Using standard mico-economics, public intervention can 
only yield 'benefits' if markets fail to allocate optimally. Such market 
failures are usually corrected by 'domestic 1 (federal) intervention and 
do not concern us here. Only where market failures are dealt with at 
subcentral level and in different ways (e.g. safety regulations) is there 
a possibility that 'barriers' arise. If differences would be costly for 
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interprovincial/interstate economic intercourse, the 'benefits' of 
overcoming market failures could in principle be kept constant by 
maintaining the objective of the intervention, while the 'costs' could be 
decreased through approximation or harmonization. 
But 1n federal countries such as Canada and the USA, the 'benefits' of 
expenditure or regulation at subcentral level also refer to advantages 
that cannot be captured in a standard microeconomic framework. Such 
benefits are perceived to consist in political and economic advantages of 
'decentralization'. The present author has refrained from attempting to 
assess qualitatively, let alone 'measure', these benefits to the US and 
to Canada. Nevertheless, no matter how elusive the advantages might be 
thought to be, they are genuine to Canadians and Americans and enter the 
cost/benefit calculus 1n these countries, implicitly or explicitly. They 
lead to maintenance of what are called 'barriers' 1n this report, 
although they are frequently felt to be 'benefits of diversity'. A 
singular focus on 'economic costs' without taking these benefits into 
account might be misleading. For instance, if certain subcentral powers 
must be considered as given, it might be more insightful to study cost 
minimization of the resulting fragmentation and compare it with the 
'benefits'. 
However, analyzing these and other aspects of immaterial 'benefits' would 
greatly extend the scope of the report. In any event further study 1s 
required before lessons can be fruitfully drawn. Only occasional 
references will therefore be made. Some of the most important 
considerations have been summarized in the paragraphs 13 through 17 of 
the 'Executive Summary and Conclusions'. 
4.2 Comparing barriers in the US and Canada 
The seven selected categories of barriers at inter-state/provincial level 
are: (indirect) taxes, corporate tax breaks and subsidies, procurement, 
financial services, technical barriers, labour mobility barriers and 
transport. In this paper I repeatedly warn against possible 
misunderstandings that may arise if attention 1s solely focussed on 
enumerating 'barriers' inside the Canadian and US internal markets. Table 
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2, bringing information together in shorthand, is susceptible to 
misinterpretation. Superficial reading of the Table might give the 
impression that economic mobilities inside the two federations are 
seriously hampered or discouraged. Such a reading of the Table would 
certainly be incorrect. The broad thrust of it is, rather, that 
states/provinces have kept a number of powers, whose use will lead to 
barriers-to-access or distortions, without on the whole causing the 
internal markets to fail in their integrative effects. The political 
benefits of this decentralization carry economic costs which will be 
indicated qualitatively where possible; the scant quantifications will 
also be given. In the few areas where 'barriers' are inducing relatively 
higher costs they are controversial and tend to be evaded. For the rest, 
there is little doubt that the 'fragmentation' is politically tolerated. 
TABLE 2 
Identifying internal 'barriers' in Canada and the US 
'barriers' or 
sector 
1. taxation 
- sales 
- excises 
- corporate 
CANADA 
provinces levy retail 
sales tax; rates vary from 
0% to 12%. 
excises differ among 
provinces; esp. alcoholic 
beverages and motor fuel; 
administrative burden 
(destination principle) 
and provincial sales 
restrictions. 
provincial rates vary from 
10% to 16%; federal tax 
collection agreement for 7 
smaller provinces (i.e. 
identical base). 
USA 
states and 
authorities levy 
sales tax; rates 
local) vary from 0% 
exempt ions of basic 
differ considerably. 
local 
retail 
(inc 1. 
to 9%; 
needs 
states levy excises espe-
cially on cigarettes, 
a1c~holic beverages and 
motor fuel; random checks 
and administrative burden 
(destination principle). 
state (marginal) 
vary from 0% to 
rates 
11' 5%; 
states also compete via 
special cases and 
exemptions; 5 states have 
no corporate tax. 
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2. 
- personal 
1.ncome 
Eublic aid 
- subsidies 
- tax breaks 
3. 12rocurement 
- formal 
- informal 
4. financial 
services 
- banking 
- insurance 
19 
rates vary somewhat among 
provinces; base is 
harmonized through federal 
tax collection agreement 
(exc. Quebec). 
vigorous subsidy competi-
tion among provinces; no 
federal supervision via 
Ottawa or the Supreme 
Court. 
numerous; not harmonized. 
complete constitutional 
freedom for provinces to 
purchase preferentially. 
the formal 
materially 
leeway is 
reduced; 
informal local 
requirements 
'understandings'. 
content 
or 
nation-wide operations 
with, however, quite some 
provincial regulation; no 
freedom of banking 
services; national 
clearing; capital market 
is nation-wide and open. 
most regulation at 
provincial level; some at 
federal; far-reaching 
voluntary harmonization 
and delegation of 
administrative controls to 
federal level. 
rates vary considerably 
among states, the highest 
marginal rates ranging 
from 10% to 13,5% in nine 
states (before recent tax 
reform; to be reduced to 
four) and lower in other 
states; seven states have 
no personal income tax and 
three levy only a tax on 
interest & dividends. 
all states have inward-
investment promotion 
activities, but direct 
state aids are very 
modest. 
numerous; not harmonized. 
around 20 states have 
preference laws (up to 5% 
price differential 1.n 
bids). 
many anecdotes about 
informal pressures; tax 
payers' consciousness in 
the US is very high, 
however. 
banks chartered at federal 
or at state level; 
fragmentation arises out 
of crippling branching 
restrictions: interstate 
branching is forbidden, 
with complex exceptions; 
intra-state branching 
prohibitions may exist. 
regulated at 
licensing of 
brokers per 
state level; 
insurers and 
state and 
divergent state 
regulations lead to 
serious fragmen- tation, 
although formally the 
freedom of services 1.s 
nation-wide. 
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5. technical 
barriers 
6. labour 
mobility 
- general 
access 
to labour 
markets 
20 
few problems in technical 
regulations. Standards are 
mostly nation-wide; so is 
certification. 
constitutional rights to 
travel and to migrate; 
recourse to provincial 
social security/services; 
nation-wide public 
pension; incomplete 
portability of private 
p~nsions. 
Numerous small, few major 
differences among states 
regulations; 
clause 
standards 
COIIIIllerce 
constraints; 
and 
certification are 
nation-wide. The major 
exception: building codes. 
constitutional rights to 
travel and to migrate; 
recourse to state social 
security/services; federal 
rules for employee pension. 
- professions extensive regulation 
professional licensing 
provincial level. 
of extensive regulation of 
at professional licensing at 
state level; no general 
rule on mutual recognition. 
7. transport 
- registra-
tion 
- fuel 
- other 
at provincial level; until 
1 82 license plates for 
every province; now there 
is 1 home-province control' 
with mutual provincial 
recognition, with inter-
provincial clearing. 
fuel taxes 
provinces; 
principle 
cumbersome 
requirements. 
differ among 
destination 
imposes 
administrative 
licensing before entering 
the road haulage sector 
takes place at provincial 
level. 
at state level; 
registration reciprocity 
is widespread; 
registration 'fees' 
competition is reduced 1n 
'compacts' (more than 30 
states), with fees shared. 
as 1n 
destination 
Canada, 
of the 
tax revenue, leads to 
administrative burdens. 
the 
fuel 
43 states have not 
deregulated on intra-state 
transport; property taxes 
and sales taxes on trucks 
differ; on axle/distance 
taxes, there is interstate 
tax retaliation. 
NOTE: The 'barriers' identified here are described in the chapters 5 and 
6. These chapters also discuss costs and benefits whenever possible. 
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5. BARRIERS IN THE CANADIAN INTERNAL MARKET 
5.1 General Issues of Canadian market integration 
5.1.1 The federal framework 
Art. 121 of the Canadian constitution stipulates that agricultural and 
industrial products of one province should be admitted freely into 
others. By virtue of this provision, tariff barriers do not exist, nor do 
border controls. The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms secures 
very broad mobility rights, with individuals being entitled to move to, 
take up residence and work in any province. Thus, physical barriers in 
the sense of the Commission's White Paper are not in place. 
What about Canada's constitutional regime on 'non-tariff distortions' to 
interprovincial trade? Art. 91(2) of the Constitution confers to the 
federation the competence to regulate interprovincial trade and commerce. 
On the face of it, this disposition could be seen as being roughly 
equivalent to the US interstate commerce clause which has proved to be a 
very powerful instrument to combat state-induced distortions in the 
American internal market (see section 6.2). Unlike its American 
counterpart, however, the Canadian Supreme Court has given a narrow 
presentation to the federal trade and commerce powers with a view to 
preserving the autonomy of the provinces (cfr. Table I in chapter 2) 
because Art. 92 of the Constitution provides them with certain exclusive 
powers. As Canada's Supreme Court, rather than adopting a cons is tent 
market integration stance, wished to safeguard the balance of powers 
between federation and provinces as envisaged by the writers of the 1867 
British North-America Act, provincial regulatory and budgetary decisions 
giving rise to non-tariff distortions of the Canadian internal market 
have often been validated. In some, admittedly rare, cases the Court has 
even upheld provincial provisions that discriminate explicitly on the 
basis of provincial origin! 
On the political scene, provinces recognize the internal market 
fragmenting consequences of their far-reaching policy autonomy, but 
retort that federal legislation distorts the Canadian common market even 
more. The most significant examples of such federally induced distortions 
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relate to the National Energy Policy, the external tariff, the federal 
tax system and freight rates. The National Energy Policy, adopted in 1980 
and revised in recent years, keeps energy prices in Canada below world 
market prices and subsidizes energy exploration. Although mutually 
offsetting effects are at play, there exists the general conviction that 
the energy-importing provinces of central Canada gain at the expense of 
energy-rich provinces of the West like Alberta. As they are the home of 
the better part of the country's manufacturing industry, Ontario and 
Quebec are also the chief beneficiaries of the common external tariff and 
the voluntary import restraints on cars and clothing. The other and in 
particular the Western provinces lose consumer surplus, being the 
importers of industrial goods. 
Conversely, the federal manufacturers' sales tax (not to be confused with 
the provincial retail sales tax), imposed on all manufactured goods 
consumed in Canada, tends to modify the interprovincial terms of trade to 
central Canada's detriment. The subsidization of freight rates (by way of 
the Crowsnest Pass Agreement of 1897 superseded by the Western Grain 
Transportation Act of 1983, the Maritime Freight Rates Act and the 
Atlantic Region Freight Assistance Act of 1970) has favoured Prairie 
grain growers and Maritime firms engaged in interprovincial business. 
One should realize that the 'winners' and 'losers' are so clearly 
identifiable 1n these cases because Canada is characterized by a very 
great overlap of product specialization patterns and regional 
specialization patterns. In the US and the EC this overlap is on the 
whole much smaller, which implies that product-wise interventions do not 
or not nearly so much lead to geographically identifiable beneficiaries 
and losers. 
In the provinces' view, Ottawa better overhaul its own legislation first 
before calling on the provinces to pay more heed to the common interest. 
There is evidence in the economic literature, indeed, that the federally 
induced distortions harm Canada's welfare more than the existing 
interprovincial barriers. However, the provinces are clearly divided over 
how Ottawa should alter its policies, and understandably so in the light 
of the just mentioned examples, s1nce provinces will be affected 
- 70 -
23 
differently by changes 1n federal policies. The current provincial 
discord on the desirability of the US - Canada free trade agreement 
provides an excellent case in point. 
5.1.2 A paradox 
In a number of areas where the EC 1s still confronted with significant 
obstacles to trade between Member States, barriers also exist between the 
Canadian provinces. Altogether, these hurdles seem impressive. Several of 
the interprovincial barriers to trade in goods, services and factors of 
production would doubtlessly be ruled illicit in the EC even under the 
present 'acquis communautaire'. 
The number and nature of the obstacles to trade suggest that considerable 
welfare is being foregone. Yet, the few economists who have studied these 
questions in some depth are more or less in agreement that the welfare 
costs inflicted by these province-induced distortions are marginal, lying 
under 1% of Canadian GOP. What might explain this paradox? 
Firstly, the 
rudimentary. 
method of 
None of 
computation used 
these calculations 
in these studies is rather 
were carried out through 
multisectoral macroeconometric or general equilibrium models, but were 
rather back-of-the-envelope assessment of direct, static costs only. Such 
an approach was perhaps the only feasible one given that reliable data on 
any of the domains touched upon are very scarce. In the EC Commission 
study on the effects of completing the EC Internal Market, the brunt of 
the welfare gains was thought to materialize in an indirct fashion and 
over a fairly long time-period. Therefore, the simple static cost 
calculus may well underestimate the actual costs incurred by the Canadian 
economy. 
Secondly, there are 'structural' explanations. East-West trade in Canada 
has never been intensive and is even partly subsidized through below 
market freight rates as a matter of nation-building. Canada's population 
is clustered along the very long border with the US, from Vancouver to 
Quebec City. The natural pattern of trade flows in North-America is 
North-South. Canada-US trade is estimated to be as large, if not larger, 
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than interprovincial trade 1n Canada, in spite of border protection and 
differences in currencies and legal regimes. Moreover, the vastness of 
the Canadian territory 1s such that systematic interprovincial purchases 
(except between Quebec and Ontario and with respect to energy and raw 
materials) can never grow substantial. On the other hand, the economic 
weight of the scope for discriminatory public procurement, often thought 
of as a prime source of welfare losses in the EC, is also quite limited. 
Provincial public purchases of goods and services net of normal personnel 
outlays do not amount to more than 2 to 3% of GDP. In addition, an 
important sector like telecom is in private hands in Canada and the army 
is small, compared to EC countries. 
The existence of trade barriers and the threat of a further uncontrolled 
growth - given the dearth of institutional forces towards closer market 
integration - has gradually become a cause for concern in public debate. 
One of the policy ideas raised by the Macdonald's Commission on the 
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (reporting in 1985) 
was the creation of CATT (in analogy with the Geneva-based GATT) which 
would be designed to settle economic disputes between provinces, but 
apparently time has not come yet for this idea to be realized. It is 
significant to point out that it was only in the run-up to the 
negotiations with the Americans on a free trade deal that the quarterly 
Interprovincial Premiers' Conference paid serious attention to the 
barriers inside Canada. After their Edmonton meeting in 1986 the 
Conference committed itself to a moratorium to new barriers and a 
permanent mechanism to reduce existing ones. However, since then the 
issue has been softpedalled at the top political level and no concrete 
policy action has come forth yet. Issues such as the Canada-US free trade 
agreement, the implementation of the Meech Lake accord on constitutional 
reform and federal tax reform figure nowadays much more prominently on 
the agenda. Hitherto, the eagerness of the provinces to keep their 
regulatory autonomy intact seems to have prevailed over considerations of 
economic efficiency, notwithstanding the little 'horror' stories that 
every now and then catch the headlines of the newspapers. 
Both the Canadian constitution and today's political climate attach great 
value to the 'benefits' of decentralization. In particular the Quebec 
view is that the 'benefits' of diversity cannot be enjoyed without 
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provincial means of articulating variety. But even the Quebec 
separatists, toying with secession plans in the 1976-1980 period, 
unambiguously wanted to retain the common market. Moreover, compared to 
the EC of today, Canadian 'diversity' should be seen against the backdrop 
of other unifying factors such as a fairly common university system, only 
two languages and the great informal economic and non-economic influence 
of a so preponderant neighbour, the US. 
5.2 Provincial Taxation 
Canadian provinces possess the constitutional right to impose direct 
taxes on private earnings and corporate income. They may also levy sales 
taxes and exc1.ses. These rights are not exclusive since the federal 
government has taxing powers too in these domains. For the taxes 
mentioned neither the rates nor the bases are uniform across provinces. 
It follows that "normal" interprovincial goods and services flows as well 
as the nation-wide allocation of production factors may be subject to 
fiscal distortions. 
The existence of so-called "collection agreements" regarding personal and 
corporate income tax between the federation and the majority of 
provinces, along with the absence of fiscal borders and the substantial 
mobility of people, enterprises and investments in Canada, have ensured 
that since World War II provincial tax regimes have not diverged too much 
1.n practice. However, as provincial fiscal competences are largely 
unfettered by constitutional court review, even to such a degree that 
their exercise is allowed to cause explicit discrimination vis-a-vis 
products and production factors from other provinces, there is always the 
possibility of a return to the situation of the thirties characterized by 
severe fiscal competition among the provinces with beggar-thy-neighbour 
intentions. 
i) Personal Income Taxes 
Under the Collection Agreements on personal income taxes the federal 
authorities collect free of charge provincial revenue in stride with 
federal taxes under the condition that the provinces accept the federally 
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defined tax base and, what is perhaps more important, the progress1.v1.ty 
structure of rates. All provinces except Quebec have entered into such an 
agreement with the central government. Consequently, it is a "joint" 
personal income tax regime prevailing in all Canadian provinces but one. 
Noteworthy from the viewpoint of the present study is that provinces not 
having concluded a collection agreement with Ottawa can constitutionally 
adopt tax rules discriminating against out-of-province products or 
production factors and hence impair the functioning of the internal 
market. Since 1979, for instance, Quebec permits residents to deduct from 
income taxes (up to a predetermined amount) the purchase of new shares in 
Quebec companies (and not those from other provinces). 
The Tax Collection Agreements with the federal government are contractual 
and therefore provinces can opt out if they so wish, for example on 
grounds of different progressivity preferences or the desire to promote 
local business interests. Recognizing that a general renunciation of such 
agreements could give rise to fiscal pluriformity among provinces 
prompting distortions of normal goods, investment and migratory flows 
inside Canada, the central government has sought to convince provinces to 
stay in by reducing the "cost" of respecting the Agreement: provinces 
have been granted increasing elbow room to define their own tax credits 
provided the latter do not discriminate against other provinces, with 
Ottawa drawing the line between what is permissible and what not. 
Recently, upon threats of withdrawal, significant concessions to 
provincial demands have been made in this respect (cfr. the British 
Columbia housing and employment bond tax credits operative since 1983). 
ii) Corporate Taxes 
To strengthen local economic activity, regional authorities having the 
power and the means to do so, often strive to attract private sector 
investment from elsewhere by offering fiscal incentives (or by awarding 
explicit public aid, cfr. 5.3). 
To the extent that such investment would not take place were it not for 
the favourable fiscal treatment, disparities in the corporate tax regime 
may trigger overinvestment in one area and underinvestment in another, 
- 74 -
27 
causing a reduction of efficiency for the national economy as a whole. 
However, provided the economy 1n question has free access to the 
international capital market, the underinvestment aspect of the problem 
should in principle not apply. 
To prevent capital flows within the Canadian internal market from being 
lopsided due to fiscal factors, tax collection agreements regarding 
corporate taxes have been put in place as well. Compared to those on 
personal income taxes, the corporate tax collection agreements provide 
provinces with relatively more room of manoeuvre to specify their proper 
fiscal regime. This is so because local taxes are imposed before (rather 
than after) the federal rate structure has been applied. This enables 
provinces for instance to vary rates according to the size of the firm. 
Yet, despite this greater leeway, the system of corporate income tax 
agreements is devoid of much significance as only seven smaller provinces 
adhere to it. The three foremost provinces, Ontario, Quebec and, Alberta 
(since 1981) collect their own corporate taxes as they felt the 
agreements tied their hands too much. As in the case of personal income 
taxes, the absence of an agreement leaves provinces free to implement 
policies with a discriminatory effect on other jurisdictions. Examples of 
such practices include special incentive schemes to promote the creation 
of provincial venture capital firms, as in Quebec (the so-called SODEQ 
tax credit) and in Ontario (the SBDC scheme). 
The general provincial tax rates on corporate income prevailing in 1985 
ranged from 10% in Alberta to 16% in neighbouring British Columbia. The 
two major and most industrialized provinces have closely similar rates. 
Although none of the three most important provinces have entered in a tax 
collection agreement with Ottawa, they do participate in the scheme, also 
operated by the central government, to apportion the provincial shares of 
the tax revenue collected from companies having permanent establishments 
1n several jurisdictions. Without such commonly accepted allocation 
rules, there would arise an obvious risk of either tax avoidance or 
double taxation (as in the US). It should be stressed that provincial 
fiscal collaboration of such kind is entirely voluntary and could 
therefore be halted at any time. 
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iii) Provincial Retail Taxes and Excises 
Wholesale sales taxes belonging exclusively to the competences of Ottawa, 
provinces can levy retail sales taxes and excises on gasoline, tobacco 
and alcoholic beverages. Most provinces have a closely common general 
retail sales tax rate hovering around 8% (Ontario 7, Quebec 9%). However, 
for some specific goods differences may be appreciable as a result of 
different rules on exemptions for extra-levies on specific items. The 
notable exception to this general sales tax proximity is Alberta, which 
in principle does not charge any. 
Sales taxes on interprovincial traded goods are, like 1.n the European 
Community, subject to the destination principle. But because fiscal 
borders between the provinces do not exist - a situation also envisaged 
for the EC by 1993 - this principle is often flouted in practice, except 
for imported motor vehicles whose ownership must be registered with the 
provincial government. When buying out-of-province, consumers tend to pay 
the local tax and neglect to notify their purchase to their own fiscal 
authorities, applying in effect the origin principle. Given the econom1.c 
geography and in particular the sheer vastness of the country, shoppers 
will not find it profitable to exploit systematically retail sales tax 
differences, save in the few populous border areas such as Ontario-based 
Ottawa and its suburb Hull, which belongs to Quebec. To our knowledge, 
the literature has not produced any evidence yet on the magnitude and 
economic effects of fiscally-induced cross-border shopping in Canada. 
A more serious threat to fair competition among producers and retailers 
could be posed by an increasing reliance on mail order firms, because 
this way the distance factor is eliminated. Since provinces cannot as a 
rule tax extraprovincially, purchasing via out-of-province mail order 
firms may even enable one to evade retail sales taxes altogether. espect). 
Provincial excises also vary considerably, and in the case of liquor and 
wines are imposed discriminatorily to advantage local distillers and wine 
growers. Differential excise treatment does not form the only instrument 
provinces employ to favour local producers of alcoholic beverages. Since 
the sale of the latter is under their tight control, provincial 
authorities have additional means to fragment the internal market. For 
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instance, the consumption of beer is restricted as a general rule to that 
brewed 1n the province or imported from abroad. Interestingly, the 
concentration in the beer industry is quite high; many plants, however, 
have a suboptimal size. Better advertising support, superior positioning 
in liquor outlets and discriminating packaging requirements are further 
ways in which provincial liquor boards promote local suppliers. Some 
provinces even limit private purchases of spirits from other provinces 
through an outright quota system. 
5.3 Provincial Aid to Industry 
The Canadian constitution has conferred no powers to central government 
to supervise provincial aid. Given the precept that in principle they can 
use at will the money raised through their own taxes, provinces are not 
legally constrained in their provision of public aid to industry. As a 
result, for the sake of promoting perceived local interests state aids 
have been awarded by provincial authorities or quasi-governmental 
organizations (e.g. crown corporations) to attract new investments or to 
keep afloat ailing enterprises. This inevitably has led to at times 
fierce provincial rivalry and the crippling of the Canadian internal 
market. 
One of the prime 
public aid which 
causal factors behind interprovincial friction over 
has sometimes degenerated into a spiralling mutual 
outbidding process, is 
income and employment 
the desire to overcome regional disparities in 
opportunities. Therefore, by obviating such 
regional concerns through its own policies, the federal government could 
in principle provide itself with a powerful instrument to prevent 
interprovincial subsidy 11wars 11 from occurring. To combat regional 
inequities, Ottawa basically disposes of two kinds of regional policies. 
The first has a purely redistributive intent and is embodied by the 
interprovincial equalization scheme discussed under 3.2. The second has a 
developmental aim and has taken shape in the operations of the federal 
Department of Regional Industrial Expansion and its precursors. However, 
the activist policy of the federation has been called into question 
repeatedly and been criticized as to its objectives and instruments. 
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The provinces have awarded investment aid to industry by availing 
themselves of the investment funds and financial institutions they 
control and by imposing restrictions on the placements of pension funds. 
Most provinces have at their disposal two types of investment funds: on 
one hand, the public trust funds, generally financed by natural resource 
revenues, and on the other hand the specific provincial development 
corporations which, because of the attendant benefits, are as a rule 
established as crown corporations. 
In order to ensure that a large part of provincial earnings are invested 
locally, several provinces have set up special funds fed by their natural 
resource revenues, after the example of the 1976 Alberta Heritage FUnd. 
These funds, especially the Alberta one, have rapidly grown very sizable. 
They tend to be employed, at least in part, for the financing of 
provincial "strategic" investment projects which may fail to generate the 
normal market rate of return (in the case of Alberta, 10% of total assets 
or about 1 billion Canadian dollars were given that destination in 1981). 
Another important use to which these funds are put is to provide grants 
and loans on soft terms to the numerous provincial crown corporations, 
being public enterprises (e.g. utilities) that are exempt from federal 
and provincial corporate income tax. Crown corporations most of interest 
in the present context concern the development corpor·ations, like the 
Ontario or Manitoba Development Corporation or the Quebec Industrial 
Development Corporation, which constitute in many provinces the main 
vehicle for an activist industrial policy. 
Such development corporations are public investment companies providing 
assistance to private industry by way of guaranteed loans or loans at 
preferential interest rates, and equity participation. Their role does 
not stop at mere financial aid and advice, but also involves helping 
companies to develop new products, promoting rationalization and mergers 
and attracting business from out-of-province. In their operations they 
enjoy considerable discretion. 
In addition, provinces owning thrift institutions have in the past used 
the latter to orient savings to provincial investment priorities. This 
happened in the beginning of the eighties to the publicly owned Quebec 
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Caisse de Depot et de Placement which - not without stirring controversy 
- granted cheap loans to public enterprises and private firms deemed 
11 Crucial 11 for the Quebec economy. 
For similar purposes the same province has restricted the investment 
options of the Quebec Pension Plan, which has gradually accumulated very 
substantial funds. In fact, the assets of the QPP are held and invested 
by the just mentioned Caisse with clear priority for the economic 
development of the province. 
Beside investment aid, provinces dispose of a wide array of general 
financial assistance programs. In this respect Trebilcock et alii (1983) 
noted that the 11diversity of what may be generally termed industrial 
subsidies is staggering, including not only the more direct and obvious 
forms of assistance such as grants, loans, and loan guarantees, but also 
indirect forms of assistance through government provision of support 
services and infrastructure either across an entire industry or on a 
selective basis to individual businesses. Provincial government activity 
1n the areas of business counselling and research and development, 
provision of transportation facilities and development of export markets 
stand as typical examples of the latter11 • They state furthermore that an 
overv1ew of the various provincial industrial subsidies programs would 
approach a hundred pages! 
Be that as it may, the available literature does not permit one to obtain 
an accurate picture on the actual size and importance of general and 
investment aid conferred directly or indirectly by Canadian provinces nor 
on their distortive economic impact on the functioning of the Canadian 
internal market. 
5.4 Provincial public procurement 
From the viewpoint of Canada's constitution, purchasing is an exercise of 
provincial contracting powers analogous to spending powers. For the same 
reasons (Art. 92(2) of the Constitution) as why they are virtually 
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unconstrained to confer state aid (see 5.3), Canadian provinces are 
basically free to contract as they wish. They are therefore free to adopt 
discriminatory public procurement policies in favour of local suppliers. 
In the recent past, most Canadian provinces have exhibited a growing 
tendency in this direction. Preferential purchase policies have either 
been enshrined in provincial legislation or ensue from the discretionary 
practices of procurement officers. The methods usually employed include 
selective or single instead of public tenders, insufficient publicity on 
bidding opportunities, and explicit preference margins for local 
producers. Purchase preferences concern not only the provincial 
administration proper but are also applied by local public utilities -
active for instance in the fields of energy or transport schools, 
hospitals and by the resource industries 1n which the provincial 
government holds a stake. 
On the basis of legislation passed in 1977, the Quebec government opts 
for the lowest bid from a Quebec firm even when it exceeds that of an 
out-of-province contender under the proviso that the offer of the Quebec 
enterprise furthers so-called 'provincial industrial development 
objectives'. British Columbia has a policy of paying up to a 10% premium 
on provincial content. In addition, the procurement authorities may take 
account of regional or sectoral unemployment as well as the general state 
of an industry rather than focus exclusively on costs. In Alberta; local 
preference will only be granted if provincial enterprises enter bids that 
can emulate approximately that of outsiders. However, the fact that over 
the years more than 90% of contracts have been awarded to Alberta firms, 
notwithstanding the relatively limited size of the province, may point to 
a difference between proclaimed policy and practice. Ontario is about the 
only province that does not apply a discriminatory system as such. It 
advocates a general 'buy Canadian' policy, but this is hardly surprising 
as it hosts more than half of the country's manufacturing base. 
Furthermore, there have been important contracts in the past for which 
purchase officers have made exceptions to this general rule to the 
benefit of Ontario-based corporations. The six smaller provinces also 
pursue preferential purchase policies but these tend to have but a 
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negligible internal market fragmenting potential. For many, especially 
capital or research-intensive goods and services, the smaller provinces 
depend anyway on out-of-province companies for want of local firms. 
Whalley (1986) has produced an estimate of the 'static' effeciency gains 
to be derived from the elimination of discriminatory provincial 
government procurement policies. As provincial outlays on goods and 
services net of ordinary personnel expenditures amount only to 2 to 3 
percent of Canadian GDP, potential savings are unavoidably minor when 
expressed as a percentage of national 1ncome. This contrasts sharply with 
the situation of EC Member States. Be that as it may, the estimate 
presented by Whalley, to wit 0,05% of GDP or about 1,5% of total effected 
provincial market purchases of goods and services seems minuscule given 
the blatant market-fragmenting procurement policies most if not all 
provinces are adhering to. 
(NOTE: Whalley's quantification attempt confines itself to a static 
partial equilibrium analysis. It therefore does not address the longer 
term salutary effects the removal of provincial public procurement could 
spawn under the form of reinforced competition in the sectors dominated 
by public purchases, industrial rationalisation and greater scope for 
exploiting industry-wide economies of scale in the wake of increased 
demand.) 
5.5 Financial services 
5.5.1 Insurance 
In insurance, there 1s a striking contrast between the formal 
decentralization of insurance regulation and the effective exercise of 
provincial autonomy affecting market integration (Baer, 1986). 
Decentralization in a formal sense goes very far, though not as far as in 
the US (see 6.6.1). Federal regulation is confined to issues of financial 
soundness of non-Canadian firms (foreign ownership varies from 60% of the 
firms in property and casualty to nearly 70% in life and health, with 
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market shares 1n some insurance lines beyond 50%) and of Canadian-
incorporated companies which are registered federally. Provinces (can) 
regulate nearly all insurance aspects both for federally and provincially 
incorporated companies. Interestingly, the narrow federal powers are 
constitutionally recognized, but repeated attempts over a century to 
extend their scope to contract terms, insurance intermediaries or 
marketing have been invalidated by judicial review. 
In reality, however, voluntary harmonisation has led to almost complete 
uniformity and negligeable costs for interprovincial insurance business. 
The Association of Superintendents of Insurance (all provinces, and the 
federal Superintendent) has produced uniform laws and their provincial 
adoption has on the whole been unproblematic. The only possible drawback 
is perhaps that this harmonization tends to lead to some rigidity, 
delaying certain innovations 1n 1nsurance policies (e. g. no-fault car 
insurance benefits). The fact that innovation takes the form of a 
deviation from agreed uniformity acts as a constraint. Another factor 
promoting effective market integration is a close collaboration between 
the insurance industry, with its expertise, and the regulators. Thus, 
whereas, since 1944, rating bureau's in the US risk conflicts with the 
federal anti-trust authorities (so that special federal law and state 
regulation had to be devised), the Insurers' Advisory Organization of 
Canada (a leading nation-wide rating bureau) and other industry 
organizations are viewed by all provinces as useful to improve 
information and objectivate pricing questions. In contrast to the US, the 
monitoring of 'rating' by provinces has been avoided. A third factor 
preventing market fragmentation is the delegation of the formal 
supervisory activities with respect to the financial integrity of 
federally incorporated (and foreign) companies to the federal Department 
of Insurance. This delegation may be formally complete (Nova Scotia) or 
controlled via exemption in provincial licensing requirements. For the 
relatively modest share of interprovincial insurance contracted by 
provincially-incorporated companies reciprocal arrangements exist, that 
in fact appls the principles of 'home province control' and mutual 
recognition (which is easy given a high degree of uniformity). All that 
provinces do is controlling the solvency aspects of provincial companies, 
based on essentially similar laws throughout the country. 
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5.5.2 Banking 
Three important features distinguish the Canadian reg~me from that 
prevailing in the US or in EC countries. First, financial intermediaries 
are regulated differently - at least until very recently - according to 
their main business. The precept of enacting separate rules for each of 
the four identified types of institutions (in Canada often denoted 
metaphorically as the 11 four pillars 11 ) led in principle to a sharp 
segregation of branches as the performance of the core activity of each 
11 pillar 11 was reserved exclusively to the firms belonging to that branch. 
The four pillars distinguished were banks, near-banks (i.e., mortgage 
institutions, trusts, credit unions, caisses populaires etc.) insurance 
companies and securities firms. 
Second, this institutional partitioning corresponds with a distribution 
of supervisory competences between the federal government and the 
provinces, which, however, ~s far from perspicacious: some financial 
institutions resort under the exclusive control of either Ottawa or the 
provinces, whereas for other sorts of intermediaries the two levels of 
government share regulatory power. The regulation of banks ~s in the 
purview of the federal authorities. Near-banks fall generally under 
provincial legislation although they may be incorporated federally. In 
any case, near-banks also qualify for coverage by the deposit insurance 
scheme which, save for the Quebec thrift and morgage institutions, is run 
by the federation. The insurance (largely) and securities pillars are 
within the competence of the provinces. Thus, the jurisdictional overlay 
to the four pillar framework is quite complex, providing ample scope for 
potential friction among the provinces and between them and the federal 
authorities. 
Third, the segregation of branches and the prominent role of the 
provinces in the regulation process has ~ gone hand in hand with a 
circumscription of the geographical mobility of financial institutions 
ins ide Canada's internal market. Unlike ~n the US, where for example 
banks are not permitted to branch out at will across state borders, 
financial service companies 
basis provided they meet 
are capable of operating on a nation-wide 
the relevant, often province-specific, 
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regulatory requirements. Near-banks, and securities houses thus face a 
situation inside Canada amounting to what tn international trade 
discussions is often termed the "national treatment" regime. Firms 
foreign to the province can establish local subsidiaries, but the 
delivery of services from out-of-province is prohibited (Observe that in 
the US banking market, the branching is outlawed but that out-of-state 
customers may be served if they wish). 
This decentralized, somewhat peculiar set-up provided financial 
enterprises in Canada for a long time with a stable environment in which 
they could perform what was conunonly held an, efficient intermediation 
function in the Canadian economy and stay competitive on world markets. 
However, since the second half of the seventies, but in particular over 
the last few years, financial services markets all over the Western world 
have undergone dramatic changes in the train of technological progress in 
the information and teleconununications field, the securization of debt, 
the rapid internationalization of activities and the deregulation of the 
market undertaken by various leading OECD countries. Canada, as an open 
economy, evidently did not escape this trend. 
These sweeping changes generated what proved irresistible market forces 
toward the (sectoral) integration of financial activities, eroding the 
very foundations on which the Canadian regime of financial service 
regulation had always rested, to wit the segregation of subsectors. With 
the pressures for a profound reform to accommodate the developments in 
the direction of "universal banking" building up over the years, leading 
on to the start of the deregulation debate in Canada early 1985, the four 
pillar regime eventually collapsed de facto in June 1987. Banks, trusts 
and insurance companies were empowered to obtain a major stake in the 
equity of securities firms. Most noteworthy in the context of the present 
study, the traditional division of regulatory competences between the 
federation and the provinces also tended to become unsettled by the 
demise of the four pillars. 
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National treatment, deregulation and the internal market of 
financial services 
Financial institutions subject to provincial regulation and supervision 
are allowed to establish subsidiaries in any province. Subsidiaries must 
abide by local rules and cannot supply services across provincial 
frontiers. The application of this "national treatment" principle 1s 
motivated by the desire that producers of financial services can operate 
on an equal footing as far as regulatory requirements are concerned. 
Depositor and investor protection also play a role. Formally, there is an 
endeavour to avoid that the existence of different jurisdictions gives 
rise to competitive distortions. Nevertheless, the fragmentation of the 
national market into provincial segments may mean that consumers are 
faced with varying market conditions. The ban for provincially 
incorporated financial enterprises on the interprovincial sale of 
financial services probably inflicts productive inefficiencies which tend 
to reduce welfare for Canada as a whole. Such inefficiencies could arise 
from imperfectly competitive markets within single provinces or from the 
cost-augmenting effects of the adaptation to the varying regulatory 
requirements imposed by authorities of the respective provinces. 
Outside insurance, few attempts have been made yet in Canada to proceed 
from "national treatment" to the mutual recognition-cum-home-province 
control principle whereby a common domestic market for finance would be 
achieved in which interprovincial discrimination of consumers would no 
longer apply. 
Canada's regulatory system traditionally distinguished between types of 
enterprises, specializing in distinct financial products, which were 
separately regulated and supervised. With the blurring of these 
specializations, firms with distinct regulatory "origin" may now offer 
identical financial products. This creates serious supervisory problems 
and equal treatment may become difficult to achieve. However, a radical 
overhaul of the regulatory setting is also very hard because it 1s 
inextricably linked with the assignment of economic powers to the two 
levels of government in Canada. In other words, the blurring of financial 
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services specializations should not be expected to generate a shift of 
regulatory power to the federal level so easily. The product-wise 
integration of financial activities poses therefore a potentially serious 
danger to fair competition between firms in Canada. 
The obvious response in order to avert competitive distortions would be 
to shift from regulations on the basis of institutions to regulations on 
the basis of functions or markets. The latter approach would imply that 
one and the same firm would be controlled by both federal and provincial 
authorities, but this would squarely conflict with the existing division 
of powers between the federation and the provinces. In addition, the 
functional approach would run up against certain limits ~n its own right. 
For instance, solvency, one of the most prominent concerns prompting 
regulation, relates as a rule to the company as a whole and not to the 
various activities or departments of the firm separately. Similarly, even 
if solvency problems would loom for one single area of business, problems 
may spill over into other dealings of the company in question as the news 
of the difficulties gets in the public domain. To prevent a domino-effect 
from occurring one may need an 11umbrella11 supervisory body monitoring the 
operations of the entire company. These considuations would tend to 
favour a more important federal presence ~n financial services 
regulations. 
5.6 Technical barriers 
If complaints or received literature serve as indicators for the 
prevalence of a barrier, the inescapable conclusion is that Canada does 
not suffer much from interprovincial technical barriers. In the more than 
20 research volumes for the Macdonald Commission, dealing with economic 
aspects of the federation, hardly any reference to technical barriers 
will be found. The authoritative source on barriers in Canada outside 
this Commission work (namely, Trebilcock et.al., ed.s., 1983) provides 
only a few references to different technical regulations in road haulage 
(provinces differ as to permissable truck weight, axle spacing and 
length) and agriculture (for example, different grading systems for 
potatoes). During interviews complaints about technical barriers were 
scant. 
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There are a number of federal laws which prevent diversity from arising: 
weights & measures, rules on pesticides, car safety and pollution 
standards and almost all packaging & labelling rules (except a few minor 
linguistic items) are federal, for instance. Reference to federally 
agreed standards 1s common in provincial laws. Thus, although every 
province has a Chief Inspector for matters of electrical safety, they 
rely on the generally accepted Electrical Code of the (private) Canadian 
Standards Association which makes for uniformity apart from adaptations 
having climatic reasons. The National Building Code of Canada (produced 
by the National Research Council) is also adopted by all provinces, be it 
with more variations than under the Electrical Code. With respect to 
health & safety in the workplace, the federal Hazardous Product Act and 
close federal-provincial coordination have prevented serious problems 
from arising. 
In contrast to the extremely complex organization of standardization in 
the USA, standard writing in Canada is done by only few organs. The 
umbrella organization is the semi-public Standards Council of Canada 
(also ISO-member). Its a1m is to promote national standards. Ignoring the 
case of the building code, there are five standard writing bodies. By far 
the largest one is the (private) Canadian Standards Association, a 
nation-wide body with some 1000 committees in 36 sectors. Access to 
committees is open; for instance probably up to one-fifth of the 
committee experts are Americans. Two specialized private bodies include 
the Canadian Gas Association and UL (Underwriters LTD) of Canada (for 
fire protection). The only provincial body is the Bureau de Normalisation 
de Quebec, which frequently aligns with national and ISO standards and 
seems not to be considered as a source of divergent standards. It also 
writes standards on agricultural machinery and, f.i., septic tanks. 
Finally the federal government sets de facto standards through purchasing 
via its General Standards Board: this has had a major impact in textiles 
and paints, for example. Participants in the standardization process 
claim that the approach to standards in Canada is functional: the 
consensus method (including government officials) works well and there is 
a permanent effort to avoid needless duplication or overlap. 
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Certification was concentrated, until recently, at the Gas Association 
and UL of Canada (for gas and fire protection standards) and the Canadian 
Standards Association for electric and many other products. For plumbing 
products, certification has recently become competitive as the production 
firm Warnock & Hersew (!) has entered the field next to ~SA. However, 
provincial approval requirements are usually based on national 
certification bodies and seem to cause few problems. 
The unproblematic nature (if not, absence) of technical barriers inside 
Canada is a result of the economic self-interest of almost a..Ll economic 
agents, given the smallness of Canadian provinces and the relativ~ weight 
of interprovincial and American market outlets, not least the protection 
against liability suits. However, it is not without interest to note that 
the Constitution or federal lawmaking do not guarantee or impose this 
harmony. Standards can be set for products sold within the province 
(according to several paragraphs of section 92 of the ~onstitution), 
provided they do not infringe upon the federal power to regulate 
interpovincial or international trade and commerce or upon the federal 
criminal power. In other words, much of the harmony is based on 
voluntarism of the provinces and any province can abrogate agreements 
(like Quebec did for tomato packaging) or discontinue to accept national 
codes. The Supreme Court's judicial review does not provide clear 
guidance on what is 'substantially local' (Silzer & Krasnick, 1986, pp. 
175/6) as it is not consistent. Nevertheless, for 'clearly' 
interprovincial matters, the federal government's legal basis disposes of 
the competence to intervene, which has proven to be effectiv~. 
5.7 Interprovincial labour mobility and licensing of professions 
Since the coming into effect in 1982 of the Canadian ~harter of Rights 
and Freedoms (in particular section 6 thereof) mobility rights have been 
firmly established to individuals within the Canadian federation. 
Canadians are fully entitled to move, take up residence and work in the 
location of their liking. However, Supreme Court rulings relative to the 
Charter have not made it clear yet whether these broad mobility rights 
take precedence over provincial legislation that expressly discriminates 
- 88 -
41 
against outsiders on private as well as public employment matters. Tne 
most prominent instance of such legislation concerns the preferential 
hiring dispositions existing in several provinces, which in effect impose 
local hiring restrictions on private employers. Two well-known examples 
in this respect are the 1978 regulation under the Newfoundland Petroleum 
and Natural Gas Act stipulating that persons granted leases for 
exploration or exploitation of oil or gas in Newfoundland shall give 
preference in their hiring practices to qualified residents of the 
province, and the 1977 regulation under the Quebec Construction Industry 
Labour Relations Act which effectively shuts out outsiders from the 
Quebec market for construction workers. Apart from preferential hiring 
provisions destined for the private sector, provincial authorities also 
advantage local workers through their public procurement of services 
(cfr. 5.4) thereby impairing in yet another fashion the functioning of 
the Internal Market for labour. In the European Community, discriminatory 
legislation of such kind would in all likelihood be deemed incompatible 
with Community law which holds that the right to take up employment on an 
equal footing with nationals is applicable to all jobs and occupations 
except those strictly connected with the exercise of official authority. 
In order to enjoy true mobility rights individuals ought to be able to 
have recourse to a reasonably comparable level of social services ln the 
new location and to preserve the pension rights accumulated earlier. The 
Canadian social security does not constitute in any significant way an 
impediment to interprovincial labour mobility ~see also 3.2). 
Unemployment benefits are regulated and paid tor federally. By virtue of 
the Canada Assistance Plan, federal funds cover partly provincial income 
assistance and welfare programmes, provided provinces do not impose a 
period of residence as a condition of eligibility to financial aid. 
Similarly, the Canada Health Act confers federal cost sharing for 
provincial medical care expenditures if and only if provincial health 
care systems allow for full portability of benefits and full 
accessibility for residents of the province. 
The Canadian pension regime, however, turns out to have a far greater 
potential to impact negatively on intra- as well as interprovincial -
labour mobility, owing the lack of portability of private plans. 
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Portability of Canada's two public pension plans (Canada Pension Plan and 
Quebec Pension Plan) pose no problems but it is private schemes that 
create difficulties on account of the inability or costliness (in terms 
of foregone pension rights) to carry paid-in pension benefits from the 
previous employer to the new one. 
The market fragmentation having to do with occupational licensing stems 
from a lack of uniformity of provincial requirements and the absence of 
mutual recognition of licensing and certification procedures. Sometimes 
barriers are directly attributable to the conduct of the provinces, 
sometimes it is the local professional organisations who decide on thl::! 
provincial recognition criteria. 
As far as the professions are concerned, barriers do not appear important 
except for a few like lawyers, pharmacists and surveyors. For a number of 
professions a minimum residence condition is imposed. For example, 
British Columbia's Notaries Act requires a three-year residency period 
prior to application for licensing. 
As to trades, more than one third of Canadians active as skilled 
craftsmen are subject to licensing and certification. In order to obtain 
a license a craftsman trained in another province is often required to 
return to school and requalify before he can resume his career. Such 
would be the fate for instance of a dental technician immigrating into 
Ontario, as the latter province refuses to recognize qualifications other 
than a period of four year apprenticeship in Ontario! Some progress 
towards the liberalization of the market for skilled labour has recently 
been made by the establishment of a federally sponsored countrywide 
professional certification programme (the so-called 'red seal 
programme'), but this program exists merely on a voluntary basis. Quebec, 
for instance, decided not to participate. It is also primarily this 
province which thwarts the provision of services from out-of-province by 
either charging higher license fees or by simply refusing licenses to 
non-residents. This applies, for example, to taxi driving, travel 
agencies and insurance policy sales. 
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The above description of the various barriers to interprovincial labour 
mobility might suggest that the resulting suboptimal allocation of the 
Canadian workforce causes significant efficiency losses depressing real 
income for the country as a whole. Yet, as in the case of public 
procurement, the only available estimate, again provided by Whalley 
(1986), is sobering, at least in the eyes of Europeans. Whalley, studying 
six different occupations and ascribing interregional wage differences to 
quota-type restrictions to labour mobility, reckoned that the removal of 
barriers would raise overall national efficiency by some 22 million 
Canadian dollars in 1981, or about 0. 005% of GDP. Admittedly, Whalley 
assumed away the possibility that such quota-type restrictions trigger 
rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the protected labour force, but 
even with modifications of the hypotheses in this direction, the estimate 
would be likely to remain trifling. 
5.8 Interprovincial road transport 
The regulation of interprovincial transportation of goods by motor 
vehicles lies, ex. Article 92(1U) of the Canadian Constitution, in 
principle within the jurisdiction of the federal government, whereas the 
provinces are competent for exclusively intraprovincial transport 
matters. With the aim of avoiding confusion and overregulation that cou~d 
possibly ensue from a duplication of rules, but also because it felt at 
that time that its administration was not adequately equipped to assume 
federal powers in transport, the federal authorities decided, however, by 
means of the 1953 Motor Vehicle Transport Act to delegate to the 
provinces the power to regulate interprovincial haulage. This delegation 
has set the stage for a significant fragmentation of Canada's internal 
market for road transport, in particular on account of the administrative 
complexities the current policy regime has given rise to and which 
truckers find expensive to comply with. 
Compared to the existing situation in the EC, the Canadian internal 
market appears at first sight much more liberalized, given the absence of 
road transport quota and the right of cabotage. But the administrative 
burden placed on economic agents is - as yet - less onerous in the 
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Community. The Canadian case shows clearly that it is costly to 
substitute extensive administrative arrangements, emanating from fiscal 
revenue and fair competition concerns, for costly border controls and 
discriminatory national regulations. 
5.8.1 Registration requirements and fees 
Because provinces exercise the competence delegated to them over 
interprovincial trucking and because transport regulations uiffer from 
province to province and are not, as a rule, mutually recognized, a 
haulier wanting to conduct interprovincial business needs to obtain a 
licence in each province he passes through and pay the attenaant fees. 
Regulatory discrepancies do not only concern entry into the profession, 
but also weights and dimensions of lorries, and safety aspects. Adjusting 
to divergent professional and technical demands, along with the fees, 
obviously discourages interprovincial trucking, the more so as the 
Supreme Court in a 1972 ruling upheld the view that provinces can subject 
carriers from out-of-province to more stringent regulations than local 
transporters. Translated into the EC context this would mean that one 
could in the fixing of domestic regulations discriminate on the basis of 
nationality! 
The provincial registration obligation also implied up to April 1982 that 
licence plates had to be obtained from each province through which 
transport occurred. Since that time, the Canadian Agreement on llehicle 
Registration (CAVR), to which all provinces adhere, has been in force. By 
virtue of this agreement, only one single licence plate is necessary, 
namely that of the home province of the carrier. A clearing scheme 
distributes this licence plate fee to the other provinces on the basis of 
distance travelled within that other province. This agreement clearly 
reduces direct registration expenses for road hauliers, but it 
complicates the latter's administration as they need to report all 
interprovincial journeys undertaken. Moreover, the implementation of the 
clearing scheme absorbs public service resources. The agreement pertains 
only to licence fees proper. They do not cover other specific 
requirements individual provinces may impose, such as regards vehicle and 
load insurance. Notwithstanding the CAVR, supplementary costs due to 
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regulatory differences may therefore still uave to be borne. This is not 
to say that actions other than the CAVR have not been undertaken. They 
have in the framework of the Canadian <.:onf erence of Motor Transport 
Administrators - an ad hoc association of provincial and federal civil 
servants responsible for road haulage and as such epitomizing 'executive' 
federalism - and they have met with some success. However, given the 
purely voluntary nature of this conference, the efforts cannot lead to a 
durable harmonization of legally binding provincial regulations; they 
will achieve a reversible acceptance of the mutual recognition principle 
at most. As long as Ottawa is not prepared to reassert its constitutional 
rights and step in to lay down federal rules on interprovincial trucking, 
Canada's internal market for road haulage stays liable to fragmentation. 
5.8.2 The collection of fuel taxes 
Unlike the situation in the Community where fuel tax is paid in and 
accrues exclusively to the country of the petrol station (at least up to 
600 lit res), which in effect boils down to an application of the origin 
principle, Canada's taxation regime on fuel for lorries is predicated on 
the destination principle: for the sake of fair competition among 
hauliers and fiscal equity among provinces, fuel taxes are expected to 
fully benefit the province where the fuel is consumed, i.e. where the 
distance ls travelled. 
Aside from the fact that, like in the cas~ of retail taxes (cfr. 5.2), 
this principle is sometimes offended in border areas by "cross-border 
trucking", its practical implementation can lead to important 
administrative costs for interprovincial road transporters. Each time 
truckers pass a provincial boundary, they have to pay fuel tax and the 
documents to be filed, for instance those to get the reimbursement of 
excess tax paid, are quite detailed. Such procedures make truckers' 
bookkeeping highly intricate. 
Two steps to alleviate these burdensome procedures have been taken 
recently. The three Maritime provinces have set up a fuel tax 
apportioning system which bears close resemblance to the aforementioned 
CAVR schem~ for registration fee collection and distribution. Instead of 
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clearing continuously arid with each province separately, truckers pay the 
tax of the province where they purchase the fuel. The tax proceeds are 
allocated subsequently among the provinces, again following the distance 
travelled. The second improvement has been the acceptance by all 
provinces of a connnon form for declaring the stretch and hence for 
calculating the tax payable. Be that as it may be, the common document 
must still be filled out in every province interested, so that remaining 
red tap is still lengthy. 
6. BARRIERS IN THE US INTERNAL MARKET 
6.1 General issues of US market integration 
In contrast to Canada, intra-US trade is much larger than - indeed, a 
multiple of - its foreign trade. A second major difference with Canada is 
that the 'fragmentation' of the US internal market is not a topic which 
arouses much interest in politics or even in the business world. Judging 
from interviews and other reactions, the term 'fragmentation' is felt by 
many US citizens to exaggerate the nuisances flowing from a federal 
structure. These nuisances appear to be broadly accepted as an inevitable 
product of decentralization, and greatly overcompensated by the benefits 
of the federation. 
Despite the superficial impression that Table 2, and the discussion in 
the rest of this chapter may convey, the integration of the US internal 
market has reached a very high degree. Its scope is comprehensive, 
interstate economic mobilities are substantial and their responsiveness 
to new opportunities or decline in one State or the other is 
considerable. Market integration is facilitateel by integrative judicial 
review, based on the interstate commerce clause (see 6.2), reducing the 
levels of interstate barriers. Moreover, the scope of barriers not 
constrained by connnerce clause application is relatively narrow. 
Nevertheless, sections 6. 3 through 6. 9 below show clearly that at least 
some barriers are not trivial and that the costs of today's fragmentation 
is likely to be high enough to merit attention. 
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The seven 'barriers' discussed below have been selected 1n the light of 
the White Paper. They do 
barriers are either highly 
not provide an exhaustive picture. Other 
specific to a State or relate to special 
products: they tend to be of trivial importance for market integration. 
For instance, the US has no internal customs barriers and States have no 
customs officers. Yet State laws can lead to phytosanitary import 
prohibition, so as to prevent certain fruit diseases. Thus, the highly 
exceptional controls on citrus 'imports' from Arizona into California 
leads to checks of persons travelling by car. Another, less exceptional 
example are random controls of cross-borders shoppers on purchases of 
alcoholic beverages, be it for tax purposes or because the county (not 
the State) is 'dry'. Interstate cigarette trade is frequently controlled 
by federal law enforcement agents (see 6.3). Also, State regulation or 
State anti-trust policies may create 
conditions 1n certain product, serv1ces 
differences 
or (segments 
1n 
of) 
competitive 
the labour 
markets. Relocation of firms 1s costly due to social 'exit' provisions, 
which differ. Finally, federal laws and policies may sometimes distort or 
frustrate interstate economic mobilities but, unlike Canada, this is not 
a ser1ous issue (quota's or 'set aside' of land in agricultural policy 
has such an effect; oil price regulations below world prices up to 1980). 
Like 1n Canada, to discuss barriers only 1n terms of 1 costs' without 
paying attention to the "benefits of diversity" would amount to a failure 
to understand federalism. The US federation uses a complex institutional 
and legal structure to minimize the costs of diversity by enabling 
far-reaching market integration, while carefully upholding political, 
fiscal and regulatory instruments at state level sustaining a capacity to 
supply local public goods in response to local preferences. The so reaped 
benefits of diversity sometimes flow from public policies having 
protectionist effects or otherwise distort market integration. This is 
particularly the case where populist local pressures (i.e. preferences) 
are dominant or cultural divergencies play a role; there is also a 
remarkable tolerance of the interstate export of the tax burden through 
severance taxes in the cases of oil or raw materials. 
That fragmentation is rarely very costly, the diversity notwithstanding, 
is also the result of other factors. These other factors play only a 
minor role in the EC and make the Community less comparable with the US 
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(at least, today). English is spoken everywhere and cultural affinities 
or origin of citizens hardly influence differences in policies among 
States. Communication networks and transport infrastructure have fostered 
market integration; nation-wide investment in both have been decisively 
influenced by national defence considerations (for instance the national 
interstate highways system is still formally linked to defence). Higher 
education is not under federal control but is private or financed by 
State or local government; yet, competition and the right of mobility 
have long led to nation-wide standards for many skilled workers and the 
professions (see also 6.8.2). Together, such factors provide a 
socio-economic context in which "diversity" becomes a nighly relative 
concept; in European eyes it amounts to ll.ttle more than a desire of 
selective differentiation from what otherwise is perceived as similarity 
or uniformity. The sense of competition, the acceptance of challenge as 
well as potential and observed economic mobilities constrain the actual 
divergencies and their costs enormously. It is against this background 
that the rest of this chapter should be read. 
6.2 The interstate commerce clause 
The USA is a federation with power divided between a national government 
of enumerated powers and state governments of residual power. The 
enumerated powers of the federation itself include all powers necessary 
and proper for carrying out the enumerated powers. The states have 
residual powers (often termed 'police powers') to provide for the health 
and safety of state citizens, for questions of public morality and more 
broadly 'general welfare'. The problem is t:herefore how and to what 
extent the states can utilize these powers, and, 
and to what extent this leads or can lead 
integration. 
as a consequence, how 
to incomplete market 
The simple clue to that question is the interstate commerce clause of the 
Constitution, reading as follows: "The Congress shall have the power .. to 
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .. ". 
This clause has been regarded almost right from the beginning, especially 
by the Supreme Court as essential to the unity of the USA, to the "more 
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perfect union" succeeding the original confederation in 1787. A telling 
quote from Justice Cardozo indicates this inclination: the commerce 
clause " was framed upon the theory that the people of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity 
and salvation are in union and not in division" (quoted from Kommers & 
Waelbroeck, 1986, p. 170). In other words, the interstate commerce clause 
is not merely an assignment to Congress but also a strict limitation of 
the States' powers so as to preserve market integration. The functional 
interpretation has therefore been allowed to prevail as becomes clear 
from today' s general definition of interstate commerce "to include every 
species of travel, communication and movement of any kind across state 
lines, whether for profit or not, as well as every species of commercial 
negotiation which will involve sooner or later an act of transportation 
of persons or things, or the flow of services or power, across state 
lines" (idem, in footnote 12). 
This comprehensive definition is leaving little scope of the 
fragmentation of the US internal market. Compared to the situation in 
Europe (despite the integrative case law of the ~,.;ourt of Justice of the 
EC, ex. Art. 30, EEC) and that in Canada, the limitation of the powers of 
the States imposes an orientation to genuinely local economic activities. 
Otherwise, State interventions are trivial in economic significance 
beyond the State's border except for financial services and a few other 
instances where Congress has preferred to leave regulation to the States 
or has introduced federal laws leaving some scope for exercising State 
powers. Given the political legitimacy of this integrative view of the 
commerce clause, the Supreme Court of the US has effectively assumed the 
responsibility for "negative market integration", that, in Europe, has 
been much more the joint product of the legislator (the Council) and the 
judiciary (the Court, helped by the Commission), with the second being 
dependent on the former given the fairly precise demarcations of 
Community law in a number of respects. A crucial difference between the 
US and the EC remains, of course, that the comparability breaks down in 
the cases of services and factors of production. The commerce clause 
applies to services whereas the EEC Treaty ties the freedom of financial 
services to capital market liberalization and explicit directives of the 
Council while the freedom of transport services forms a part of the 
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construction of a common transport policy. In fact, however, the US 
situation is not so radically different since Congress has used the 
clause as a basis for federal laws in financial services, leaving ample 
scope for State regulation, which in turn has fragmented the US internal 
market. With respect to interstate transport, Congress adopted a federal 
law a century ago empowering the Interstate Commerce Commission (and, for 
air transport up to 1984, the Civil Aviation Board) to pursue a kind of 
common transport policy with entry and rate regulation as well as routing 
restrictions. Deregulation of road haulage has altered the substance, not 
the 'commonness', of the policy. 
In the case of factors of production the differences between the EC and 
the US are too great to make a comparison useful (but see sections 3.2 
and 6.8. 
The force and scope of judicial review on the interstate commerce clause 
is perhaps best understood by comparison with the EC in three key domains 
of product market integration, excluding services or factors so as to 
increase comparability. 
EC judicial review (to repeat: on products!) is sometimes even more 
centralized than the US. However, in other respects it is incapable of 
being applied given the considerable 'reserved' powers of the Member 
States. Following Kommers & Waelbroeck (1986) we look at three domains of 
regulation: health & safety, taxes, and environmental and consumer 
protection legislation. 
health & safety: after establishing whether state regulations fall within 
the scope of 'police powers' (US) or Art. 36, EEC (and this is done 
restrictively, i.e. the mere "incantation of a purpose to promote the 
public health and safety •• does not insulate a state law from commerce 
law attack" (US), or, the burden of justification in the EC falls on the 
Member State to show that the 'general interest' grounds of Art. 36, EEC 
apply), two tests are applied; first, a 'burden' or proportionality test 
seeks to determine whether the impact on commerce is excessive in 
relation to the benefits derived from the regulatory scheme; second, an 
alternative measures test seeks to establish whether the purpose could 
not be achieved by means that would imply a lesser impact on the free 
movement of products. 
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In this context the Cassis-de-Dijon ruling has to be placed, which says 
that products having ".. been lawfully produced and marketed in one of 
the Member States" cannot justifiably be restricted on the general 
interests grounds of Art. 36, EEC. Read as such and in isolation, this 
sentence neither represents EC case law properly nor is comparable to the 
US. The latter point is important as Cassis-de-Dijon is frequently 
referred to as an effective rule for "negative market integration", 
similar in impact to the commerce clause. 
The Cassis-de-Dijon criterion is only applied after a comparability test 
on the health or safety objectives pursued: if the exporting EC country 
pursues 'comparable' safety (etc.) objectives, the Cassis-de-Dijon 
criterion will outlaw import restrictions (although a weak obligation, 
say, of labelling may still be imposed). In the US, not the 
'comparability' of objectives plays a role but the burden on interstate 
commerce. If the burden test is made severe, an effective reduction of 
safety & health standards down to the lowest (state) level will take 
place unless Congress preempts. Should Congress fail to preempt for 
political reasons, a "regulatory gap" may emerge (Heller; 1986) as the 
"price" of a more complete market integration. The gap emerges as states 
are not allowed to legislate and Congress is unwilling or incapable. 
taxes: It is crucial to see that the Supreme Court deals with numerous 
tax issues, whereas the Court of Justice of the EC deals merely with 
product taxes (i.e. excises and VAT, and near-perfect substitutes). Both 
apply equal treatment - absence of discrimination between imports and 
domestic goods - criteria to state tax structures. The EC Court goes very 
far in that a tax structure benefitting a typically national drink (e.g. 
cognac, grappa, akvavit) as against alcoholic beverages of a substituting 
nature (imported or not) is held as discriminatory. The Supreme Court 
would not be expected to use more than a practical 'fairness' test, 
leaving a greater leeway for the States. Note however that the US has no 
internal frontiers which de facto restricts the freedom of States to 
impose discriminatory tax structures, a restriction of freedom that in 
Europe is achieved by the judiciary. In this respect it may be 
interesting to have regard to absolute tax levels on products as they 
determine in large part the incentive to arbitrate among (state) markets. 
Thus, the cases of cognac, etc. struck down in Europe all formed very 
substantial discriminations in price in absolute money terms. 
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environmental/consumer protection: Essentially matters are similar to 
health and safety, except that environment & consumer protection are not 
explicitly mentioned in Art. 36, EEC. The Court decided that they could 
be brought under the Article by using the criterion of "overriding 
considerations of general interest", with (as before) the burden of proof 
on the Member State. In the US, a curious distinction is made by the 
Supreme Court between the State as regulator (when the usual strictness 
of the commerce clause applies) and the State as entrepreneur or market 
participant. In the EC the latter would fall under Art.s 37, EEC and 90, 
EEC and particularly under Art. 37, EEC there is substantial case-law 
promoting non-discrimination and market access; Art. 90, EEC case-law has 
not developed very much because of political inhibitions with public 
firms and because of the ambiguous language in its text. In the US state 
activities as a market participant have been discriminatory without 
having been struck down by the commerce clause. Be that as it may, it is 
noteworthy that such cases remain marginal in the economy. Unlike in 
Canada and some EC countries, state distribution systems hardly exist 
with the exception of spirits; unlike the EC, public firms are rare in 
the US. The US Supreme Court has also displayed, perhaps more than in 
Europe, sensitivity to local interests with regard to state legislation 
designed to protect the environment, to control quality or to conserve 
energy. There is even a tendency in the Supreme Court to take into 
account that "parallel state legislation" (i.e. cooperative federalism) 
may go together with preemption of Congress and hence that in such an 
event state legislation should not be shot down very easily. 
6.3 Interstate tax competition 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The US Constitution is not clear about taxation assignments, except that 
customs duties are strictly a federal competence. Unlike in Canada, where 
the provincial and the federal level levy a number of competing taxes and 
where provinces have the retail sales tax as an exclusively provincial 
tax, the US developed a tradition up to World War II whereby states 
financed expenditures by means of indirect taxes and the union by direct 
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taxes. This historical assignment has become somewhat unbalanced ever 
since the war expenditure necessitated the federal government to raise 
direct taxes considerably. Later, educational, health and social 
expenditures at state level led to a 'counter increase' of indirect tax 
rates and since this is very hard to do in a non-coordinated way in a 
true common market, states began to look to other types of taxes. 
Therefore, today' s fiscal structure in the US is shaped by historically 
grown assignments and by fierce tax competition among the states. The 
latter is in tune with what one would except from the theory of fiscal 
federalism (which assumes a perfect common market underlying the 
federation): a single state is constrained in raising taxes as this may 
lead to exit of mobile factors, hence to a weakening of economic activity 
and of the taxable base. Before discussing interstate tax competition 
below it is useful to point out that the focus merely on the tax aspect 
is mistaken. Taxes are imposed in order to provide public goods and 
services. In as far as factor mobility is a response not to fundamental 
economic forces but to state action, it is the utility derived from the 
public services level in combination with taxes that is the relevant 
determinant to look at. 
In comparing the USA with the EC in 1993, problems of incomparability 
the ref ore arise. Whereas the EC will then have a common market which is 
beginning to resemble the US common market, the latter is overarched by 
redistributional and taxation instruments facilitating in turn the 
mobility that integrates the 50 state markets into one (see section 3). 
Thus, direct taxes (personal and corporate) are levied at two levels in 
the US, but only at Member State level in the EC; approximation of 
corporate or personal income taxation is not included in the White Paper. 
With respect to indirect taxes, the EC substitutes negotiations at 
Council level for the pressure to approximate or not to diverge too much 
that would arise from the lack of fiscal frontiers the US is used to live 
with. While the comparability of indirect taxes is less of a problem 
between the US and the EC, focussing only at indirect taxes and only at 
state level merely because the EC does not touch national fiscal 
sovereignty, introduces a too narrow and biased perspective. In section 
6. 3. 2 indirect taxes will be discussed whereas fiscal competition with 
respect to business will be reviewed in section 6. 4. How important the 
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linkages between the two in a true common market with mobility of 
products, services and factors of production are, will be discussed in 
section 6.4. But this has to be seen in the context of the overall 
revenue needs of the states in the longer run. As Table 3 makes clear, 
over the last three decades, sales tax & excise revenues, license fees 
and other tax revenues (such as severance taxes on the extraction or 
sales of non-renewable resources, property taxes at state level (normally 
a local source of revenue) and death taxes) have all decreased as a 
percentage of state revenues, to the benefit of state income taxes. 
Among the states, tax structures can differ enormously, and conclusions 
should not be drawn too rash. Tax competition takes many forms and tax 
structure as well as exemptions are at least as important as the rates. A 
few examples may provide an idea of the virtues and drawbacks of the 
great tax autonomy US states have. Delaware is known in Europe especially 
because of relatively lax regulatory regime with respect to corporations, 
but it also has the highest per capita 1ncome tax of all US states 
(1985). On the other hand, it has no sales tax. There are five states 
without a personal income tax, four states without a sales tax, seven 
states without a corporate income tax and there is one without a death 
tax (Florida attempts to attract the rich elderly by a constitutional 
prohibition of death taxes). If one uses per capita tax burden data one 
has to be careful, too: Alaska has by far the highest overall tax revenue 
per capita, but ( 1) Alaska has no sales and personal income taxes, and 
(2) shifts roughly two-third of its entire tax burden to other states v1a 
a severance tax on its oil and gas exports to the rest of the country and 
a corporate income tax burdening virtually only oil companies. Note that 
severance taxes, although clearly export taxes inside the common market, 
have been upheld against the commerce clause. Other states with severance 
taxes enjoy the same effects but in a much less radical way. For Wyoming, 
half of its tax revenue is derived from severance taxes, for Oklahoma, 
Montana and New Mexico one quarter, for Louisiana and Texas one fifth. 
Typically, Texas and Wyoming have no corporate income tax and no personal 
income tax, Montana no sales tax. There are no value-added-taxes on 
products in the US, but Michigan repealed its corporate income tax and 
replaced it by a kind of special VAT on business. 
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6.3.2 Indirect taxes 
Sales and use taxes fulfil roughly the same function as the VAT in the 
EC. A retail sales tax falls on the ultimate consumer and is stated as a 
percentage of the purchase price. It is applied to products, some 
services (dependent on the state) but rarely realty. There are general 
and specific sales taxes. State general sales taxes in 1987 range from 
non-existent in five states, via a low of 3% (4 states) and a US median 
of 4.75% to a high of 6% (6 states), of 6.5% (Washington) and a top of 
7.5% (Connecticut; however, note that Connecticut has no tax on personal 
income, except for dividend and interest). The range widens a little if 
local sales taxes (that may or may not exist) are included: from a low of 
zero for the five states, as before, via a bottom inclusive-rate of 4% to 
a high of 8.25% (several places in New York State, including New York 
City) to a top of 9% (New Orleans) (Source: ACIR, Significant features of 
fiscal federalism, 1987 edition, Washington UC). 
The economic differences between a VAT and a sales tax are well-known: 
the sales tax will also burden the product-inputs for final goods 
production and hence yield a pyramid of taxes included in the final 
purchase. This pyramid may be conceived of as a kind of capital tax, 
especially for complex and capital-intensive production. Vertical 
integration, in avoiding the tax for intermediate supplies, might be 
artificially encouraged this way. Another disadvantage is that the 
pyramide differs quite arbitrarily between one good and another. Very few 
states exempt from the sales tax the purchase of equipment used to 
manufacture goods (typically, Michigan with its industry does). An 
overall exemption for inputs exists nowhere. For the ordinary citizen, on 
the other hand, lots of exemptions exist, again varying among the states: 
2 9 states exempt food from sales taxes (a few don't, but give a tax 
credit to low-income tax payers instead); 44 states exempt prescription 
medicines; 32 exempt private purchases of electricity and gas; 6 exempt 
clothing; and 20 states do not or hardly tax services. 
Whether interstate differences in sales taxes lead to artificial 
encouragement or discouragement of traae flows, given absence of fiscal 
frontiers, requires a conditional and complicated answer. The 
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comparatively low rates (compared with our VAT rates, which however, do 
not contain or lead to double taxing) can be explained in part by the 
commercial and fiscal drain large differences in sales tax rates would 
give rise to among states. But one should not lose sight of the fact 
Year 
1957 
1967 
1977 
1985 
Table 3 
Shares of tax categories in US state revenues 
(1957 - 1985) (in %) 
sales/excise taxes income taxes license fees 
58.1 17.6 15.1 
58.2 22.4 11.4 
51.8 34.3 7.1 
48.8 37.8 6.3 
other 
9.2 
8 
6.8 
7.1 
Source: Book of the States, 1986-87 edition, p. 262, Council of State 
Governments, 1986 (Lexington, KY). 
that a crucial characteristic of the US (as well as Canada) 1s the 
geographic size of the country. Ignoring the five zero-rate states, the 
highest spread is 4.5%, and 5% with local taxes included. Therefore, the 
only problematic cases are (a) where zero-rate states border high sales 
tax states; (b) where large metropolitan areas overlap two or more states 
with either a large spread or different exemptions. The first category 
creates few actual problems: Alaska is obviously a non-issue; Oregon is 
surrounded by four states with Idaho having 5%, California 4.75%, Nevada 
5. 75% and Washington 6. 5% - this leads to few t)roblems because of great 
distances in these sparsely populated states or border zones; Montana 
(itself very large and sparsely populated) is surrounded by big states 
with tiny populations and having sales tax rates of 3% and 5%; New 
Hampshire might perhaps be thought to keep neighbouring sales tax rates 
no higher than 5% (Mass. and Maine); it is only tiny Delaware, caught in 
the Northeastern megapolis between Washington DC and New York, that might 
cause some problems as Maryland has 5%, and Pensylvania and New Jersey 6% 
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- one indication of the potential cross-border shopping might be the fact 
none of the three neighbouring states have local tax additions to the 
state's sales tax. 
The second category includes Delaware again but also for instance New 
York City. New Yorkers pay a state/local rate of 8.25%, which differs 
little from that in New Jersey (6%), except with respect to New Jersey's 
clothing exemption. But these two examples can hardly be multiplied, 
which may be seen as a confirmation that the absence of fiscal frontiers 
keeps the spread from growing too large (i.e. more than a few % or at 
most 5%). Indeed, 1n and around the big cities in the US rates rarely 
differ very much. 
A special consequence of the sales tax, under the destination principle, 
is the so-called 'use tax'. Because suppliers may directly supply buyers 
from outside the states, sales tax evasion would be easy. Buyers in state 
A purchasing from suppliers in B are obliged to pay the 'use tax' which 
is equal to the sales tax, unless the supplier from B has 'sufficient 
nexus' in A (the word is from the Supreme Court); if so, the supplier is 
obliged .to collect the use tax and any practical difference with the 
retail sales tax vanishes. Compliance can be achieved via registration 
requirements (for cars) and business accounts. For individual purchases 
the effort is simply not made. This has created a problem with mail order 
purchases because they usually have insufficient 'nexus' in other states, 
hence do not have to collect so that the individual buyer will evade 
sales taxes easily. 
States also raise revenue by means of excises. The three most important 
instances are cigarettes (sometimes a wholesale tax on tobacco), 
alcoholic beverages and motor fuel excises. Cigarette state taxes 
(ignoring local taxes) have gone up considerably recently for two 
reasons. First, anti -smoking campaigns have created a more favourable 
political climate to exploit the low price elasticity of demand for 
cigarettes for revenue purposes. Moreover, the success of the campaign 
has reduced smoking which also induced pressure to raise tax rates so as 
to keep revenue from falling. A second reason is the success of combating 
cigarette tax evasion: states feel less inhibited to raise the excise as 
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interstate smuggling has become more difficult and risky. In 1960, the 
excise ranged from 2-6 cents a pack in all states, except in two tobacco 
states (Virginia and North Carolina) and in Oregon, where no excise was 
levied. The range had widened in 1970 to 2-18 cents and to 2-21 cents in 
1976. In the US there is a great deal of practical tolerance of casual 
smuggling by the individual; formally, a number of states enacted strict 
laws which were only rarely enforced however. It is estimated that at 
around a 10 cents differential, profit opportunities begin to attract 
organized crime. During the early and mid 1970s, cigarette 'bootlegging' 
became a serious problem: revenue lost to states was estimated to amount 
to $ 400 million in 1975; thousands of wholesalers and retailers in 
high-tax states had gone out of business; corruption crept in. A federal 
cigarette tax was rejected as a solution; instead, a federal law in 1978 
made it a crime to engage 1n large scale cigarette trading without tax 
indicia (stamps) of the relevant state. Federal law enforcement 
subsequently led to such an increase in risk that systematic smuggling 
has almost disappeared (source: ACIR, Cigarette tax evasion, a second 
look, 1985; Washington DC). In 1977 14 states were identified as having a 
serious bootlegging problem; in 1983, only Connecticut and West Virginia 
could be placed in this category, and most losses there are probably due 
to casual smuggling, including cross-border shopping. Two interesting 
side effects of the federal law are now: first, states have economized on 
resources devoted to enforcing state cigarette laws (because the federal 
Treasury does it); second, the upward tendency of the cigarette taxes, 
and their interstate spread, has been reinforced. In 1980 there were 
three states with the top rate of 21 cents, whereas in 1986 there were 15 
states with higher rates, ranging up to~ 29 cents for Hawaii (calculated 
from a wholesale tax) and 27 cents for Oregon (with North Dakota going to 
27 cents in 1987), whilst Kentucky has still 3 cents and North Carolina 2 
cents. It should be noted, finally that the federal government levies a 
tobacco tax of 16 cents per pack as well. 
Excises on alcoholic beverages differ enormously, too. A complication is 
that seventeen states have monopoly systems for distilled spirits; one 
has it on a county basis; some counties in various states still maintain 
complete prohibition of any alcoholic beverage. Beer frequently is taxed 
differently or on ordinary sales tax rates; wine (or beverages below 14% 
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alcohol) may escape heavy taxation. Given the lower value/weight ratio 
(compared to cigarettes), systematic smuggling seems to be less of a 
problem. With cross-border shopping occasional random checks sometimes 
occur in some states. In 1986, the spirits excise in dollars per gallon 
(= 3.79 liters) in different states ranged from$ 1.50 to$ 6.50, with a 
number of caveats about exceptions or special surcharges plus additional 
wholesale taxes. 
Motor fuel exc1Ses display a smaller spread, because even oil-producing 
states tax the use of motor fuel. In 1987 they ranged from 8 cents per 
gallon in five states to 19 cents in Utah; Florida maintains a 4 cents 
exc1Se but this is topped up by local taxes to a range of 5-10 cents 
(apart from a sales tax that is also included). As section 6.9 will 
discuss, interstate trucking is subject to precise motor fuel reporting, 
limiting cross-border purchases. Observe that diesel and gasoline taxes 
may differ in some states, and if so, diesel is always taxed more. 
6.4 Interstate tax competition and state aids 
In times of recess~on (if not always), local and regional governments may 
be sensitive to cross-border mobility which adversely affects the local 
or regional economy. Stronger, they might actively seek to induce inward 
mobility of factors in order to boost the local or regional economy. The 
latter strategy will largely be a zero-sum game among the states if 
imitated by all. To the extent this game employs tax incentives, there ~s 
a serious risk that the state's tax basis is eroded to the detriment of 
the provision of public goods and services. There is a strong current ~n 
the US, maintaining that a state's manipulation with business-relevant 
taxes does not but marginally effect location decisions of firms, even in 
the absence of interstate imitation. 
Although this discussion might be said to echo some of the debates about 
regional policy in Europe, the comparability is weak. First, some 20% of 
state expenditures is actually paid by the federal government: this 
transfer alone is roughly double the entire EC budget. The main items 
concern welfare, education and highways; this does not include some $ 25 
billion welfare expenditures directly paid by the federal government. The 
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bloc grants-in-aid to the states result in unequal shares of the federal 
programmes in state /local welfare expenditures, in part due to income 
disparities. Thus, low income states attract (c.p.) more federal aid, 
reducing the tax burden for that state. Whereas the average federal share 
is 56%, Southeastern states have an average of 69% and Southwestern 
states 59%. Second, after-tax incomes differ less among states than 
pre-tax incomes because of progressive federal taxes. Third, there is no 
federal regional policy comparable to the EC Regional Development Fund. 
There are solid reasons to expect factor mobility to respond to 
fundamental economic factors such as long run developments in population, 
real wages, availability of skills and agglomeration economies. To the 
extent states might be able to influence the determinants of factor 
mobility, this is 
(1) almost certainly going to be marginal 
(2) possible with both fiscal and non-fiscal means 
(3) not independent from adequate public services and the 
quality-of-life including proper education. 
A 1981 study (ACIR, Interstate tax competition, Washington DC) concluded 
that above all fundamental economic forces, and tax competition at most 
marginally, determine mobility. Such forces include lower wage rates, 
population and local market growth, technology improvement (air 
conditioning~), the natural resource base, the improved interstate 
highway and air transport system and the end of racial discrimination. 
The indices for manufacturing wage rates are quite telling: in 1929 the 
Southeastern states were at 67% of the US average, ~n 1960 84% and in 
1976 87%. Population shifts were not large, except to the Far West and 
(less strong) to Southwestern states. Nevertheless, the Great Lakes and 
the Mid-East together comprised 42.5% of the US population in 1950 and 
only 38.6% in 1977. This relative decline still continues. 
The study found that the competitive enactment of tax and other 
incentives has largely neutralized their effects, even if marginal, and 
most of the problems are now with the neighbouring states of a region. It 
found that firms rarely leave a state so as to settle in another one: 554 
instances were identified on an initial population of 140000 
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establishments (with 20 persons or more) for the period 1969-1976. 
Analyses of the birth of new firms shows that virtually no state in the 
US exhibited strong signals of stagnation, but that the Southeast, the 
Southwest and Far West regions obtained a larger share of the births of 
major new manufacturing establishments than proportionally. 
The doubts of effectiveness are confirmed by other economic literature 
although recently the consensus is breaking down (McGuire, 1987 for a 
survey). In any event Table 4 shows that States feel compelled to join 
the competition: both interstate tax competition and interstate 
competitive bidding for investment via financial assistance has markedly 
increased in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
One has to be prudent 1n interpreting this table as the label 'exemption' 
covers quite different arrangements. It 1s also inadvisable to assume a 
too 'European' perspective at the list of instruments of public aid to 
industry. For instance, in 1984 the average state budget for Industrial 
Development Agencies was$ 7.8 million (includes salaries) and the US 
total was $ 360 million (Clarke, 1986, p. 23). After personal and 
promotion costs, this leaves hardly any money for financial assistance. 
Bond financing exploits a loophole, causing states to take a 'free ride' 
on the federal government by shifting the interest tax deductions to 
federal taxes. This practice, increased enormously, is curtailed by the 
1986 tax reform. 
The effectiveness of tax competition 1s greatly reduced by two fiscal 
rules currently still in effect. One is the allowance of state and local 
tax payments as a business expense for income tax purposes. The second 
consists of the deductibility of state/local income, property and sales 
taxes for federal individual income tax purposes. So, interstate tax 
differentials are, de facto, much lower. A study in the late 1970s (ACIR, 
'81, pp. 20-22) showed that state/local tax burdens for individuals 
earning $ 50.000, ranging in different states from 53% to 163% of the US 
average, narrowed to 90% - 113% of the US average if the federal income 
tax was taken into account. The 1986 tax reform reduces somewhat the 
possibilities for federal deduction of state taxes, which will render 
high-rate tax states more exposed to interstate tax competition. 
- 109 -
62 
Table 4 
Number of states employing state and local tax incentives for industry, 
selected years, 1966, 1970, 1978 
1966 1970 1978 
Corporate Income Tax Exemption 11 
Personal Income Tax Exemption 15 
Excise Tax Exemption 5 
Tax Exemption of Moratorium on Equipment, Machinery 15 
Inventory Tax Exemption on Goods in Transit (freeport) 32 
Sales Tax Exemption on Raw Materials Used ~n 
Manufacturing 32 
Sales/Use Tax Exemption on New Equipment 16 
Accelerated Depreciation on Industrial Equipment 9 
Tax Exemption or Moratorium on Land, Capital 
Improvements 10 
21 
20 
9 
21 
39 
39 
26 
14 
17 
Number of states employing state and local financial assistance for 
industry 
State-sponsored Industrial Development Authority 25 
Privately Sponsored Development Credit Corporation 31 
State Revenue and/or General Obligation Bond Financing 10 
City and/or County Revenue and/or General Obligation 
Bond Financing 28 
State Loans for Building Construction 11 
City and/or County Loans for Building Construction 8 
State Loan Guarantees for Building Construction 11 
State Financing Aid for Existing Plant Expansion 14 
Source: ACIR, Interstate tax competition, 1981, (p. 25) 
29 
36 
16 
43 
13 
5 
11 
26 
21 
19 
10 
28 
41 
44 
33 
25 
23 
32 
34 
22 
45 
19 
8 
14 
29 
In recent econometric work (Papke & Papke, 1986) the measure for a 
compar~son of tax burdens is the 'net after-tax rate of return on a 
marginal investment in alternative locations'. The study is restricted to 
business tax differentials and hence ignores personal income taxes and 
non-tax factors of location. The authors found that states with lower tax 
levels (higher after-tax returns) attract more investment: e.g. a 
positive difference of one percentage point ~n the industry after-tax 
rate of return (say from 10 to 11%) increases capital investment per 
worker by $ 515. Of course, traditional cost differences remain 
influential for location but tax differentials are not necessarily 
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irrelevant, although $ 515 is only a small fraction of capital investment 
per worker in most sectors. Another study (Genetski & Chin, 1978, as 
quoted in ACIR, '81, pp. 55/6) found a positive relationship between 
relative economic growth and changes in state/local tax burdens, lagged 
by three years. 
Since the Supreme Court dislikes to step in, as became clear 1.n the 
Moorman case (1978) on Iowa's blatantly discriminatory apportioning 
formula for the corporate income tax (not on sales out of state; not on 
property and payroll), and s1.nce the federal level advocates a 'new 
federalism' with presumably more initiative and manouvrability for the 
states, interstate tax competition is likely to stay, if not intensify. 
With the recent US federal tax reform, the federal corporate tax rates 
have reduced, probably having induced another round of intensification of 
interstate tax competition. 
In one respect, the logical end of interstate tax competition is the 
avoidance of taxing corporations at all at state level. In fiscal year 
1985 state corporate income tax accounted merely for 4.8% of the total 
state revenue on average, with a high of 9.2% in Michigan. 
6.5 State procurement 
There is little systematic knowledge about discrimination in state 
procurement. The topic has simply not attracted much analytical 
attention. In a rare example of economic analysis, Craig & Sailors (1986) 
concentrate on formally legislated degrees of discrimination. Between 
1965 and 1980 thirteen states have (or had) so called 'percentage 
preference laws', allowing an in-state bidder a preference of between 2% 
and 5% over all out-of-state bidders. Another nine states had 'percentage 
preference laws', allowing preferences for in-state bidders only when a 
competitive out-of-state bidder resides in a state where a 'percentage 
preference law' exists. The authors 'empirical work yields an estimated 
3% average additional spending (per capita) for states having 'percentage 
preference laws'; there is no demonstratable effect for the reciprocal 
laws. 
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This result calls for some comments. First, the outcome is based on a 
cross-section analysis with a dummy variable for states having formal 
preference laws, and not on an analysis of procurement directly (which, 
admittedly, is very difficult). Hence one has to be prudent in accepting 
these 'costs' of procurement discrimination. Second, unlike in Europe, US 
citizens and firms have a highly developed tax payer consciousness. The 
National Association of State Purchasing Officers' official position is 
that the costs of discriminatory state procurement greatly outweigh any 
benefits and that preferences should be removed. Despite these values in 
public debate, however, numerous colourful anecdotes are heard in the USA 
that seem to be little different from those in Europe. This suggests 
that, the strict states' tendering procedures notwithstanding, in many 
states there is still discretion for in-state preferences. Third, the 
economic scope for preferential purchasing is not comparable to that in 
the bigger EC Member States, due to the small size of many US states 
Whereas the EC has three Member States with populations significantly 
below 10 million inhabitants, the USA has 44 states with less than 10 
million inhabitants, and still 36 with less than 5 million. Given the 
greater interindustry specialisation in the highly integrated US market 
(see Horiba & Kirkpatrick, 1981; Hufbauer & Chi las, 1974), these small 
sizes must imply that states frequently cannot rely on local suppliers 
because of unavailability. All in all, focussing on formal procurement 
discrimination may understate the costs of actual preferences; at the 
same time, one ought to recognize that there are natural constraints as 
to the scope of procurement discrimination at state level. 
More generally, a juxtaposition of US States with EC Member States may be 
misleading as far as procurement is concerned. Key problem expenditures 
1n Europe such as armaments and space are, 1n the US, at federal level; 
telecom is private in the US; also in higher education and health 
services, privatization is more extensive in the us than 1n Europe. 
Therefore, not only is the scope for preference moderate on the supply 
side, the sums of expenditure at State level are incomparibly lower than 
for EC Member States, hence the total are likely to be significantly 
lower than in the Community. 
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6.6 Financial services 
6.6.1 Insurance 
The US internal market for 1nsurance services is complex in combining 
multi-variate fragmentation with elements of integration. First, in the 
US insurance regulation is almost entirely concentrated at state level, 
with incomplete parallelism among state laws. Second, there are 
continuous changes in state laws and frequently not minor ones. In short, 
it is a 'legislative and regulatory morass' (Prybutok, 1982, p. 79). 
In a formal sense, the interstate commerce clause applies ever since a 
famous ruling of 1944, reversing a tradition of the Supreme Court going 
back to 1868, held that insurance across state lines constitutes 
interstate commerce. Typically, however, the greatest concern after that 
ruling was not the access to state insurance markets, but the fact that 
economic transactions 1n interstate commerce are (also) subject to 
federal antitrust jurisdiction. 
Indeed, by the ruling of 1944 the South-Eastern Underwriters Association 
was considered as an illegal price-fixing mechanism. The Supreme Court 
did leave an opening, however, for regarding at least some 'rating 
bureaus' (even if run by business) as being the result of "state action" 
and hence not subject to (federal!) anti-trust law. This led to the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 which de facto invited states to legislate 
because, to the extent they didn't, federal jurisdiction would apply. 
The paradox of the US Internal Market is the following 
o free trade 1n insurance services across states, in a formal sense 
o chartering of firms and licensing of agents doing business in a 
state; the authorization process materially limits the 'free trade' 
a lot by raising costs and imposing other constraints 
o the 'regulatory morass' generates strong pressures for 
the industry to 'innovate' around the law (but innovation 1s 
throttled in many other ways through the regulatory burden) 
the state governments to face 'competition among rules' and 
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hence respond to innovative challenges from other states (but 
this leads to frequent changes in the laws, after almost every 
election or even annually) 
o the limits of avoiding Washington DC are tn sight, because the 
National Governors' Association has now asked Congress to preempt 
state product liability laws by enacting a federal uniform product 
liability law (given the crisis in the insurance industry and the 
extreme uncertainty about what risks are to be covered how high; the 
fragmentation led to - different - uninsurable risks in a number of 
states). 
The differences tn state regulations are costly and may also 'indirectly' 
restrain trade tn insurance products which cannot be easily authorized 
(in some States). A brief enumeration of the problems: 
1. The politicization of insurance matters in state politics is strong 
and causes a permanent legislative drift, in consultation with but 
also often tn opposition to the State insurance Commissioners. "The 
responses of American regulators and state legislators to problems 
are typically far more pragmatic and less legalistic than those of 
their European counterparts. This has the distinct advantage of 
allowing experimentation, flexibility and quick action in the face 
of perceived emergencies but it also tends to generate piecemeal 
legislation having little coherence or structural consistency and to 
create a wide diversity of laws among the states and territories" 
(Prybutok, p. 84). 
2. Practically all States regulate the rates of insurance policies. In 
life and accident and health insurance, rates are normally not 
regulated although State Commissioners 
power if the benefits of a policy are 
usually have disapproval 
unreasonably low for the 
premium charged. Regulation ts stricter for rates of automobile 
insurance, fire and casualty insurance and workers' compensation. 
Rate regulation differs enormously among the States. Illinois ts the 
only state having no rate regulation. Competitive rating also occurs 
under a 'use-and-file' system (although commissioners may suspend). 
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A little more stringent is 'file-and-use': it refers to open 
competition laws, except that if the commissioner suspends the rate, 
a roll back can be ordered (may lead to refunds). A number of 
Eastern states maintain 'prior-approval' systems, implying tacit 
approval of priorly filed rates before use ("tacit" means that 
approval periods lapse automatically); the criticism on this system 
is that it encourages uncertainty through discretion. Six states 
still maintain state-made or mandatory bureau rates in one or more 
insurance lines of business. 
3. Solvency regulation is also quite disparate. The main problems here 
are the absolute refusal of "home state control", so that every 
state where a company conducts business must reach its own 
determination regarding solvency (irrespective of findings 1n 
another states) and the discretion (and hence implicit disparity) 1n 
asset valuation and assessment of loss reserves. Apart from the 
obvious costs this gives r1se to, the (cooperative) guaranty 
associations (obligatory 1n all states) have great difficulties 1n 
coordinating over state borders 1n cases of insolvency. Related to 
solvency are minimum deposit and minimum statutory requirements 
which also differ among States. Tax breaks promote instate 
investment from the portfolio of local companies, thereby distorting 
capital flows among States. 
4. Product approval takes place in a number of states. There is a risk 
of throttling entrepreneurship. what is important for the purpose of 
this study is that the interstate commerce in insurance is clearly 
impeded 1n this way, unless policies are sold directly (without 
agent or broker). 
5. Chartering of firms and licensing of agents or brokers causes a de 
facto fragmentation of the US Internal Market for insurance 
services. There is little doubt that the regulatory (and inspection) 
costs could be lowered enormously but pressures to do that are low 
because the 'costs' are considered part of the system and can be 
shifted to users and consumers. The balkanization is so deeply 
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entrenched that out-of-state firms are referred to as 'foreign' ( ~) 
and non-US firms as 1 alien 1 • Observe however that the scale of 
business can be very small e.g. a one county mutual. 
The licensing practice may lead to reciprocity but also to 
retaliation among states; reciprocity seems to work reasonably well 
for agents and brokers; retaliation may be implicit in tax and fee 
rules but also entry requirements (like capital). 
Licensing of insurers is linked to the approval of products if there 
are exit restrictions, as occurs in homeowner and 1n automobile 
insurance. The exit restrictions are not identical among States. 
The US insurance industry 1s not concentrated. At the end of 1986 there 
were more than 2300 life insurance companies (not counting agents) and 
more than 3500 companies in the property/casualty insurance segment. 
There is little doubt that the numerous small insurance firms, with often 
only a local presence and few lines of business, represent a major 
interest lobbying for the status quo, that 1s, regulation at State level. 
The States themselves have their own interests as well: they have become 
accustomed to the regulatory power and resist to lose it, but above all, 
they cannot miss the revenues from the premium taxes they levy. In 1985 
States received $ 4.5 billion from insurance premium taxes, representing 
more than 2% of all state-tax revenues. The insurance industry assumes an 
ambivalent attitude as it prefers not to be subject to federal anti-trust 
law, yet complains about the unnecessary costs of nation-wide business. 
Assessing the costs of fragmentation is a herculean task. The greatest 
costs have been removed by the adoption of over a hundred model laws by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and other common 
services of the NAIC. However, the acts are not always adopted by State 
legislatures, and if so, frequently with many changes. Some approximation 
also results from the following of 'leader' States in regulation and from 
the permanent fear of federal preemption. There is a case to regard the 
diversity in regulation as a benefit, made possible by federalism. Thus, 
the States argue that the US internal market for insurance services is 
not only not costly, but actually offers the best of both worlds: 
parallel model legislation and 'competition among rules' promote the 
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desired uniformity, hence reducing costs, 
specific rules 'customize' insurance to fit 
while state licensing and 
the needs of the individual 
States. This plea is seriously weakened, however, by the permanent 
legislative drift discussed above. 
It should also be noted that the federal government 1s not entirely 
absent as a regulator (by means of pension and welfare laws) and 
administers a number of specific nation-wide programmes such as deposit 
1nsurance (see 6.6.2), export credit insurance and very special kinds of 
1nsurance (crop; nuclear damage; oil pollution; political risk). 
Finally, it ought to be stressed that co-insurance (through so called 
surplus and excess lines) is subject to less rigorous public supervision: 
they are called E & S carriers, usually to be found on 'white lists'. 
Apart from licensing, there 1s virtually no regulation for 
'reinsurance'.The key economic arguments are the absence of the need for 
consumer protection (as in the EC; Court of Justice of the EC) and the 
serious risk of unavailability in case of strict regulation. 
6.6.2 Banking 
Like insurance, banking serv1ces emerged out of the 19th century as a 
typically state-regulated activity. Congress did not 'regulate commerce' 
nation-wide but delegated regulatory authority to the states already in 
the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864. The states used this 
authority to prohibit interstate branching. A number of states went even 
further and limited intra-state branching as well; this led to so called 
'unit banking', banks with only one seat. Variants existed such as 
city-branching or a quantitative restriction on the number of branches. 
Unlike insurance, however, the effective impossibility of interstate 
banking has always been politically controversial and economically 
problematic. 
In the 1980's yet another wave of proposals to permit interstate banking 
has generated a heated debate. This time new technology, financial 
innovations and market pressures were added to the consequences of a 
conspicuously large number of bank failures, including the 'bail-out' of 
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the big Continental Illinois bank (more on Continental, below). The 
complexity of the issue is therefore much greater than a century or even 
half a century ago: both regulatory and market developments have to be 
discussed and both are in a state of flux. 
Regulation of the US banking services market has erected 
o geographic barriers to entry 
o sectoral barriers to entry. 
Although we are interested in the geographical barriers to entry, 
(de-)regulation of financial products and hence the separation, or 
conversely the blurring, of product-lines dealt with 1n separate 
commercial institutions has also been of some importance. The 
Glass-Steagall Act forbids commercial banks to underwrite or to deal in 
corporate debt and equity, although banks can invest 1n ('hold') 
corporate debt. The National Banking Act and state statutes prevent 
commercial banks from investing in equities. But this means, 1n effect, 
that commercial banks and investment banks hardly compete with one 
another. 
Before interstate banking can be set out, it should be known that the US 
has a 'dual banking' system. The chartering of banks can take place at 
federal or at state level. A federally chartered ('national') bank is 
subject to federal examination given federal prudential rules, but other 
regulation applicable is largely that of the state. 
The geographical barriers in the mid-1960's were determined by: 
1. The Me Fadden Act of 1927, prohibiting national banks from branching 
across state lines 
2. The Banking Act of 1933 permitted intra-state branching for national 
banks if the state law also permitted state-chartered banks 
state-wide branching. 
3. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 
prohibiting bank holding companies to buy banks 1n other states 
unless the laws of the state(s) expressly permit it; the few bank 
holding companies that had already developed interstate operations 
(of course no direct interstate banking, like deposit-taking, etc.) 
were 'grandfathered', but could not expand into other states without 
explicit legal state provisions. 
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Not surprisingly, these geographical barriers throttled the interstate 
flow of banking services. Observe however that the branching prohibition 
does not preclude the 'interstate commerce' of banking services: there 
was and lS free payment across state borders and banks deal with 
out-of-state customers if they find them; nation-wide interbank markets 
developed, inter alia, v1a so called 'correspondence banks', taking 
deposits from banks in the region and hence serving as clearing agent for 
checks transferred among banks; a federal funds markets developed as an 
intermediary to facilitate and possibly finance all kinds of payments and 
other transactions among the numerous banks that did not (have to) know 
each other. The central point is that retail banking remained extremely 
fragmented. There are some 14.000 banks in the US! Many of these are very 
small unit banks in small, rural towns, frequently with a limited number 
of services (and by definition, no automatic reach to large networks) 
whilst being entirely dependent on local deposits and the 
creditworthyness of local loan debtors. 
Since the barriers are so strict and the need for a greater variety of 
services, greater quality and more facilities for consumers has continued 
to increase during this century, incentives to get around the barriers 
have always been strong. During the last ten years or so, a truncated 
manifestation of interstate banking can be observed. 
The first way around the branching prohibition 1s of course the legal 
one. There are two important variants, one getting around the notion of 
what a 'bank' is; the other circumventing what a 'branch' is. Both 
problems relate to the Me Fadden Act where section 36 forbids interstate 
branch activity and section 81 limits the out-of-office activity of 
national banks. Section 81 essentially says that the 'general business of 
banking' outside the home state is not permitted. Case-law is somewhat 
confusing here. In a major reversal (see Freeman, 1986), the Court 
recently defined the 'general business of banking' as the performance of 
any task that could have been carried out by the bank at its main office. 
Obviously, such definition may encompass almost anything a bank does. 
There are currently four types of interstate activities of national banks: 
calling officer programmes: loan officers visiting business so as to 
get new clients or gather information on creditworthyness 
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loan production offices: retail facilities to solicit loans and to 
fill in loan applications; the main office considers and provides 
the loan, however 
representative offices: discuss business with out-of-state 
customers, gather local information and disseminate the banks' 
information 
trust representative offices recruit trust business & customers. 
Clearly, these offices may significantly facilitate banking services 
across state lines on the initiative of the customer. Outlawing them via 
judicial review increases the obstacles to interstate banking (unless 
national banks convert to 1 state chartering 1 because then the Me Fadden 
Act does not apply, while the commerce clause would probably forbid state 
restriction of this kind of offices). 
What a 'bank' is has become crucial since the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956. Holding companies could acquire banks 1n several states and, 
although not directly utilizing a branching network, facilitate 1n a 
number of ways interstate banking. The Douglas Amendment prohibits these 
holdings to buy banks in other states unless the relevant state expressly 
permits it in legal provisions. This amendment was weakened a little in 
1970 when certain 'non-bank' activities of holding companies were 
permitted interstate. The non-bank activities reflected the spirit of the 
Glass-Steagall Act (separation of banking and general commerce, because a 
'shoemaker ought not influence the provision of loans to his competitor, 
or, for that matter, his companion') in that they had to be closely 
related to banking. Major activities were thereby freed for interstate 
banking, be it through holding companies: mortgages, finance companies, 
industrial bank and loan operations, trust companies and credit card 
operations. The difference with the case-law on branching is that this 
kind of offices of a bank from another state are illegal (if the Supreme 
Court sticks to its new doctrine), but they can stay if they are offices 
or activities of a bank holding company. 
As if this was not enough, a 'non-bank bank' was invented by only taking 
deposits or only making loans, so escaping the restrictions on interstate 
banking by holdings (because a bank had to do both). This 'loophole' has 
now been closed in the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. 
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The second way has to do with international banking. Foreign banks in the 
US had fewer branching restrictions than domestic banks until the early 
1980's. National banks can set up corporations to conduct international 
banking under the Edge Act of 1919. To eliminate the competitive 
disadvantage of domestic banks, the national banks' Edge corporations 
were allowed to go interstate but of course only for international 
banking. Nevertheless this kind of business may be indistinguishable from 
information gathering and even loan solicitation, for domestic purposes, 
now outlawed by case-law as being 'branches'. 
Third, technology has played a role. A great inconvenience of the US 
banking system is the cashing of a check of a non-affiliated bank. Given 
the many thousands of banks, this is daily business for millions of 
citizens and businesses. Three, four or five endorsements on a check are 
far from exceptional. Time, handling costs and interest foregone must be 
costly, no doubt. Credit cards and automated teller machines (ATMs) have 
radically improved the clumsy payment operations in the US. Credit cards 
are of course interstate and have greatly reduced the 'float' (waiting 
time for cashing checks) for smaller payments. ATMs are not interstate as 
they are 'branches' according to the Court. But there is no problem if 
ATMs are linked in large interstate networks for information on services 
and for payments, as long as they are not used for deposits (they are 
obviously incapable of making loans and already substitute the cashing of 
checks, so these two functions are irrelevant). A combination of ATMs and 
credit cards (legal, if pursued via holding companies under the 1970 
amendments of the Bank Holding Company Act) also exists: machines may 
provide cash to a credit card holder, which ~s an almost perfect 
substitute for cashing a check (if not better because it is not subject 
to interstate restrictions). Electronic banking may induce other 
upheavels yet. 
Therefore both at industry level and for the individual consumer, 
problems with interstate banking have greatly reduced. This is not to say 
that these problems no longer exist. The attention seems to switch from 
the excessive costs and delays of interstate banking services or from the 
difficulty of enjoying the latter at all, to the overriding objective of 
a safe and sound banking system. Another objective, always luring in the 
background, is the efficiency as promoted by bank competition. 
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Thus, the fourth way to get around interstate banking prohibitions was 
opened by the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 (amidst a financial crisis). In 
case of failing banks or saving and loan associations, bank holding 
companies from elsewhere may buy them (upon Federal Reserve approval). 
This 'purchase-and-assumption' agreement has advantages: it is cheaper to 
the federal insurance institutions (FDIC for deposits; the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) for savings and loans 
associations and mutual saving banks; the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) for credit unions which make personal loans to 
members), it is less disruptive for the regulators (the Comptroller of 
the Currency, Treasury Dept, for national banks; the Federal Reserve 
Board for state-chartered member banks and bank holding companies; the 
FDIC for state-chartered federally insured banks which are not members of 
the Fed; the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHBB) for federally insured 
savings & loans; the National Credit Administration NCUA for federally 
insured credit unions) while also providing discipline to management 
(Horwitz & Selgin, 1987, p. 13). The law has led to interstate take-overs 
such as Citicorp' s entry into the Illinois savings market (obtaining 62 
branches in one stroke). 
The fifth way is also prompted by issues of soundness and of efficiency. 
States themselves have finally accepted that the drawbacks of prohibiting 
interstate banking were too great to be continued. A peripheral state 
frequently experiences serious difficulties to draw in enough capital for 
the desired development of the state's economic or infrastructural 
activities. Prompted by development motives, Maine used the Douglas 
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act to expressly permit the entry 
of out-of-state holdings in 1975. In 1982 Massachusetts followed but with 
the proviso of New England regional reciprocity (hence not New York~) and 
New York State enacted national reciprocity. A wave of regional 
liberalizations followed (be it that they all use the holding company 
route), especially when in 1985 the Supreme Court stated that regional 
'compacts' did not imply impermissible discrimination of other states, 
hence were constitutional. 
The situation 1.s now far too complex to present in detail (see Savage, 
1987; NGA, 1986) In any event, 77% of all federally insured US commercial 
banks in early 1987 are located in states that have enacted interstate 
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banking laws (via holdings); these banks hold more than 91% of all US 
domestic banking assets. 37 States have enacted such laws but few of 
these laws are fully comparable. Regional preferences (sometimes 
inconsistent in terms of reciprocity), reciprocity or not, and other 
special provisions make for an intricate 'patchwork', still throttling 
interstate penetration enormously. Ignoring all transition periods for a 
moment, only 28% of all possible 2550 combinations in the 37 laws is 
actually exploitable for expansion (Savage, 1987, p. 83). 
While benefits are few, even for the small, local communities, the costs 
of the interstate branching prohibition are very considerable. 
Undoubtedly the most conspicuous cost item ~s the (ceteris paribus) 
greater financial instability, caused by relatively undiversified 
portfolios and a relatively high exposure to risk. A banking system with 
instability properties can be very costly to the economy at large and to 
individuals and firms. Whereas financial instability is not really an 
issue ~n Canada or in EC countries, where bank failures are very 
exceptional, the us has been plagued by systemic bank crises for more 
than 150 years up to the mid-1980's (Horwitz & Selgin, 1987). Such crises 
usually included a fall ~n output (regionally, in a few States) and 
prices (especially on the stock market) and bank runs, causing liquidity 
problems. Since objectives such as a stable banking system and protection 
of depositors are prominent in banking regulation, another way of making 
the same point is that market failures have been replaced by government 
failures under the disguise of 'federalism'. 
A disproportionate number of bank failures in the 1980's have occurred in 
typical farm States or oil States (like Texas and Oklahoma). Numerous 
unit banks solely rely on local prosperity or decline; the alternatives 
of diversification or help via a branching network over many States are 
not available; closing branches, so as to concentrate activities while 
guaranteeing depositors their money, is impossible, too. 
Other benefits of branching are also foregone in the US, to the extent 
branching is still forbidden or roundabout. They include a reduction of 
'float', less need for reserves (as banks unknown to each other 
frequently have to include some reserve payments when clearing larger 
- 123 -
76 
checks), less need for a federal funds market (as banks would know each 
other better), more appropriate incentives for acquisition of banks (as 
noted, acquisition is possible under the Garn-St. Germain Act when banks 
fail, but not when banks are still healthy and perhaps merely ~n need of 
better management; observe also, that very small troubled banks do not 
even fall under this Act) and more competition in banking in terms of the 
scope of services. 
Finally, and not unimportant ~n the light of the purpose of this study, 
the costs of interstate mobility of travellers, workers and firms u 
lowered by interstate branching as all would benefit from the ability to 
use the same bank in different States. Name reputation of banks would 
facilitate search; 1.n turn, this would force local banks to engage ~n 
networking too and to remain competitive over a greater range of 
services, at a high(er) professional standard~ 
The counterargument& of the more than 13.800 small banks relate to the 
'lack' of local affinity and familiarity of out-of-state banks and the 
fear of excessive concentration if not a 'money monopoly'. These 
arguments do not cut deep. Local branch managers need not differ ~n any 
relevant aspect from local bankers. With respect to concentration, it 
should be mentioned that US banking is much less concentrated than ~n 
Canada or Europe. Moreover, a serious flaw ~n the counterargument ~s 
that, today, regulatory protection causes numerous local monopolies that 
are hardly or not contestable (see also Freeman, 1986, part IV). 
6.7 Technical barriers 
From a European Community perspective one might hope the category of 
interstate technical barriers to provide instructive lessons for the EC 
programme up to 1992 or beyond. However, such hopes should not be set too 
high. The early national orientation of producers and the strict 
application of the interstate commerce clause have effectively eliminated 
almost all of the 'costly' technical barriers in the US Internal Market. 
These two fundamental factors have been strengthened by the national 
organization of standardization and certification. The complexity of the 
US situation creates certain problems but they do not primarily affect 
interstate economic intercourse. 
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The three (potential) technical barriers technical regulation, 
technical standards and certification - will be dealt with in separate 
subsections. 
6.7.1 Technical state regulations 
As 1s clear from section 6.2, on the interstate commerce clause, states 
have few effective possibilities to regulate the technical properties of 
a product or service in a fashion that would negatively affect interstate 
commerce. This is even true for intra-state economic activities under 
certain conditions. In the event this might lead to a 1 regulatory gap', 
Congress should 'preempt'. However, Congress sometimes refuses to act as 
it may perceive state powers as politically justified, or it may be 
incapable of reaching the necessary majority for a specific bill. 
Numerous acts have been legislated since Congress became more active in 
the late '30 such as the Consumers Product Safety Act, the Public Health 
Service Act, the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety 
Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act. Of course there are many more such 
federal laws like the Clean Air Act, the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide 
and Rodenticide Act (on pesticides), the Federal Communications Act 
(inter alia, on radio frequences), the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the 
Federal Aviation Act and a number of laws on hazardous waste. Many of 
these and other federal laws have their counterparts in EEC directives, 
although there may be great differences in substance and implementation. 
A number of federal laws do not or not fully 'preempt' state legislative 
activity and even when they do, certification or inspection may still be 
delegated to the States. It would require a major research effort to find 
out to what extent federal and state laws with respect to technical 
regulations exist in parallel, and where this might lead to extra costs 
permitted under the commerce clause or those laws themselves. 
A well-known case is the Californian exhaust emission standard for cars 
which is exempted under the Clean Air Act of 1966. In the first decade 
and a half after this law came into force, the US car market became 
'fragmented' into California and 1 the rest' with respect to emission 
standards. Although no cost studies are known the fragmentation was 
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generally regarded as initially expensive. An offsetting benefit LS 
sometimes argued to have been that California acted as a 'natural 
laboratory for testing emissions control innovations' (Crandall et al., 
1986, p. 88). Since the cost/benefits ratio for the car emission standard 
programme in the US is bad, and competitiveness was greatly hurt (see 
Crandall, pp. 159/160) this off-setting benefit is low. Because 
technology has since greatly improved and federal regulations actually 
have become more stringent, the differences between California and the 
rest are either trivial now or have no impact any more on exhaust 
equipment designs. When safety (in contrast to environmental) regulations 
for cars became an issue, however, the typical response of the US car 
industry was to lobby for uniform, federal rules taking precedence over 
the patchwork of state vehicle regulations (source: Ludvigsen, first 
report to the Cecchini group). In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966, federal regulation was made to supersede any and all 
state vehicle laws with respect to safety regulations. Thus there are no 
state safety laws for cars (although there are a few States with laws on 
recreational vehicles and or their components). A similar nation-wide 
approach was taken when fuel economy standards for cars were introduced 
Ln the US in the mid-seventies (see Crandall et al., Regulating the 
Automobile, Washington D.C. (Brookings), 1986. 
State technical regulations for products are numerous. A comprehensive 
data set, kept by the National Bureau of Standards (an agency of the 
Dept. of Commerce) could in principle be exploited as the basis for 
discovering potential cost-raising barriers to trade (see Breitenberg, 
ed., 1987). But again, commerce clause judicial review limits cases of 
more than trivial importance to exceptions that must have specific 
grounds or must have been explicitly exempted in (otherwise) preempting 
federal legislation. In the large majority of cases State laws employ 
"reference-to-standards" and those standards are almost always national. 
They may also require certification and/or inspection and there is an 
appreciable degree of reference to nationally respected, yet private, 
certification bodies or (if state officials inspect) uniform rules. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that, dependent on the product, differences 
among States may exist because 
some states have laws on the product, others not 
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inspection/certification may or may not be required, and may be 
executed by designated private agencies or by state organs 
some states may impose labelling requirements, others not 
some states may impose registration requirements, others not; or 
special certificates, etc. 
It may also happen that federal programmes are voluntary but with the a1m 
of achieving uniformity in state practices. 
The author is 1n no position to assess the potential or actual barriers 
in all these state laws. There are strong arguments to believe that the 
costs are kept low, if not by the interstate commerce clause, then by 
uniform laws, national standards, interstate cooperation and compacts or 
by the lack of enforcement. But as Slot (1975, ch. 7) reminds us in his 
detailed description of the 'trade wars' among the States in the late 
1930's, all these mechanisms go only some way towards eliminating trade 
barriers, and a true 'national' (i.e. combined federal-states), attack 
has never been accepted as the proper solution, not even in the worst 
period. The relative disinterest in the US in the problem may be the best 
indication that today's costs are bearable. 
A notorious example of interminable trouble are the building codes that 
differ (in exceptions and special requirements) not only from state to 
state, but also among counties and even municipalities. Another problem 
having stirred controversy is differential state technical regulation 
with respect to cable television, despite the presence of the Federal 
Communication Agency. 
6.7.2 Technical standards 
Standardization in the US is largely privately organized and occurs 
mostly nation-wide. Although this prevents a number of difficulties, 
familiar to Europeans, from arizing, it is far from clear that the US 
'system' is efficient and effective in promoting standards for the 
general welfare of the US economy. Two prominent questions are (1) the 
enormous splintering of standards bodies, often with historically grown 
divisions-of-labour, creating high information barriers (though not or 
rarely along state lines, as in the EC), and (2) the great discretion 
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these bodies de facto appear to have had (or still have), causing 
preoccupations about procedures, openness, transparency, redress and 
anti-competitive conduct. 
Apart from the building codes and possibly isolated cases, there is no 
explicit 
the EC. 
regional differentiation in standards in the US comparable to 
Pressures to organize nation-wide are not only strong for 
commercial reasons but also because engineers education is to some extent 
coordinated nation-wide, in turn facilitating mobility of skilled and 
highly skilled personel using and applying the standards. 
6.7.3 Technical certification 
Certification takes place at three levels: private, state and federal. 
The NBS is currently preparing an overview of state certification 
requirements - at the moment of writing, this survey was not available to 
the authors. The crucial question is to what extent state certification 
requirements act as a cost-raising barriers to interstate trade and 
economic intercourse. As has been stressed before, the interstate 
cormnerce clause and the reference to nation-wide standards as well as 
recognition of (private but nation-wide) certification bodies is likely 
to reduce such barriers to nuisance levels in most cases o Furthermore, 
state legislation frequently replicate either legislation in other States 
(by imitation or through the 'uniform laws' approach - see NBS Handbook 
130, Uniform laws and regulations, ed o C. Brickenkamp, 198 7, on weights 
and measures, packaging, labelling, sales methods, unit pricing, dating 
and type evaluation) or federal regulations which are not mandatory, for 
intra-State commerce purposes. Nevertheless, even though methods may be 
similar or identical, requirements may still lead to licencing or permits 
or mandatory seals which complicate trade. The scope and costs of state 
certification requirements are not known, as far as the authors have been 
able to verify (neither are their benefits). 
Although it is possible (if not likely) that there are anti-trust issues 
(see Federal Trade Commission, 1983), a significant fragmentation of the 
US market, caused by certification cannot readily be observed. This is 
equally true for laboratory accreditation for which there are also 
federal, state and private programmes 
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6.8 Interstate labour mobility and licensing of professions 
In a common market one would expect, in principle, completely 
unrestricted movement of persons and any kind of labour, including the 
professions. In the US this is the case to an appreciable extent. The 
freedom of persons and workers to move interstate and to establish in a 
state with the same priviliges as enjoyed by residents 1s straightforward 
except for the profess ions. It is again the Supreme Court which has 
protected interstate mobility. Judiciary review has made up for the fact 
that the 'free ingress and regress to and from any other state 1 - a 
formulation used 1n the Articles of Confederation was weakened 
subsequently in the US Constitution of 1787. 
6.8.1 Mobility of persons or workers 
There are three constitutional sources of a fundamental right for persons 
to move freely throughout the 'union' for virtually any lawful purpose. 
All three do not exist in the EC, which is going no further than a 
(harmonized) setting of non-discrimination for foreign EC workers and 
some liberalization in terms of residency requirements. The White Paper 
moves beyond this and the US case law is instructive in teaching us about 
the kind of questions this raises. The first source is the right to 
travel, irrespective for what purpose. So, migrant workers and indigents 
alike also have this right; neither the states nor the federal level can 
alter it. This does imply free access to social security/welfare without 
any waiting period. The second source is the interstate privileges and 
immunities clause. The third one is, of course, the commerce clause. 
The concrete implications for the mobility of people within the USA are 
as follows: 
a) no barriers or forms of discrimination can be maintained with 
respect to entry into and exit from states and the desire to remain. 
Thus, physical mobility is protected at least by the commerce 
clause, if not by the ('higher') affirmative right of national 
citizenship. Judicial review has restored the original article of 
the confederation; the exceptions are of trivial importance. 
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b) job search mobility is also unhindered in the US. 
Because the Supreme Court had accepted that common resources could 
be a reason to allow some state protection, Alaska attempted to 
discriminate in hiring and firing for oil and gas pipelines (etc.) 
against non-Alaska residents, but also this was rejected. Fiscal 
disincentives discriminating agains non-residents (such as a 
'commuter tax'), were held to violate the privileges and immunities 
clause; non-residents were taxed "without representation" ~n the 
State's legislature. 
c) professions (see next section) 
d) welfare/medicare 
Completely free access, as noted before. Only severe capacity 
problems leading to an incapacity to maintain facilities to those 
who had supported them through taxes, might perhaps lead to (weak) 
requirements. 
e) education 
In contrast to the EC Court (in a recent case against Belgium), 
higher tuition for non-residents and 'bonafide residence' 
requirements are permitted for higher education. It is viewed as a 
reasonable means of distributing the costs of higher education 
equitably between those who have and those who have not recently 
contributed to the state through tax payments or other expenditures. 
Note however that the original status of non-residence-ship cannot 
be required to be valid for longer than one year; after that the 
student is resident! 
f) property 
6.8.2 
There are no serious barriers to the acquisition of property. The 
Supreme Court would reject the erection of such obstacles under the 
privileges clause. 
Interstate mobility of professionals 
The regulation of professionals takes place at state level ~n the USA. 
Over 800 occupations and professions are licensed in the states of the 
USA, but only about 60 are licensed in common by the majority of states. 
Therefore there is an obvious potential for imposing higher costs on 
migration of professionals. In turn, this may engender economic effects 
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that may weaken the proper functioning of the US common market. Costs and 
effects differ among occupations, among states (depending on the 
conditions) and among the types of regulatory restrictions. Broadly, 
there are three types of regulations (source Book of the States, 1986-87 
ed.; F. Berry, pp. 379ff): 
o licensure is the most restrictive form of state regulation: it is 
illegal for a person to practice a profession without 
first meeting the standards imposed by the state 
o certification amounts to 'title protection' (if standards are met) 
but competition from uncertified practitioners is not 
forbidden 
o registration amounts to a mere filing obligation. 
The motivation of consumer protection is, 1n itself, obvious but it is 
far from obvious that this would require licensure in so many cases 
rather than certification or only registration; neither is it clear that 
administrative procedures, examinations, controls-after-admission, ect. 
are optimally organized in the public interest; that differences among 
states have public (rather than sectoral) interest grounds. Some 
rationalisation of procedures seems to have taken place. Since 1980 there 
exists a National Clearinghouse on Licensure, Enforcement and Regulation 
(CLEAR), linked to the Council of State Governments; over 35 States now 
have a central agency for most if not all licensure boards; so called 
'sunset laws' exist in 38 States, implying that occupational and 
professional licensing boards have to be explicitly re-enacted after 
certain periods; most States now place one or more public members on 
licensing boards (but empirical work by Schneider (1987) shows that this 
has had no effect on decision-making). 
Economists have repeatedly shown that occupational licensing requirements 
restrict interstate mobility. Of the more sophisticated studies, 
Pashigian's (1979) statistical analysis (logit model; regressions) for 34 
aggregated categories of professions shows that local goodwill does 
reduce interstate moblity; that licensing itself reduces interstate 
migration; and that, when licensing is combined with restrictions on 
mutual recognition among states, interstate migration reduces even 
further. The latter is especially clear in the dental and legal 
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professions. Pashigian shows that interstate mobility lS lower 1 n 
licensed occupations even after controlling for the importance of local 
goodwill. Additional tests so as to discriminate between different 
categories of lawyers, yield the result that human investment ln 
state-specific laws do not appear to be the primary reason for the 
comparatively low interstate movements of lawyers. This outcome must be 
assessed against the backdrop of the well-recognized group of 'national' 
law schools, with eminent reputation, such as Harvard, Chicago, Stanford, 
Yale, Michigan, etc., excluding a comparison with the European Community 
of today or the 1990's for lawyers. (Of course, the incomparability with 
the EC lS also increased by the greater differences between national 
legal systems and traditions, compared to the US). 
White ( 1987) studied the case of registe-red nurses. This study is 
interesting not only because it deals with geographical mobility in a 
profession, but also because it analyses the spread of legislation among 
states over time. 'Competition among rules' in the US federation, in this 
particular instance, takes the form of a rapid diffusion of occupational 
licensing 'innovations'. This wave of imitative lawmaking led to a strong 
increase in restrictive regulation, to the detriment of interstate 
mobility nurses. white finds a relation, on the one hand, between the 
introduction of restrictive laws and inflows of less skilled nurses from 
out-of-state, and, on the other hand, between efforts to achieve (high) 
standardization at the national level and 'mutual recognition', reducing 
the negative effect on interstate mobility. The hypothesis that inflows 
stimulated the introduction of mandatory laws is supported at 
statistically significant levels; thus, mandatory licensing ln a 
relatively weakly regulated common market is used as a barrier to access 
(to the state market). Apparently, policy makers have become concerned 
about the restrictive effects of licensure laws for nurses. 
Interestingly, they have not concentrated their efforts so much on the 
legislation of mutual recogniton but on obtaining national standards via 
private mechanisms. Licensure examinations became standardized during the 
1950's and nursing schools attaining this (national) standards were (can 
be) accredited by the National League of Nurses. 
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6.9 Interstate road transport 
With the increasing economic integration of the states of the USA in the 
course of the 19th century, it became less and less possible to maintain 
that regulation of intra-state transport would not directly or indirectly 
affect interstate commerce. For interstate commerce, judicial review had 
already become quite stringent with respect to state transport laws. In 
1886, a famous reversal of the Supreme Court led it to reject the state 
setting railroad rates for interstate transport with respect to that part 
of the journey within a state's borders. This prompted Congress to move 
1.n. In 1887 the Interstate Commerce Act was passed, establishing inter 
alia the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). This federal agency 
assumes technical and economic regulatory functions for road haulage, 
transport by rail and bussing. 
Since approximately 1976 a gradual administrative flexibility, followed 
by outright deregulation in the 1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act have 
greatly reduced the regulatory function of the ICC (while the Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 took away the functions of the Civil Aviation 
Board, that was dissolved in 1984). In fact, the ICC pursued a kind of 
common road haulage policy up to 1980 in maintaining an approval system 
for (interstate) transport rates, in regulating entry barriers for new 
trucking companies and all kind of other restrictions restraining 
competition, including the allowance of collective rate fixing, 
restraints on wages and labour conditions and on the length and 
directions of hauls as well as the gateways (i.e. routings) that could be 
used. Deregulation has been 'partial' and some controls have been 
maintained. 
For the purpose of this study two questions arise: 
o Has deregulation at federal level facilitated interstate road 
haulage, thereby fostering market integration? 
o What are the consequences of the combination of deregulated 
interstate road haulage with (largely) still regulated intra-state 
road haulage for the US internal market? 
The first question can be answered in the affirmative. Widely recognized 
effects of interstate road haulage deregulation include an enormous 
increase of entry into the sector, especially by small firms; greatly 
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increased service of suppliers; less reliance on in-firm haulage; and a 
decline of rates. This success makes the second question only more 
important. 
By early 1987 some 43 States had not deregulated intra-State transport at 
all. Among these States intra-State regulation differs appreciably. Thus, 
Oregon only allows entry after a test of 'public convenience and 
necessity' and Texas, besides maintaining entry barriers, even outlaws 
any price competition (cf. material supplied by Ernst & Whinney). This 
kind of regulation can sometimes lead to situations similar to the 
prohibitions of 'cabotage' in EC Member States. In the case of Texas 
there is evidence of trade deflection to neighbouring States, 
particularly by shifting distribution centers out of Texas. Differences 
in competitive conditions lead to the claim that Texan agriculture, a 
highly transport-sensitive business, 1s hardly competitive anymore 
outside the State. On the other hand, one has to be prudent before 
generalizing the Texan example. Many States have much 'lighter' 
regulations, creating fewer competitive distortions in the internal 
market. Given the prevailing market integration, Congress has a legal 
basis to act ('preempting' State legislation) but an attempt led by 
Senator Packwood to do this in 1986 died early. 
In addition there are administrative and tax differences that make 
interstate trucking more onerous. Without the competence to register 
being shifted to federal level, and without a federal obligation of 
'mutual recognition', states have drastically reduced the actual costs 
incurred by trucking companies flowing from the state's power to impose 
registration. Under registration reciprocity, a vehicle properly 
registered in one state can travel legally in any other state without 
having to pay additional registration fees. Such fees can vary from $ 35 
(Oregon) to $ 2200 (in Illinois). Clearly, without such reciprocity 
agreements, interstate trucking would be administratively cumbersome, 
while competition with other transport modes (rail; air; inland shipping) 
would be seriously distorted. All states are now party to one or more 
agreement(s). 
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Still one could conce1ve of 'fee competition' among states so as to 
attract domicile of interstate carriers. This would be problematic also 
from the point of view of burden sharing of highway costs. An initial 
response was to erect 'fee sharing compacts' among (especially) 
neighbouring states. Today the IRP compact has 31 states as members (plus 
one Canadian province~). Under the IRP compact, the home base state 
annually collects the fees of the states through which the carr1er 
expects to travel (on extrapolation basis), in proportion to their shares 
in the total interstate mileage of the vehicle. For the calculation, the 
respective (i.e. divergent) fees of the states are used, in other words, 
the total fee is the weighted sum of all the state fees, with the mileage 
shares used as weights. In case the vehicle would also travel through 
non-IRP states, the home base state would fall back to the normal 
reciprocity and collect that share itself (at its own fee). 
However, fuel taxes differ among states as well, with a maximum spread of 
11 cents a gallon. On average per heavy vehicle this tax yields twice the 
revenue of registration fees, but is not subject to sharing or 
reciprocity. States impose motor fuel reporting, indicating their 
operations in a state on a quarterly basis: if fuel purchased is less 
than the usage in the state, the difference (i.e. the tax foregone) has 
to be paid to the state motor fuel tax authorities. Property taxes on 
vehicles differ, too; so do sales taxes on vehicles and for both there is 
again no sharing. Neither is this so for weight-distance or 
axles-number/distance taxes, a type of tax better reflecting the purposes 
of expenditure (highway maintenance). To make matters worse, seven states 
retaliate against vehicles from weight-distance-tax states by levying a 
special tax. Hence, still apart from regulatory differences among states, 
administrative and fiscal aspects render interstate trucking complicated 
in the US. 
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7. THE US/CANADA FREE TRADE AREA 
7.1 Introduction 
Between May 1986 and December 1987 the United States and Canada have 
negotiated a bilateral free trade agreement. For the purposes of these 
negotiations, Congress conferred a fast-track mandate to the US 
Administration. This expedites the US legislative procedure as it implies 
that by renouncing its right to amend, Congress can only accept or reject 
the draft treaty as a whole and is obliged to do so in two months. A 
draft text was submitted to Congress on 3 October 1987 and a final 
version signed by President Reagan on 2 January 1988, after which 
Congress disposes of 60 days to ratify the agreement. Neither 1n Canada 
nor 1n the us will ratification be a matter of rubber-stamping. But if 
all goes well, a free-trade agreement between the US and Canada will 
enter into force in 1989, although the eventual implementation will be 
spread over several years. 
There are three reasons to include a discussion of the prospective North 
American free trade area (NAFTA) in the present report for the project 
'The costs of Non Europe'. The first one is that NAFTA has the potential 
of being the only international liberalization attempt which is, at least 
on certain major items, somewhat comparable to the White Paper programme. 
Therefore, one can utilize NAFTA as an alternative way of overcoming the 
question of incomparability between North America and the EC. Whereas the 
first six chapters of this study analyze two internal markets under the 
inevitable proviso that their being parts of federations reduces the 
comparability with the Community, this section looks at two sovereign 
countries under the inevitable proviso that their liberalization 
programme - though ambitious in GATT terms - is not fully comparable in 
scope and stringency with the White Paper. It is expected that insights 
can be had from pursuing both approaches. 
A second reason is that the NAFTA negotiations are instructive to 
appreciate more fully the assignment of economic powers inside the US and 
Canada. In this sense, it complements the previous chapters. The question 
- 136 -
89 
one may ask is whether a bilateral free trade negotiation will 'preempt', 
as it were, the exercise of state/provincial powers. If the 'benefits' of 
diversity and decentralization are felt to overcompensate the 'costs' of 
some fragmentation of the internal market, can one expect these benefits 
to be sacrificed for NAFTA? A negative answer would imply a significant 
reduction of the scope of NAFTA whereas a positive answer would signify a 
major change of the two internal markets. 
The third reason, dealt with 1.n chapter 8, is that Canadian economists 
have engaged in an interesting debate about the economic impact of the 
enormous market enlargement NAFTA would imply for their country. The 
econom1.c methodology as well as the orders of magnitudes found are of 
obvious interest to the 'Costs of Non-Europe' project. As a market outlet 
the US market is more than ten times the size of the Canadian domestic 
market. This is a more or less comparable situation to that existing in 
the EC where even for the biggest Member States the rest of the Community 
represents a market four times as large as the home market. 
In 1986, Canada imported 74 billion US dollars in American goods, whereas 
it exported for 95 billion US dollars. Given its size, bilateral trade is 
crucial for both economies, but more so for Canada of course. More than 
70% of Canadian exports are US bound, representing around one quarter of 
Canadian GNP. Ontario accounts for more than half of these exports. If 
exports to the US shrink, say by 10%, as many as 250,000 Canadians may be 
made redundant. About 22% of US exports go to Canada, equalling some 2,5% 
of American GDP. The latter figure being small, it gains prominence in 
view of the fact that the American interests in trade with Canada are 
geographically strongly concentrated. More specifically, this trade is of 
great importance for the Northeast-Midwest region, which accounts for 
about 70% of total US-Canada trade. It has recently been estimated that 
around 2 million American jobs rely on US exports to Canada, of which 
half are located in the just mentioned region. America's presence in the 
Canadian economy does not stop, however, at exports. American direct 
investment in Canada is massive, as illustrated by the fact that more 
than 60% of Canadian manufacturing is US owned. 
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7.2 Barriers to one North-Amrican market 
It would be erroneous to infer from the sheer magnitude and macroeconomic 
importance of these commercial and investment flows that trade between 
the two North-American countries is free. 
Among the more important remaining barriers one finds: 
o tariffs, especially on traditional products 
o tariff exemption ('duty remission') on re-exports with a certain 
value-added 
o various non-tariff barriers 
o problems related to direct investments 
o obstacles to trade in services 
o barriers caused by applying so called 'trade remedy laws' 1n 
response to dumping or public aid. 
Tariffs 
More than 65% of US exports get into Canada duty free and an additional 
20% carries a tariff of less than 5%. The corresponding figures regarding 
Canadian exports to the US amount respectively to 80 and 15%. Although 
the average level of tariffs between the US and Canada is thus quite low, 
some specific industries are still subject to considerable import levies, 
with the Canadian typically higher than the American o~es, as can be 
gauged from Table 1 in Annex 1. The sectors for which tariffs are still 
appreciable along both sides of the border include textiles, clothing, 
footwear, furniture, glass and metal products, and electrical machinery. 
There are also a number of issues 1n agricultural trade, the most 
contentious ones being tariffs, quota's, meat laws and Canada's subsidies 
to Western grain transports to central Canada undercutting US exports. 
The 'duty remission' programme for cars in Canada arouses fears in the US 
that, under NAFTA, Japanese or Asian firms would escape origin-rules by 
establishing subsidiaries in Canada, enjoying first tariff-free entry for 
components (into Canada) and then tariff free access to the US. 
Non-Tariff Barriers 
American rules on public procurement frustrate Canadian exports and 
vice-versa. As far as military contracts are concerned, Canada and the US 
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work together under the Canada-US Defence Production Sharing Program 
which can generally be said to provide on a mutual basis fair bidding 
opportunities for firms from the other country. The progrannne does not 
cover all defence purchases. 
The access for non-nationals to civilian contracts, which account for the 
better part of total public purchases is probably much more inhibited. 
Although recent steps have been taken to reduce their coverage, and hence 
their importance, the 1 Buy American 1 discriminatory policies of the US 
government still pertain to about one third of total federal purchases of 
goods and almost the whole of services. The federal procurement code does 
not apply in principle to state or municipal authorities, but it binds 
them also when they buy goods or services with money supplied wholly or 
partly by the federal government. Subcentral governments, along with 
(quasi) public corporations, are major or the principal clients for 
communications and electric transmission equipment, public transport 
systems and electrical power generators. Due to a variety of federal Acts 
such as the Public Works Act, the Clear Water Act and the Surface 
Transportation Act, setting up federal-state cost sharing programs to 
finance investment ~n these public services, states and cities are 
frequently under the obligation to buy American with respect to their 
major purchases. Moreover, it must also be borne in mind that more than 
twenty states have procurement regulations advantaging local suppliers 
(see section 6.5). 
Unlike the American situation, legal provisions prescribing 1 buy 
Canadian' policies do not exist (Moroz, 1986). Instead, there is a 
multitude of administrative guidelines that have paved the way for clear 
'buy Canadian' practices. Because of this intricate array of regulations 
and the attendant room for administrative discretion, a general complaint 
of US firms about Canadian public procurement is the lack of tendering 
information and the transparency of the adjudication process. 
The Department of Supply and Services (DSS) is the central purchasing 
unit in that it contracts about 40% of total federal purchases of goods 
and associated services. The DSS discriminates ~n favour of Canadian 
bidders ~n two general ways. First, Canadian enterprises are given 
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priority during the selection procedure. If at least three ~anadian-based 
manufacturers have entered bids, non-nationals are virtually excluded 
from the tendering process. Furthermore, over two third of the value of 
total purchase contracts concluded by DSS are adjudicated following 
discussions with a limited number of preselected enterprises. 
Second, the DSS confers an informal premium to up to 10% for domestic 
content which enables Canadian suppliers to win contracts in spite of 
exceeding the bids from non-national competitors. For contracts valued at 
more than 2 billion Canadian dollars, foreign bidders are held to specify 
their plans for subcontracting in Canada. These DSS administrativ~ 
guidelines do not only concern the federal government proper; public 
corporations and other federal agencies, like Air (.;anada or Canadian 
National Railways, are also supposed to respect them. 
The federal purchase of construction services is in the purview ot the 
Department of Public Works. As a rule, public construction contracts 
contain a clause stipulating that the main contractor will make use of 
Canadian inputs as much as possible. Finally, as is the case with US 
states, Canadian provinces, and the public corporations, hospitals and 
schools over which they exercise authority, apply preferential purchase 
rules in favour of the local firms of the province. 
Technical regulations and standards do not appear to obstruct Canada-US 
trade in any significant way. 
Direct investments 
A sensitive issue in Canada-US economic relations concerns the 
performance conditions the Canadian government attaches to direct 
investment by foreign companies. As more than half of their manufacturing 
is in the hands of US firms, Canadians are anxious to ensure that the 
activities of the foreign, primarily American, subsidiaries do not 
undermine Canadian national interests. This prompted Ottawa to set up, in 
1973, the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA). This Agency was 
designed to examine foreign direct investment requests and, if need be, 
impose conditions to entry. The performance requirements the FIRA 
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demanded in the past have included export targets to be met by the 
foreign owned production unit or commitments to employ a minimum volume 
of Canadian inputs. Sometimes, entry conditions were not related to the 
specific investment project at all as foreign firms engaged themselved to 
purchase goods and services from any one Canadian supplier to the order 
of a certain predetermined amount. Such obligations have the potential to 
distort trade flows: the pursuit of export targets may force firms to 
trim their profit margins or dump outright on foreign markets; on the 
other hand, respecting domestic input rules may induce artificial 
consumption of Canadian goods and services that might otherwise be 
imported from the US. The present Mulroney government relaxed these 
regulations. 
Trade in Services 
For the US and Canada, freeing trade in services is, so to speak, 
uncharted territory and this first attempt looks set to meet with great 
technical problems. Getting experience in this kind of negotiations is an 
important reason why the US is very keen on concluding an accord with 
Canada. The agreement could assume a pilot-function in the inevitably 
complex negotiations on the same subject in the framework of the current 
Uruguay Round. Freeing trade in services between the US and 1..anada is 
likely to prove a strenous undertaking for yet another reason. In both 
countries many of the regulatory powers affecting trade in services ao 
not belong to the federal authorities but are vested with the American 
states and Canadian provinces. This explains why, despite the recent wave 
of deregulation the markets for various services like banking and 
insurance as well as transport, are still considerably fragmented within 
each country (see sections 5.5, 6.6 and 6.9). 
Executing any substantial agreement between the two federal authorities 
is bound to run up against problems unless it also gains the approval of 
the lower levels of government. The negotiations on services thus risk 
being complex also on account of the sensitivities surrounding the 
political balance of power inside both federations. 
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Discussions will in all likelihood focus on financial and professional 
services because of their growth, international trade potential and the 
just mentioned regulatory issues, and advertising which touches a 
delicate subject in Canada, to wit that of cultural identity. 
For their trade in financial services to be opened up - by relaxing the 
rules on the establishment of foreign branch off ices or subsidiairies, 
and on the freedom to provide services across the border - the US and 
Canada will have to come to terms with essentially the same technical 
questions the European Community has to sort out in its endeavour to 
create an Internal Market. But, in the North American context these 
'universal' problems are compounded by those arising from the restraints 
on inter-state or inter-provincial operations, of which some are likely 
to remain. The market access the two countries grant each other is 
therefore bound to be circumscribed, because otherwise foreign 
competitors would be able to conduct business on a more favourable basis 
than domestic firms. If, for example, following a US-Canada agreement 
Canadian banks were allowed to operate all over the US, they would enjoy 
a better market access than the American financial institutions 
themselves (in fact, foreign banks had such an advantage in the US until 
1978). 
A similar remark can be made with respect to the liberalization of 
professional services like engineering and consulting. This will involve 
measures in the area of occupational licensing, for which it is again 
states and provinces who are generally competent. ~onsequently, 
completely free access for the professionals of the partner country will 
not as a rule be possible for these services either. Both for financial 
services and professions, one route would be to agree on 'national 
treatment', combined with the right of establishment, a solution which is 
by and large the status quo in the EC before the White Paper. 
For the sake of promoting its cultural identity Canada has in the past 
fiscally penalized its firms which place advertisements with US border TV 
stations and Canadian broadcasting corporations have been obliged to 
respect a minimum domestic content in their programs. Since cultural 
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protectionism, even if it introduces some economic inefficiency, is felt 
necessary by a large majority in Canadian politics, Canada is likely to 
insist on exemptions from the free trade package on services for 
advertising and moving pictures. 
Trade Remedy Laws and Subsidies 
The most important source of friction on trade matters between the US and 
Canada in the past has undoubtedly been the use of so-called trade remedy 
legislation and the provision of subsidies benefitting exports. Since 
1980 the US has initiated more than 60 trade complaints against Canada, 
13 of which concerned countervailihng duties against subsidies. Cases in 
automobiles, tyres and softwood lumber have generated feelings of 
uncertainty about the discretionary nature of US trade policy. In 
retaliation to softwood lumber countervailing duties, Canada hit back 
with an extremely high tariff. 
The Canadians have repeatedly claimed that the US makes an unfair use of 
their anti-dumping and countervailing duty regulations. Rather than 
correcting for trade distortions induced by trading partners they serve 
to protect inefficient domestic producers who otherwise risk losing 
market shares to Canadian exporters. Because such duties are levied 
unilaterally and their imposition is not always foreseeable, if not 
arbitrary, American trade remedy laws are seen across the border as a 
sword of Damocle hanging continuously over sectors in which Canadian 
exporters are successful. Although a key issue for NAFTA, this issue has 
not relevance for the White Paper as EC trade policy is already unified 
in this respect. 
7.3 The Canadian-US agreement: a brief 
This section will itemize the more interesting provisions of NAFTA for 
the purposes of this report. Wherever relevant, a short comment is 
provided. 
(a) tariffs and related issues 
tariff removal bilaterally in three stages (typically textiles, 
clothing, wine and beer, agricultural products and tytes take 
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ten years) 
elimination of subsidies on Western grain transports to central 
Canada (a century ago a matter of 'nationbuilaing' for Canada; 
now removed via external pressure) 
far-reaching liberalization of agriculture (less so for fish) 
trade in automotive products (already governed by US/Canadian 
Automotive Products Trade Agreement, which leaves 95% of the $46 
billion flow tariff free) will be free but the Canadian 'duty 
remission scheme' will be phased out and origin-rules will 
require 50% North American content 
removal of import and export controls on energy trade. 
(b) non-tariff barriers 
for public procurement at federa1 level (but not at provincial/ 
state level unless explicitly covered by the GATT Code) a 'bid 
protest' scheme will be mandatory and rules will apply already 
for purchases above $ 25 000 
certain safeguard rules 
trade in alcoholic beverages will be facilitated \note that this 
has consequences for state and provincial liquor monopolies and 
their discriminatory marketing practices) 
on technical barriers better mutual information is foreseen (but 
this would seem to be much weaker than EEC directive 83/ 189); 
work is planned to harmonize product approval and to recognize 
each other's laboratory accreditation systems (it is unclear how 
strong this commitment is) 
'culture' is exempted. 
(c) direct investments 
end of performance requirements, linked to investments as such 
reduction of screening of acquisitions and divestitures; end to 
screening of new direct investments 
(d) financial services 
the blurring of previously segmented financial services, due to 
deregulation in Canada since mid-1987 (see 5.5.3) and exceptions 
to or amendments of the Glass-Steagall Act (see 6.6.2), have 
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been pushed a little further by facilitating mutual access in 
such a way as to weaken the effects of domestic regulation 
restrictions of (federally-regulated) share-holdership of 
Canadian-owned financial institutions have been relaxed only 
marginally; size restrictions of US subsidiaries are lifted. 
(e) other services 
right of establishment and 'national treatment' 
implementation differs from case to case, hence it is as yet 
unclear (if not doubtful) whether this will actually alter the 
autonomy of states and provinces and the effect in the market. 
(f) trade remedy rules 
on this contentious issue there is no clarity at all. A 
three-track set of obligations is 'agreed' but the key element 
is still completely open, namely the development over a five to 
seven year period of mutually advantageous rules on subsidies 
and dumping, including a bilateral panel with binding powers. 
Moreover, this may exactly be the reason for Congress to refuse 
ratification. 
(Note that dispute settlement 
non-binding). 
on all other issues is 
It is crucial for an appropriate assessment to see what kind of issues 
were avoided or softpedalled. The highly protectionist US Jones Act, 
insulating the shipbuilding industry, was 'grandfathered' (i.e. left 
untouched). Whereas the liberalization for wine and spirits is rather 
unclear in its impact, the beer trade is completely left out of the 
Agreement. Especially in Canada, interpovincial trade in beer hardly 
exists; marketing and distribution restrictions in both countries (all at 
provincial/state level) are grandfathered. The direct investment controls 
have been relaxed but the Canadian concessions are circumscribed: oil, 
gas and uranium investments remain subject to review as before; 
performance requirements can still be imposed in the cases of subsidies 
and public procurement related to investment; many other conditions 
(product mandate, R&D and technology transfer requirements) can still be 
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restrictions on foreign 
transport sec tors are 
ownership in 
grandfathered; 
the 
tax 
discrimination between foreign-owned and domestic firms is permitted; 
Canadian crown corporations are exempted from national treatment; and the 
review under the Investment Canada Act is not subject to the dispute 
settlement. In financial services, there will be no freedom to trade 
financial services across the US-Canadian border (this makes for a 
fundamental difference with the White Paper, to be sure). Finally, on 
subsidies no rule or discipline has been agreed at all, except if one 
adheres to the official Canadian view that the 'new rules' under the 
trade-remedy-section provide 'secure access'; as noted before these rules 
will have to be negotiated and their basis and principles are still 
undecided. 
All in all, the potentially sweeping NAFTA negotiations turn out not to 
approximate the White Paper programme. In terms of current GATT 
obligations or compared, for instance, with EFTA, NAFTA is fairly 
ambitious. But in terms of the Community's Internal Market calendar, few 
similar major issues have been tackled. The effects in the product market 
are likely to be substantial, but in services and factor markets a large 
impact is improbable. A considerable number of regulatory or financial 
distortions affecting product trade will remain unaffectea. 
8. ENLARGING MARKET SIZE: ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDIES FOR CANADA 
Given the dramatic increase in market size for Canadian producers and the 
import competition sheltered economic activities in Canada will be 
subjected to, the analysis of the economic effects of a North American 
free trade area may be instructive for the Community when assessing the 
costs and benefits of the White Paper. The question addressed in this 
section is what the nature and size of the potential welfare gains will 
be for Canada. In presenting the results from the literature, brief 
references to methodology will be made. The focus is on product markets. 
- 146 -
99 
8.1 Costs and benefits: a qualitative view 
Benefits 
First, liberalization of trade will allow Canada to exploit better its 
differences with the US. By freeing trade, Canada will be able to 
specialize its production in goods and services in which it is relatively 
efficient, or which employs intensively its relatively abundant factors 
of production, and import those goods that the US can produce relatively 
more efficiently. This is the familiar static trade creation effect. 
Second, an improvement in a country's terms of trade raises its welfare. 
Depending on specific assumptions, Canada's terms of trade can move 
either way upon the creation of a NAFTA. However, a favourable change 
appears more likely. Because the size of the US market is much larger 
than that of its own, Canada is basically a price-taker for both its 
imports and its exports. The imposition of protection by both trading 
partners will push up the price to be paid by Canadian consumers of 
American imports, whereas Canadian export prices are likely to be 
depressed as prices for the US consumer of imports will stay unchanged. 
Upon the removal of such obstacles this relative pricing process is 
reversed, implying a real income transfer from the US to Canada. 
For many industries the Canadian domestic market is too small. A secured 
free access to the US market, with its 240 million inhabitants, will 
allow Canadian industries to exploit better their potential for economies 
of scale. Unlike its effect under constant returns to scale, the trade 
liberalization for products whose costs decline as output grows larger 
will, through larger exports, serve to lower the price for Canadian 
consumers and hence raise their welfare. Moreover, since it vastly 
expands the size of the market, the creation of a NAFTA will also permit 
greater product diversity as a wider array of goods can then be supplied 
at competitive prices. Greater consumer choice is also a form of welfare 
gain. 
Integrating the Canadian market with that of the US will strengthen 
competition in the Canadian economy and therefore constitutes a kind of 
anti-trust policy. The immediate impact will be on prices, but production 
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effect will also occur. In the face of rising import penetration the 
domestic industry will seek to boost productivity by restructuring. This 
rationalization process can take on various forms. By way of mergers, 
takeovers or outright closures the industry will reduce the number of 
firms and plants that operate at too small a capacity. Other Canadian 
firms will cut the variety of products on offer and concentrate instead 
on a few goods for which, in order to reduce average costs, they will try 
to expand output by capturing a larger part of demand, if necessary by 
selling south of the border. This horizontal specialization strategy need 
not imply that the domestic consumer choice is hemmed in. The product 
variants previously supplied domestically may now be imported and 
overall, variety may ev~n increase. 
For these reasons the existing trade barriers between the two 
North-American countries are often thought to go a long way towards 
explaining the fact that Canadian manufacturing labour productivity is 
much lower than in the US (in 1986, this difference was in the order of 
26%). Hence, their removal will bring important productivity and real 
income gains. However, because increasing returns to scale go hand in 
hand with imperfect competition, it is not certain that trade 
liberalization will yield product and plant rationalization. Markusen 
(1985) (1) (notes on p. 133) has recently spelt out under what conditions 
this rationalization process will materialize. He concluded on the basis 
of available empirical literature that those conditions are fulfilled for 
Canada, i.e. Canadian industry is likely to respond to a free trade 
agreement with the US by shaping up its production. 
One expects the welfare costs caused by the trade diversion effect to be 
small. To take advantage of the opportunities from free trade with the 
US, Canada will need to reorganise its production. As import-competing 
firms contract and export-oriented enterprises expand, factors ot 
production will have to respond accordingly, implying movements within 
and between industries and regions. This raises questions about 
adjustment costs (see also 8.3) and the sectoral and regional 
distribution of the overall gains from free trade with the US. 
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Obviously, as industry goes through this transformation process, part of 
the Canadian workforce employed in shrinking sectors will become 
redundant and will have to resettle and be retrained. However, from a 
purely economic viewpoint, these short run dislocation costs should be 
seen as a production investment as they are necessary to realize the long 
run benefits for the Canadian economy. Moreover, as the trade generated 
by the Agreement will be preponderantly of the intra-industry type, the 
rationalization of production will generally involve concentrating 
activities on specific niches within sectors, rather than massive shifts 
out of entire sectors. One ought to recognize, of course (e.g. Krugman, 
1987) that frictional unemployment stemming from industrial 
reorganization, can turn into local or sectoral pockets of longer term 
unemployment if workers adjust very sluggishly and real wages are rigid 
downward. 
The fact that closer integration with the US economy may alter the income 
distribution between provinces strikes, though, a sensitive nerve in 
Canadian politics. The resource-based capital-intensive industries of 
Western provinces stand to gain at the expense of the more labour 
intensive, medium technology employing manufacturing industries of 
Eastern Canada. This regional income distribution aspect establishes a 
nexus between the prospect of North American free trade and the 
functioning of the Canadian Internal Market. By and large 60% of 
manufacturing in Canada is in the hands of US multinationals. The fear 
has therefore been expressed that in the wake of a free trade accord 
these firms might begin to repatriate their production, entailing a 
strong slump of investment in Canada. While this fear may be well-founded 
in the case of a unilateral removal of obstacles to trade, a bilateral 
free trade arrangement would have an uncertain impact on direct 
investment flows. US investment in productive capacity designed to serve 
the Canadian domestic market only may no longer be forthcoming, but the 
removal of US (non-)tariff barriers may make Canada a more attractive 
base to cover the whole North American market. 
A fourth source of welfare costs connected with a free trade agreement 
with the US hinges on the fact that Canada will grow even more dependent 
on an economy that possesses a much vaster domestic market and that is 
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therefore basically impervious in its policy-making to Canadian requests 
or threats of retaliation. The provisions of the trade agreement itself 
may even impose direct constraints on Canadian economic policy with 
respect to matters that in principle are of an exclusive domestic nature. 
In exchange of circumscribing the scope of their countervailing duty laws 
and the common creation of a dispute settlement body, the US may demand 
that Canada act to reduce its state aid and revise the eligibility 
criteria. The restrictions on subsidies as a quid pro quo for a more 
predictable, more secure access brings up another link between the 
Canada-US free trade issue and the working of the Canadian economic union. 
8.2 Quantitative economic impact studies 
Quite a number of empirical studies have been devoted to the quantitative 
economic impact on Canada of a North American free-trade area. For the 
purposes of this report the focus is on the order of magnitudes found and 
the economic methodology applied. 
The extraordinary differences in the results these various studies offer 
is immediately appreciated when observing that the range of estimates on 
welfare changes from the bilateral removal of trade hindrances goes from 
-1% to almost 9% of GDP. Taken at face value, such differences leave 
economic policy makers at a loss. Therefore the underlying modelling 
assumptions are spelt out and compared. Three approaches are discussed: 
partial equilibrium, general equilibrium models and sectoral 
macroeconometric models. 
The simple method of partial equilibrium 'welfare triangles' was already 
used two decades ago. The various studies relying on the conventional 
hypothesis in the theory of international trade like the absence of both 
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition have all arrived at 
estimates holding out the prospect of marginal welfare modifications. The 
removal of tariff barriers (non-tariff barriers were never addressed) 
would change Canadian prosperity by at most a few tenths of one percent 
of GDP, essentially owing to the low level of average bilateral tariffs. 
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However, Ronald Wonnacott (1975), aside from the usual static consumption 
and production efficiency benefits, also addressed the effect on the 
terms of trade and the advantage coupled to the larger room for ~conomies 
of scale. As to the first two sources of gains, i.e. specialization 
corresponding to comparative advantages and the improvement of the terms 
of trade, Wonnacott borrowed estimates from a study by Williams (but only 
published in 1978) which suggest that through these two channels ~anadian 
GDP would go up by 2.3%. Because the Williams' findings were predicated 
on a constant returns to scale production function, Wonnacott argued that 
the beneficial economies of scale effect ought to be added. By 
attributing the difference in US-Canada productivity levels in the 
manufacturing sector (which stood at 27% in 1973) exclusively to the 
difference in scope for scale economies on account of the existing trade 
barriers, Wonnacott stated that Canada would raise its welfare by an 
additional 5.9% (as manufacturing generated some 22% of Canadian GDP). 
The reciprocal removal in 197 5 of trade obstacles with the US was thus 
predicted to bring a total long term bonus to Canada or some 8% of GDP. 
This paper is not suited to enter an in-depth discussion of the common 
characteristics of general equilibrium models (GENs) set up to address 
international trade questions (see, e.g. Shaven & Whalley, 1Y84). For a 
good understanding of the various results reported below, it is useful to 
recall that in a GEM the various product and factor markets represented 
are in continuous equilibrium by way of changes in relative prices. As 
all markets clear, GEMs assume away unemployment and adjustment costs. 
They therefore can be said to take a long term view, the more so as they 
do not incorporate the financial sector of the economy (money is so to 
speak 'hyperneutral' in the macroeconomic sense). 
Table 5, drawing on the survey conducted by Lester ( 1987), gives an 
overview of the empirical evidence produced by GEMs on the effects of a 
bilateral removal of barriers. A glance of this table teaches that the 
estimated effects vary strongly, from a marginal loss to a gain of almost 
9% of GDP (plus a real wage increase in manufacturing industries of 28%). 
What explains these strinkingly divergent outcomes? On a general level 
they can be said to result from differences in: 
i) the structure of the model as concerns, for example, the degree of 
sectoral disaggregation, the inclusion of economies of scale and 
TABLEJr: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A BILATERAL LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE ESTIMATES 
OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
Percentage change in Weighted average of trade 
barriers on goods lase Year "IlL""' ...... Econ. of Trade 
Welfare TOT 
·f Scale Diversion 
(GOP) Canada/US US/Canada .uct••s 
Wi 11iams (1978) 2.6 exogenous 14.0 9.1 1961 63 No No 
Harris Cox ( 1984) 8.9 n.a. 9.7 17.8 1976 29 Yes Yes 
Kami lton & 
Whalley (1985) a) 0.6 1.8 4.9 6.7 1977 6 No Yes 
b) 0.7 0.7 23.3 20.2 1977 6 No Yes 
Wigle (1986) a) -0.1 -2.6 8.1 2.6 1977 6 Yes Yes 
b) 0.7 n.a. 21.7 13. 1 1977 6 Yes Yes 
Co111111ents 
Linear programming 
model. Product ion and 
consumption function 
1-' 
are of Leontief type 0 
""' 
This model comprises 
three regions 
(Canada, us, ROW) 
(Inclusion of NTBs) 
Eight endogenous 
regions; expl1c1t 
tariff barriers only. 
Both tariffs and NTBs 
Kami l ton & Whalley 
model but with 
economies of scale 
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imperfect competition, and the associated pricing behaviour of 
enterprises, the extent of the mobility of production factors, and 
so forth; 
ii) the structure of key parameters in behavioural functions in the 
model, like for instance export and import demand elasticities or 
the elasticities of substitution between producer inputs and between 
consumer goods; 
iii) the assessment of the size and kind of the barriers, which, among 
other things is dependent on the selection of the model's base year. 
As Williams (1978) has a remote base year which is not comparable with 
that of the other three studies and its linear programming nature make it 
lie outside the mainstream of general equilibrium analysis, it will not 
be discussed. 
The most interesting contributions for our purpose are Harris and Cox, 
Hamilton and Whalley (b) and Wigle (b) as they are calibrated on 
virtually the same base year and all three have made an attempt to 
comprise both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
The fact that Wigle, who has modified the Hamilton and Whally model by 
inserting economies of scale, arrives at a GDP effect of only 0,7%, 
demonstrates that the introduction of scale economies in a GEM is not 
sufficient to obtain large welfare effects from bilateral trade 
liberalization. It turns out that it is the combination of two 
assumptions, namely increasing returns to scale and collusive pricing 
behaviour on the part of Canadian industry protected against American 
imports, that lies at the heart of Harris and Cox's relative large 
welfare gain estimate. 
Even so, a review of the Harris and Cox model by positing constant 
returns to scale across all industries yield a GDP growth result of 2,4%, 
still more than three times the Hamilton and Whalley prediction. This 
discrepancy can be ascribed to essentially three factors: first, Harris 
and Cox (wrongly) assume that US bilateral impediments to trade are more 
important than their Canadian counterpart; second, their import and 
export price elasticities are about three times the size of those used in 
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the Hamilton and Whalley exercise. These two hypotheses make for an 
improvement of the terms of trade following the removal of trade 
barriers. Third, their model is much more disaggregat~d: the economy is 
composed of 29 sectors, as against 6 in the other studies. The finer the 
degree of sectoral detail, the more capable is the model of tracking the 
reallocation of resources towards greater specialization along 
comparative advantage lines. 
Evidently, these three factors must also be drawn upon to explain the 
difference between the Harris and Cox and Wigle results. But the prime 
explanation here is linked to the assumption regarding the pricing 
behaviour of firms active in industries characterized by imperfect 
competition. Harris and Cox postulate that in some of the twenty 
manufacturing sectors exhibiting increasing returns to scale, firms set 
their prices monopolistically with each of them perceiving a constant 
elasticity of demand and charging the proiit maximizing price (the 
so-called Negishi assumption). In other sectors firms are supposed to 
collude tacitly, setting the Canadian price at the world price plus the 
tariff (the so-called Eastman-Stykolt hypothesis). The absence of price 
competition in sectors shielded by the tariff gives r~se to 
X-inefficiency showing up in too many plants and firms and too wide a 
product variety. Upon the liberalization of trade the domestic industries 
characterized by pricing collusion will be forced to restructure allowing 
Canada to reap rationalization gains through a better exploitation of the 
economies of scale potential. The higher the ex ante tariffs and the 
larger the import price elasticity, the greater the economies of scale 
potential that will actually be realized. 
In contrast, under monopolistic competition and a given technology, 
productive inefficiency is absent. The lowering of domestic tariffs will 
depress demand for domestic goods. With falling production, the scale of 
output and hence average productivity diminish as well, which would tend 
to reduce economic welfare. 
The inclusion of the Eastman-Stykolt hypothesis is of key importance to 
the Harris and Cox result. This is readily appreciated when varying the 
relative weights apportioned to the two pricing strategies. If instead of 
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50% - as assumed in their reported exercise - 80% of firms in imperfectly 
competitive sectors are supposed to collude in terms of prices prior to 
the liberalization of trade, the positive GOP effect from a NAFTA soars 
from 8,9% to more than 16%. Conversely, a reduction of the importance of 
the collusive pricing conduct to 20% of firms dwarfs the welfare gain to 
4,3% of GOP. In contrast to Harris & Cox (1984) only one out of the six 
sectors modelled in Wigle's study displays collusive pricing. The choice 
of Wigle's parameters is such that he limits the post tariff 
rationalization effects ceteris paribus to 40% of what would be obtained 
in the Harris model (Lester, 1987, p. 21). 
In sum, Harris and Cox's rosy prediction on Canada's gains from the 
establishment of a NAFTA hinges on Canada's import competing industry's 
ability to eliminate productive inefficiency as tariffs vanish. This 
ability is supposed to be positively contingent on the presence of 
pre-NAFTA price collusive practices. 
The third approach consists in sectoral macroeconometric models (SMMs), 
usually based upon neo-Keynesian traditions. SMMs, as distinct from 
general equilibrium models, can be utilized to study both the short run 
and long run effects of trade liberalization. Short terms consequences 
include labour dislocation and unemployment costs. SMMs model explicitly 
the linkages between the financial and real sector of the economy. 
Whilst in GEMs the welfare effect from a NAFTA derives primarily if not 
exclusively from a reallocation of production factors following a change 
in relative prices, SMMs are typically driven to a large extent by 
developments along the aggregate demand side. For instance, one of the 
typical channels through which the benificial upshot from trade 
liberalization makes itself felt in a SMM is by lowering the general 
price level compared to what it would be otherwise. This cut in prices 
triggers a real income and wealth effect and depressed interest rates. 
Hence, freeing trade provides an indirect impetus to domestic demand. 
This emphasis on demand factors renders SMMs proper instruments to shed 
light on the shorter term consequences of a NAFTA. Compared to GEMs, they 
are less well-suited for long term purposes as, they are silent about how 
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at remote time horizons demand can be accommodated by a supply function 
that is subject to constraints. 
Given their emphasis on aggregate demand developments, SMM's lack 
carefully specified production functions. All of the models employed to 
probe consequences of a NAFTA display constant returns to scale and are, 
therefore, incapable of accounting for the productivity increases 
springing from scale economies and industry rationalization processes. 
This inability to generate such increases endegenously is often sought to 
be remedied by inserting productivity improvements into the model in an 
exogenous fashion. 
Table 6 surveys employment and output forecasts produced recently by two 
SMMs', the TIM-model of INFO&~TRICA and the CANDIDE 3.0 model of the 
Economic Council of Canada. 
The TIM-model consists of 19 sectors and it generates the evolution of 
the terms of trade with the US by itself. (Non tariff barriers in the US 
are measured to exceed those still in place in Canada). Fiscal policy 
following the removal of tariffs is supposed to be neutral, i.e. the 
revenue loss is compensated by tax increases in other domains. Under 
constant returns to scale, the bilateral elimination of trade obstacles 
boosts GNP by 1,3% after five years, with no further expansion effects 
later on. Employment rises by 0,6% after 5 years to edge up to 1% after a 
decade. When productivity in the manufacturing sector is posited to grow 
by 5% over a ten-year period, the predicted welfare effect becomes larger 
(nearing 2% after ten years) but the expansion of employment is - not 
surprisingly - less pronounced. 
Economists at the Economic Council of Canada, have run a macroeconometric 
simulation on the CANDIDE model in 1986, which was refined in the course 
of 1987. The analysis will center on their most recent research. 
CANDIDE 3,0 is a large disaggregated annual macroeconomic model of the 
Canadian economy, with parameters based on 1954-81 data. It is composed 
of 44 detailed sectoral models, interfaced with a neo-Keynesian 
macroeconomic model. The latter rests on the standard IS-LM framework, 
TABLE ' 
Models let year 
E•plt. 
INFOR.'IATICA (TIM) (1985) 
(tariff barriers) A) -0,0 
(tariff barriers+NTBs) B) 0,0 
( B + exogenous producti-
vity increase) C) 0,0 
Economic Council of Canada (Candide 
tariffs + NTBs. Exogenous 
increase of manufacturing 
industry productivity 
across the board by 5% -0,1 
GNP 
-0,0 
0,1 
0,1 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A BILATERAL LIBERALISATION OF TRADE 
SECTORAL MACROECONOMETRIC MODELS 
5th year lOth year Weighted average of Period of 
Emplt. GNP Emplt. GNP barriers on goods trade analysis 
Canada us 
0,1 0,3 0,3 0,5 3,6 3,6 1988-2005 
0,6 1,3 1,0 1,2 6,5 8, 1 1988-2005 
0,5 1, 6 0,8 1,9 6,5 8, 1 1988-2005 
3.0) ( 1986) 
0,0 0,1 1,9 2,4 3,3 6,5 8,1 1987-1995 
Economic Counci 1 of Canada (Candide 3.0) (1987) (employment figures in 
1000) 
recalculated tariffs 
and NTBs A) 38 1,0 144 1,6 89 1,6 4,8 4,1 1987-1995 
A) + sector specific pro-
duet i vity increase amounting 
to 6. 1% for the whole of 
industry B) 12 1, 1 187 2,8 350 3,3 4,8 4,1 1987-1995 
No of Terms of 
sectors t r.1de 
19 endogenous 
19 endogenous 
...... 19 endogenous 0 
\0 
44 exogenous 
44 exogenous 
44 exogenous 
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with refinements to feature newer generally received insights like public 
sector finance constraints, private sector expectations and public sector 
reaction functions, and labour market constraints. 
Two different methods (based on price and on volume comparisons) were 
used to calculate the tariff equivalent of trade restrictions associated 
with countervailing and anti-dumping duties, safeguard actions, voluntary 
export restraints, standards and import licensing. The effects of 
removing federal discriminatory public procurement regulations on net 
exports of each of the 44 industrial sectors were computed on the 
hypothesis that following the liberalization of trade, the import 
propensity with respect to public purchases will be as large as that for 
private domestic demand. Given this assumption, bilateral trade would 
intensify strongly in sectors like transport equipment, non-household 
electrical appliances, and scientific instruments. Industrial and 
agricultural subsidies handed out by both federal governments were not 
incorporated in the free trade simulations. Non-tariff barriers impinging 
on tradeable services were not addressed either. 
A survey of econometric estimates of industry economies of scale in 
Canada reveals that for most sectors the scope for trimming total average 
costs by stepping up output is rather small. The scale parameter 
estimates varying from sector to sector in a narrow range of 1,0 
(constant returns) to 1,10, it is found that on (weighted) average a 
doubling of industrial output will raise total factor productivity by a 
mere 6%. 
However, the observation that 70% of Canadian plants claim only 20% of 
industrial production lends support to the view that there is ample room 
for efficiency gains from restructuring. Estimates put forward by Lester 
and Robidoux (1986) suggest that if all plants of suboptimal size were to 
operate at minimum efficient scale (MES) level, total average costs, 
inclusive of intermediate inputs, could fall by almost 4% in the 
manufacturing sector. When converting these potential cost savings 
(expressed on a gross output basis), into value added by multiplying them 
by the industry-specific ratio of value added to gross output, ensuring 
all plants to work at MES level would push up total factor productivity 
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in industry by 12% on average! The Economic ~ouncil of ~anada economists 
thus assume that half of these potential productivity improvements would 
be taken advantage of following the conclusion of a NAFTA. This explains 
the selection of the exogenously imposed productivity figures, amounting 
to 6,1% for industry in its entirely, employed in the simulation reported 
at the bottom of Table 6. 
The chief economic mechanisms at work in the CANDIDE 3,0 model in the 
wake of the bilateral elimination of obstacles to North American trade 
are as follows. First, as Canadian goods become cheaper for American 
consumers, export demand will mount, resulting in more output and jobs. 
The obverse happens on the import side where Canadian production is 
displaced by a rise in imports from the US. However, to the extent that 
firms used to operate inefficiently, tougher import competition may 
provoke the emergence of rationalization process. Even in the absence of 
this industrial restructuring effect, lower import prices exert three 
beneficial influences. Less costly imported inputs buttress Canada's 
competitive position relative to third countries. On the one hand, the 
lowering of the general price level will cause a beneficial real income 
and wealth effect, propping up aggregate demand. In as much as the fall 
in priced reduces wage claims, a virtuous circle originates whereby the 
removal of trade barriers may subdue the inflation rate for an extended 
period. Finally, the demand induced expansion of output, will spur 
investment, the more so as the price of investment goods, which are to a 
large degree obtained from the US, will decline by more than the average 
price level. Therefore, it is primarily modifications in the components 
of macroeconomic demand rather than the reallocation of production 
factors towards greater efficiency that are at the root of the reported 
global welfare and employment effects. 
Assuming industrial productivity to go up by on average 6.1% (over five 
years), the Candide 3.0 model predicts Canadian GNP to have expanded by 
2,8% five years after the creation of a NAFTA. After ten years GNP is 
forecast to have risen by 3.3%. Strikingly, and except for the very short 
run, employment is to benefit more from an elimination of bilateral trade 
obstacles if in the aftermath productivity increases. 
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8.3 Adjustment costs estimates 
As factors of production become unemployed due to trade liberalization, 
social - as well as private - costs are incurred. These social costs 
amount to the volume of output lost during the reallocation process of 
the redundant labour and capital. This loss has to be set against the 
productive efficiency and consumer welfare benefits brought about by free 
trade in order to obtain an accurate picture of the net gains from a 
NAFTA. 
In the case of general equilibrium models, the problem of possible 
redundancies is ignored because all markets are held to clear 
continuously following changes in sectoral supply and demand signalled by 
relative price movements. Estimates on the size of factor relocation due 
to a NAFTA can, however, be inferred from such models. According to the 
Harris and Cox findings, nearly 7% of the manufacturing labour force will 
need to shift sectors under bilateral free trade with the US. Concomitant 
with the industrial rationalization process, where the brunt of welfare 
gains turns out to spring from, a lot of intra-industry factor 
reallocation will have to take place, although no figure or range was put 
forward to this effect. 
Macro models lend themselves much better to an analysis of production 
factor dislocations and net demand effects, at least as far as labour is 
concerned (2). By linking the aggregate results from CANDIDE 3.0 to the 
Statistics Canada Input-Output Model, the 1987 study of the Economic 
Council of Canada has estimated the effects of L:anada-US free trade on 
employment after ten years. 
Three-quarters of all sectors, manufacturing and 
enjoy an expansion of employment, with large 
industries and construction. Big gains would be 
services alike, will 
increases in primary 
registered for the 
services sector - retail and wholesale trade and commercial and personal 
services which alone would claim two-thirds of all new jobs. It 
underscores once more the importance for the Canadian economy this 
sectoral macroeconometric model attaches to expansionary indirect demand 
effects ensuing from free trade. Only five industrial sectors - rubber 
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and plastics, leather, textiles, knitwear, electrical appliances, all 
being highly protected at present - would be forced to shed labour. But 
this loss in employment would not total more than between 7. 000 and 
15.000 jobs, with attendant retraining and relocation costs in principle 
light to bear as none of these problem sectors is concentrated in a 
traditionally disinherited area. Unless they conceal a great deal of 
mutually offsetting gross intersectoral labour shifts, these small 
figures contrast sharply with the 7% estimate from the Harris and Cox 
exercise. 
The Economic Council of Canada simulation predicts, furthermore, that the 
growth of output and the 200.000 to 350.000 new jobs ensuing from trade 
with the US are spread fairly evenly over the provinces. There would be 
no salient winner& or losers, with the two dominant provinces, Ontario 
and Quebec, where more than two-thirds of Canadian manufacturing is 
based, registering smallest gains ranging from 1,3% to 2,5% more 
employment. British Columbia and Alberta would outperform the country as 
a whole but so would the poorer Atlantic provinces like Newfoundland or 
New Brunswick. Cast in EC jargon, the implementation of a bilateral free 
trade agreement with the US would serve to heighten economic 1 cohesion 1 
in Canada along an upward growth path for the federation in its entirety. 
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NOTES: 
(1) Markusen (1985). Markusen states that trade liberalization in 
circumstances of increasing retruns to scale and imperfect 
competition will engender a rise in domestic welfare if it sets the 
stage for either an expansion or the outright elimination of 
domestic production. For this production rationalization process to 
emerge it is sufficient that the following four conditions apply: 
a) the country is too small to exhaust economies of scale by 
selling only in the domestic market; 
b) the difference in technology employed by the two trading 
partners is not such that domestic firms have higher marginal 
costs than their foreign counterparts. If it were, domestic 
enterprises may be prompted to reduce output in response to 
trade; 
c) product differentiation is primarily horizontal, i.e., the 
various products on offer, belonging to one and the same product 
group, exhibit basically the same quality. If products are 
differentiated in this fashion, the producers in each country 
will face, subsequent to the liberalization of trade, a 
potential demand that is larger than would be the case with 
perfectly homogeneous products; 
d) the domestic market, in spite of being imperfect (e.g. due to 
the fact that the market supports but a few suppliers, or the 
fact that goods are not perfectly homogeneous) is characterized 
by free entry and exit. This condition rules out lasting profits 
(i.e. price will tend to equal average costs) and ensures that a 
firm will not react to trade by producing in a less efficient 
way: such a firm would after a while be driven out of the 
market. If potential new entrants do not find themselves in a 
structurally unfavourable position, the freeing of trade will 
imply that existing firms will obtain access to larger markets 
but also farce stiffer competition. 
(2) To our knowledge there are very few studies that have produced 
estimates of output foregone due to excess physical capacity struck 
in industries following a change in the foreign trade regime. 
Baldwin, Mutti and Richardson ( 1980), studying the effects on the 
1971 US economy of a multilateral halving of trariffs, suggest that 
welfare gains exceed aggregate factor adjustment costs by a ratio of 
25 to 1. 
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Tariffs by Industrial Sector, post-Tokyo Round: 1987 
(ad valorem) 
Industry Canada United States 
Textiles 16,9 7,2 
Clothing . 23,7 18,4 
Leather Products 4,0 2,5 
Footwear 21,5 9,0 
Wood Products 2,5 0,2 
Furniture and Fixtures 14,3 4,6 
Paper Products 6,6 0,0 
Rubber Products 7,3 3,2 
Non-metal Mineral Products 4,4 0,3 
Glass Products 6,9 'j,7 
Iron and Steel 5,1 2,7 
Non-ferrous Metals 3,3 0,5 
Metal Products 8,6 4,0 
Non-electrical Machinery 4,6 2,2 
Electrical Machinery 7,5 4,5 
Transportation Equipment 0,0 0,0 
Miscellaneous Manufactures 5,0 0,9 
Note: Canadian tariff averages are weighted by imports from the United 
States and vice versa. 
Source: The United States Trade Representative. 
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